Whew! The last few days have seen feverish developments on the possibility of the United States using nuclear airstikes to knockout potential Iranian nuclear facilities. The casual reader might be convinced we're on the verge of world war III and that summer trips to the coast should be shelved and the money instead spent on basement survival kits. Call me a pollyanna if you will but I'm not going to throw my chips on this bet just yet.
Seymour Hersh caused a stir with his recent New Yorker article, The Iran plans. Picked-up my all the major blogs and then the Washington post yesterday, its publication is certain to reverberate in the week ahead providing fodder for much deliberation and plenty of heated debate.
Mr. Hersh deserves every bit of respect that can be accorded a journalist, and his article provides great insight into the present-day conventional wisdom on Iran in defense and intelligence circles. That said, I think some points (not necessarily of his making) deserve extra scrutiny before meriting accord.
Let's dissect:
One military planner told me that White House criticisms of Iran and the high tempo of planning and clandestine activities amount to a campaign of "coercion" aimed at Iran. "You have to be ready to go, and we'll see how they respond," the officer said. "You have to really show a threat in order to get Ahmadinejad to back down."
As I've written in comments a number of times in other recent nuke-related diaries, a very interesting theory was put forth by retired CIA officer, Graham Fuller, in the latest issue of
Forward:
"the proliferation of all these articles on war plans, attack strategies, U.S. generals visiting Turkey to talk of military 'preparations,' etc., increasingly shows the fine hand of U.S. (maybe U.K. too) disinformation and psychological warfare against Iran using a variety of newspapers to plant stories of rising threats, time running out, and the urgency of the need to use force to stop Iran. Indeed this campaign may now be intensified, perhaps out of frustration that the 'real thing' is not, in fact, on the table any more."
Of all the rampant speculating over what to make of this purported nuclear talk, I think Fuller's makes a lot of sense and it meshes well with the administration's desire to always show a position of strength bordering on aggression. I know that many readers of this diary will be quick to remind us of the eerily similar comments that were being made about Iraq in late 2002. But mind those who make that argument, in 2002, America was still whipped-up in a post-9/11 frenzy and Bush was polling in the high 60's with looming mid-term elections. There was little chance debate was going to be objective nor any investigation of presented intel thorough. So my point here is that, UNLIKE 2002, Bush has every reason to face Herculean obstacles in front of any authorization for nuclear airstrikes, be it from congress or joint chiefs of staff.
Weighing decisive action:
But those who are familiar with the Soviet bunker, according to the former senior intelligence official, "say `No way.' You've got to know what's underneath--to know which ventilator feeds people, or diesel generators, or which are false. And there's a lot that we don't know." The lack of reliable intelligence leaves military planners, given the goal of totally destroying the sites, little choice but to consider the use of tactical nuclear weapons. "Every other option, in the view of the nuclear weaponeers, would leave a gap," the former senior intelligence official said. " `Decisive' is the key word of the Air Force's planning. It's a tough decision. But we made it in Japan."
He went on, "Nuclear planners go through extensive training and learn the technical details of damage and fallout--we're talking about mushroom clouds, radiation, mass casualties, and contamination over years. This is not an underground nuclear test, where all you see is the earth raised a little bit. These politicians don't have a clue, and whenever anybody tries to get it out"--remove the nuclear option--"they're shouted down."
The attention given to the nuclear option has created serious misgivings inside the offices of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, he added, and some officers have talked about resigning. Late this winter, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sought to remove the nuclear option from the evolving war plans for Iran--without success, the former intelligence official said. "The White House said, `Why are you challenging this? The option came from you.' "
War-planners believe that, unlike attacking Iraq, attacking Iran would have to be 'decisive' recognizing that (1) the very real threat of major retaliation against US assets in and around Iraq and against Israel and (2) the US needs to be certain of completely destroying Iran's underground nuclear facilities.
