In this final installment, possible remedies for rebuilding our military are proposed. First and foremost is an acceptance of reality: that alliances are a necessary part of effective military action; and secondly, that the War in Iraq is not the whole war on terrorism; it is actually only one battle and a poorly elected one at that.
The neoconservative argument for preemption, as articulated by David Frum, is to view the war on terrorism as being analogous to the American Civil War. He associates those who view the war in Iraq as elective and thus, a needless diversion of soldiers and resources from the continuing war on Al Qaeda to be the modern day equivalent of the overly-cautious approach of General George McClellan. In contrast, Frum identifies "a big victory approach," now embraced by the Bush administration as the most effective way to fight terrorism--just as the big victory group during the Civil War, which he believes was led by General Ulysses S. Grant, was the most effective way to defeat the Confederacy.
Just as McClellan wanted the Union as it was--slavery intact, instead of a new Union--with Blacks as full citizens, Frum believes that the Bob Grahams and Wesley Clarks of the world see the Middle East in the same light--a conclusion for which he offers no proof. Frum fails to understand that while there are differences in strategies, the goals are similar. He also erroneously equates fighting a step by step war against terrorism as inadequate, much as McClellan's timid advances into Virginia in 1862. In similar fashion, he sees Bush as a latter-day Grant, a leader bold enough to do the required fighting necessary to bring the enemy to its knees. For many reasons, however, Frum's analogy is just plain wrong.
In this incongruent analogy, Frum makes a leap of faith that we will transform Iraq and possibly Iran from being enemies to being reliable allies who will, in turn, help democratize the remainder of the Middle East. He assumes that a new Iraqi government will automatically become a pro-Western player in his Middle Eastern equation. What if the Iraqi military we are now creating were to be someday be used against Israel?
David Frum's first false premise is that he looks at the preemption doctrine through the eyes of a neoconservative North American instead of through the eyes of a Marsh Shi'ia or a northern Kurd or a Sunni from Fallujah. Their actual responses may range from, "Thank you--now go home," to "Thank you for getting rid of Saddam: it makes it easier for us to put an Ayatollah in power," to just plain old "Go home!" These are all the cultural nuances David Frum's Civil War analogy fails to consider. It is folly to assume that the various peoples stepped in the various ancient religious traditions of Mesopotamia will adopt Jeffersonian principals overnight.
But there is yet another Civil War analogy which may be more accurate.
During the early part of the war, a Union Naval ship intercepted a British vessel carrying Confederate emissaries to Europe. Only after the Confederates were arrested and transferred to the US Naval vessel was Her majesty's ship allowed to resume its voyage.
Angered by such action, Great Britain threatened military retaliation. As part of their response, ten thousand soldiers were immediately dispatched to Canada for possible hostilities.
Lincoln, who already had problems keeping enough Union soldiers in the field against the Confederacy, could ill afford to simultaneously take on the British Empire. Lincoln quietly let the Confederate emissaries go.
"One war at a time," Lincoln remarked.
The United States military, although the most efficient and powerful in today's world still has its limitations. And currently, it is stretched to the breaking point. As we have examined earlier in previous chapters, continuous deployments in the Balkans, Afghanistan and Iraq have left the Army with a manpower shortage. Soldiers, exhausted by extended and often hostile deployments are opting out of the service. Reservists and National Guardsmen who are feeling the financial pinch are being asked to be police officers in a war zone--without the required training. Then there is always the danger of a reorganized Taliban, an unbent Al Qaeda or a nuclear North Korea engaging in some form of aggressive hostility. Frum's analogy simply ignores Lincoln's sage warning.
And it was Lincoln, not Grant, who was the leader of "the big victory group" during the American Civil War.
Frum, and his neoconservative colleagues also fall prey to another fallacy: that all the various terror threats are actually monolithic in nature. But just as Communist China and the Soviet Union had distinct agendas, so too do today's terror organizations.
Without evidence--and often to the contrary of existing evidence--David Frum and his fellow "philosopher-kings" simply merge the various state-sponsored terror threats, both past and present, into a single terror threat. A secular Saddam Hussein was not the same as a religiously fanatical al-Qaeda. Even as Colin Powell admitted on January 9, 2004, there is still no proof that Iraq was involved in planning the events of September 11th, 2001; nor have weapons of mass destruction been found; and nor has been any proof of an imminent threat been proven. It turns out that Saddam may have been nothing more than a Middle Eastern Fidel Castro, a nuisance, but not an imminent threat.
Unlike al-Qaeda, which is a network terrorist organization--supported by wealthy individuals as opposed to being supported by sovereign states, the overall war on state sponsored terrorism has taken a different path. Nations such as Sudan and Libya have successfully used their oil reserves to make peace with the United States and Great Britain--concluding a process begun long before the events of September 11th, 2001 (In Libya's case, perhaps the messy episode of Pan Am flight 103 prolonged this effort). It seems that in order to force the Saudi Arabians into action against their terror-stoking madrassas, the Bush administration has decided to deal with nations still oppressing their own peoples in much the same as Saddam Hussein.
