The "shock and awe" strategy in Iraq was supposed to deliver victory by using high-tech weapons, blitzkreig tactics, and less use of manpower. Three years and some later, the initiative appears to have stalled considerably, violating one of the central tenets of warfare--maintaining the initiative.
As worry grows that a similar strategy is about to be employed in Iran, only with nuclear bunker-busters this time, it's worth taking a look at some of the background of this aggressive strategy.
Thus it is recommended to read the book "Computers in Battle, will they work?" edited by David Bellin and Gary Chapman, Harcourt Brace Javonovich, Boston, 1987.
Specifically, there is one chapter by Gary Chapman which explains one of the driving reasons behind the evolution of more aggressive battle doctrine called Air-Land Warfare. I.E., that there is a limited pool of draft-age men, around 18-20. He cites studies that showed by 2000 about half of the male population in the US would be age 40 and above, and that in the prime draft age group, about half of them would either be deferred for physical or other reasons, or going to college. Thus the military could be a prime competitor for males in this age group, under normal force structure standards even in peacetime. Let this sink in as you contemplate the logical extension of current policy in Iraq, and then apply it to even conventional warfare in Iran. Few seem to be raising the point. It's worth looking at in more detail, but it has not yet surfaced in the traditional media.