This point I don't debate. But I think it warrants highlighting because it demonstrates a concerted understanding of the risks inherent in ANY airstrike against Iran. In other words, there is a likelihood that the Bush administration has pushed for an 'optimal' war-game scenario, the scenario that would render Iran incapable of retaliation, a scenario that necessitates the use of nuclear weapons. Thus conventional scenarios are simply off the table because of the impracticality of airstrikes that leave a good part of the defense structure in place. If the perceived success in this 'campaign' (as observed by the Bush administration) hinges on the use of nuclear weapons, than the liklihood of ANY unilateral surgical airstrike seems remote as it would almost certainly lead to a blowback that would grow very big very quickly.
Rumsfeldian pontification on the 'new' US nuclear arsenal:
The adviser added, however, that the idea of using tactical nuclear weapons in such situations has gained support from the Defense Science Board, an advisory panel whose members are selected by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld. "They're telling the Pentagon that we can build the B61 with more blast and less radiation," he said.
The B61 is a versatile gravity bomb originally developed in the late 60's whose yield can be adjusted within a range of 10 to about 340 kilotons (Hiroshima was 15 kt).
The use of a low yield nuclear weapon to destroy potential WMD sites was initially explored in the 1990's when Libya was thought to be developing chemical weapons:
The reason for the November 1995 schedule change became clear the following April, when a series of Pentagon spokespersons, including Dr. Smith, used the imminent deployment of the B61-11 to threaten Libya. At a breakfast meeting with reporters on April 23, 1996, Dr. Smith outlined U.S. conventional and nuclear capability for destroying a suspected Libyan chemical weapons factory, under construction underground at Tarhunah, 40 miles southeast of Tripoli.
Dr. Smith explained that, at present, the United States has no conventional weapon capable of destroying the plant from the air, and such a weapon could not be ready in less than two years. Smith went on to tell reporters that an earth-penetrating B61 nuclear bomb, in development, could take out the plant. The new bomb would be ready for possible use by the end of this year, Smith said, before the expected completion date of the factory.
Since 1978, the United States has assured the world that it would never use nuclear weapons against nonnuclear countries who signed the NPT, unless a country were allied in aggression with a nuclear weapon state. On April 5, 1995, President Clinton reaffirmed this policy, which has been a cornerstone of U.S. nonproliferation efforts, and an important part of the offer the U.S. made to skittish nonnuclear states to induce them to vote for the indefinite renewal of the NPT.
On April 11, just 12 days before Dr. Smith's announcement, and after an interagency struggle that pitted the Pentagon against the State Department, the United States signed the African Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaty in Cairo. In this treaty the U.S. pledged not to use or threaten to use a nuclear weapon in Africa against any of the nearly 50 signatory states, including Libya.
U.S. negative assurance pledges (pledges of "no first use" except under the circumstances mentioned) were thus clearly devalued by the Pentagon's threat, which marked a shift in explicit U.S. nuclear policy. That shift was to openly include the possibility of preemptive strikes against weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capabilities, in addition to the possibility of a nuclear response to WMD use. Such a posture, if allowed to stand, would have been unprecedented in nuclear history.
The announcement by Dr. Smith, which had been joined by statements from Secretary of Defense William Perry and others, sent shock waves through diplomatic circles. A retraction was given by Defense Department spokesman Kenneth Bacon at a press conference on May 7, 1996.
So clearly we've seen the use of unconventional tactics against supposed WMD proliferators advanced in the past and its not unlikely to expect the current administration to be seeking the same. But the idea that these weapons can be modified to limit the extent of radiation while maximizing destruction seems a farce:
The Pentagon claims that the use of the B61-11 minimizes the risks of "collateral damage". According to US. military planners, "potential adversaries" are hiding their WMDs in "fortified bunkers" below more than 100 feet of concrete. Yet test results indicate that the low yield B61-11 has never penetrated more than 20 feet below the ground (See also The Independent. 23 October 2003) :
"The earth-penetrating capability of the B61-11 is fairly limited. ... Tests show it penetrates only 20 feet or so into dry earth when dropped from an altitude of 40,000 feet. ... Any attempt to use it in an urban environment would result in massive civilian casualties. Even at the low end of its 0.3-300 kiloton yield range, the nuclear blast will simply blow out a huge crater of radioactive material, creating a lethal gamma-radiation field over a large area " (Low-Yield Earth-Penetrating Nuclear Weapons by Robert W. Nelson,Federation of American Scientists, 2001 ).