In any event, while the Bush administration is only left with being able to boast of ridding the world of a dictator, but not much else. While we are paving the way to begin the purchase of Libyan and Sudanese oil, two facts certainly still exist: Qaddaffi has not closed his own torture chambers and Khartoum's NIF still sells South Sudanese Christians and Animists into Islamic slavery.
But imminent threats still exist. One of the most potentially hostile is North Korea. And clearly, our unilateral action in Iraq has had little deterrent effect upon Kim Jong Il. In the case of Iran, the invasion seems to have quelled internal unhappiness with the Mullahs much as Hitler's invasion of the Soviet Union quieted widespread internal hatred of Stalin.
But one tool President Bush could have used to immediately reduce both resentment on the occupation as well as the stress on our military in Iraq would have been to swallow some pride; his administration could have worked out a deal with the United Nations that would have allowed its international civilian police (CIVPOL) to be responsible for a good deal of the day-to-day law enforcement. Perhaps this could have prevented much of the looting and disorder that began almost immediately after May 1, 2003. Our military is not designed to be a police department, but that is CIVPOL's primary mission.
CIVPOL is a United Nations program which gets its police officers through member nations. The officers are deployed to failed states that are being rebuilt. There are 44,000 law enforcement agents from 45 countries in the United Nations' CIVPOL program. According to the U.S. Department of State, the United States provides 555 American police to UNMIK (United Nations Interim Administration In Kosovo) Police and approximately 14 police trainers to the KPS school managed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE); another 200 officers to UNMIBH (United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina); " 5 other CIVPOL to monitor reentry of police into sensitive villages and 5 police trainers to manage and train at the police academy;" and one police manager, one curriculum development specialist, one police accountability specialist, and two police trainers for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia . They provide law enforcement while training locals to take over their own law- enforcement responsibilities.
If we, as a nation could use this tool effectively in the Balkans, then why haven't we done the same in Iraq? The answer again seems to be that it would have interfered with neo-conservative dogma of projecting unilateral, raw American military power. Straussian philosophy frowns upon any international institution that promotes a less hostile world.
And it is a shame that this administration turned its back on such a valuable resource. Wouldn't it have been better for American interests if those engaged in constructing a new Iraqi police force were Muslims who, besides having law-enforcement training, also would have better understood Iraqi culture? It certainly would have helped deflate the claims of extreme Muslim fundamentalists who say that we are nothing more than modern-day crusaders, bent on destroying Islam. This, in turn, just might have taken away some of the resentment aimed at our troops who are still on the ground in Iraq. Instead, this resentment was allowed to fuel an insurgency that has cost well over 1,200 coalition troops.
Our National Guard units and reservists are also worn out and stretched thin. Their ranks consist of citizens who leave their civilian jobs behind when they are called up. They form almost half the ranks of our nation's military. During the last several years their call-ups have been more numerous than had been expected.
As a recent article in the Virginia-Pilot noted, "For the first time in more than a decade, the Army National Guard and the Army Reserves may fail to achieve recruiting goals, the Defense Department confirmed. The National Guard and Army Reserve were lagging behind recruiting goals by 6,000 and 700, respectively, in recent months. And some National Guard leaders predict that as many as 60 percent of the Guardsmen mobilized today will leave the service at the first opportunity."1
When reservists and Guardsman are called up, it usually means a decrease in their personal incomes. A new reservist who is activated earns about $12,000 annually.2 That means if you are then forced to leave behind a job with an annual salary of $45,000 for extended service in Iraq, that $33,000 pay cut can be devastating. As Burke again points out, "Many reservists are in their 30s, 40s and 50s, leaving behind children, businesses and homes under construction. More than half of all reservists are married, and 37 percent have children. The rigors of fighting wars and keeping peace have been physically punishing -- even lethal." So far more than fifty reservists have given their lives during Operation Iraqi Freedom.
One possible way to alleviate the strain on both the full-time and reserve military is by implementing a limited conscription. This would entail a six-month period of service-- with no college deferments--focusing on basic training and a brief domestic service (overseas service, as well as duty extensions, could be optional, enticed by scholarships or tax exemptions). And in the case of national emergency, a pool of trained soldiers would be ready to complement the standing military, the reserve units and the National Guard.
A limited draft would have other benefits. Military service would promote cross-class contact, further strengthening democratic notions within the military culture. It would be good for a child of privilege to have to come to terms with a drill sergeant who worked his way up from poverty through the military. It also would promote national service and give young people a chance to serve their nation. But most importantly, it would force more citizens to take a greater interest in national politics. It encourages a sense of community.