Nuclear Holocaust
According to GlobalSecurity.org , the use of the B61-11 against North Korea would result in extensive radioactive fallout over nearby countries, thereby triggering a nuclear holocaust.
"... In tests the bomb penetrates only 20 feet into dry earth,... But even this shallow penetration before detonation allows a much higher proportion of the explosion to be transferred into ground shock relative to a surface burst. It is not able to counter targets deeply buried under granite rock. Moreover, it has a high yield, in the hundreds of kilotons. If used in North Korea, the radioactive fallout could drift over nearby countries such as Japan" (http://www.globalsecurity.org/... )
If it were to be launched against Iran, it would result in radioactive contamination over a large part of the Middle East - Central Asian region, resulting in tens of thousands of deaths, including US troops stationed in Iraq:
"The use of any nuclear weapon capable of destroying a buried target that is otherwise immune to conventional attack will necessarily produce enormous numbers of civilian casualties. No earth-burrowing missile can penetrate deep enough into the earth to contain an explosion with a nuclear yield [of a low yield B61-11] even as small as 1 percent of the 15 kiloton Hiroshima weapon. The explosion simply blows out a massive crater of radioactive dirt, which rains down on the local region with an especially intense and deadly fallout."(Low-Yield Earth-Penetrating Nuclear Weapons, by Robert W. Nelson, op cit )
At present, the B61-11 is slated for use in war theaters together with conventional weapons. (Congressional Report" Bunker Busters": Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator Issues , Congressional Research Service March 2005). Other versions of the B61, namely mod 3, 4 and 7, which are part of the US arsenal, involve nuclear bunker buster bombs with a lower yield to that of B61-11).
(Bold text my emphasis)
Let me repeat, the use of nuclear bunker-buster could potentially expose our OWN TROOPS to radiation as a result of our using even low-yield nuclear-tipped weapons. In my mind, that would appear to be a deal-killer for our generals on the ground and I have to think it is one of the reasons we can expect continued revolt - even resignations - if the nuclear option is not taken off the table.
So what to make of a nuclear airstrike against Iran? Well, this final passage from Hersh's article really sums up the lunacy that prevails in the neocon-driven arms of the Bush war machine:
With or without the nuclear option, the list of targets may inevitably expand. One recently retired high-level Bush Administration official, who is also an expert on war planning, told me that he would have vigorously argued against an air attack on Iran, because "Iran is a much tougher target" than Iraq. But, he added, "If you're going to do any bombing to stop the nukes, you might as well improve your lie across the board. Maybe hit some training camps, and clear up a lot of other problems."
The Pentagon adviser said that, in the event of an attack, the Air Force intended to strike many hundreds of targets in Iran but that "*ninety-nine per cent of them have nothing to do with proliferation. There are people who believe it's the way to operate
"--that the Administration can achieve its policy goals in Iran with a bombing campaign, an idea that has been supported by neoconservatives.
(Bold text added for emphasis)
The canard that is being propagated by this administration is that these targeted bombing campaigns will somehow act as a catalyst to foment internal revolution and the eventual overthrow of the Iranian regime. This of course runs counter to the above plan of attacking targets not related to proliferation. The simple result, whether or not conventional or unconventional weaponry is utilized, is akin to stirring up a regional hornets' nest that destabilizes a region to such a degree that its hard not to predict a conflagration of historical proportions.
As maniacal as this administration has acted in the past, I sense there are too many other levers that need to be pulled this time around. I recognize that they have given us every reason to believe that they are capable of pulling-off something so insanely NUTS but my sentiment is that the cards are much different this time around and what we are seeing is a campaign of intimidation driven by the recognition that the current Iraq scenario presents enormous complications for Iran airstikes. I think what we are witnessing are the administrations' insecurities manifested in chest-thumping and disinformation.