However, as New York Congressman (and Korean War veteran) Charlie Rangel believes, if more American families knew that a potential war could include their loved one and simply not some stranger's kid, more citizens would be more likely take a greater interest in the affairs of the nation. Beyond that, the issue of our military's standard of living and G.I. benefits surely would be moved up from the back burner.
Perhaps as an extension of conscription, there could be a choice given for service in a beefed-up Peace Corps. This product of JFK's New Frontier should be considered as a compatible tool to supplement our military in accelerating the rebuilding of the infrastructure of failed states. Once again, scholarships and tax exemptions or credits could be used to induce overseas and extended periods of service. Such a reinvigorated service could be used in nation building in Afghanistan, Iraq and other potentially failing states. It could do the job a lot cheaper than a Halliburton, and with a more altruistic spirit.
In one of his last interviews before his assassination, Robert F. Kennedy spoke of how judgment actually may be more important than knowledge. He explained how during the Cuban missile crisis it just wasn't important for JFK to know where the Soviets' cargo ships were, but what to do when they reached a certain location. Do we stop them or do we attack? How far should the ships be allowed to travel before commencing military action? RFK knew that knowledge can go only so far. There is a point at which judgment takes over. A leader can have all the knowledge he desires, but if he does not exercise the correct judgment in applying that knowledge, then it is all for naught.
Clearly, exercising good judgment is not a Bush administration forte, especially in military matters. It jumped into Iraq without securing WMD sites and even failed to secure an atomic waste site known to and formally inspected by the I.A.E.A. It went in with too few troops and not enough supplies. In Afghanistan, when Osama bin-Laden was cornered in the caves of Tora-Bora, the Rumsfeld micro-managed U.S. Army chose not to send our troops in for the kill.
After all the carnage al-Qaeda caused on 9/11, and as dangerous a mission as it would have been, it would have been easy to motivate American soldiers to complete such a task. Instead, unreliable, but easily bought-off warlord militias were used and public enemy number one escaped into Pakistan through mountains along the border. The only logical explanation for not using our troops would be fear of a high American casualty count. Such a failure is even more outrageous when one considers that the responsibility for not succeeding at Tora-Bora must rest with George W. Bush, the same man who scornfully criticized President Clinton's cruise missile attacks on bin-Laden to be "...really a joke" and by saying that "...people viewed that as the impotent America...a flaccid, you know, kind of technologically competent but not very tough country..."2 Judge not, lest yea be judged, indeed!
More importantly, the elitists in the Bush administration do not truly understand the military code of looking out for each other. Its elitism prevents it from truly empathizing with either our soldiers or the citizens it protects. It resorts to social Darwinism when dealing with soldiers, veterans, minorities, or the middle class. Real soldiers, unlike our president, know that whether fighting a battle in the military or in civilian life, it is all about the guy next to you. Neoconservatives may deride such a notion as "nanny government." We choose to see it as a well-deserved benefit for their valiant contribution to the common good of the American community.
And this is where liberalism and the American military ethic truly converge. Whether a citizen becomes a wounded soldier trapped behind enemy lines or an unemployed computer worker whose benefits are about to run out, that citizen cannot be left behind. We must all look out for each other. In and out of the military, we must all stand up on our two feet and contribute to the daily fight. But this does not obviate the fact that whether in battle or on the street, we are still our brother's and sister's keeper. We are all part of an American community that is only as strong as our weakest link. And in the final analysis, that is why the ethos of both the military and true liberalism are compatible. They are both truly about safeguarding American freedom, liberty and prosperity.
This is the essence of FDR's defining statement, "Liberals understood that as new conditions and problems arise beyond the power of men and women to meet as individuals, it becomes the duty of government itself to find new remedies to meet them." Preserving the common good often requires picking up your buddy and carrying him to safety. So it follows, that we never leave any citizen behind, and in doing so, we will create a more responsible country.
In 1961 JFK challenged us to "... ask not what your country can do for you; ask what you can do for your country.'' Liberals must now take this challenge one step further. The members of our military, both past and present, have already unselfishly done extraordinary things for our country; we must now begin to ask what we can do for them.
True liberalism demands this of us. Otherwise, we are just as hypocritical as elitist neoconservatives who believe that it is the duty of others to shoulder the burden of vigilance while enjoying the blessings of liberty. Liberals can and must do better. If not, the non-radical Left will become further marginalized while the members of our armed services will unjustifiably be used more as a tool for unilateral empire rather than its proper purpose of protecting the vital institutions that maintain the common good.
NOTES:
1. Posted on Hackworth.com on September 2, 2003, originally from The Virginia-Pilot,, The Sad Plight Of Our Reservists, By Bill Burke, August 31, 2003.
2. Ibid.
3. Woodward, Bob, Bush At War, page 38