With the current flareup in the Mideast crisis, it's often forgotten that Palestinians and Israelis almost settled their conflict just a few years ago. If they had, Israel would not now be bombing sites in Lebanon, Lebanese guerrillas would not be firing rockets into northern Israel, and Palestinian political parties would not be attacking, killing, and kidnapping Israeli troops. Nor would we be speculating today about the possibility of a wider war, involving possibly Syria or even Iran.
I have often suspected that an Israeli/Palestinian peace deal in 2000 or 2001 might even have prevented 9/11, which would have prevented the US invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.
It's important, then, to understand why negotiations failed. In a couple of diaries over the past couple of days I'd offered my opinions on what had happened, but I wasn't really satisfied with my own level of understanding of the process. So I did a little research, and on the flip is what I've learned.
The Camp David peace negotiations in July 2000 were a direct outcome of the
1993 Oslo Peace Accords , in which the PLO formally acknowledged Israel's right to exist and Israel accepted the eventual formation of an independent Palestinian state in the occupied territories. Oslo was a major breakthrough, because both sides finally agreed on a two-state solution to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.
Article V of the agreement established that final status negotiations were needed to address the difficult issues, such as Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees, Jewish settlers in the occupied territories, security arrangements, borders, and "other areas of common interest."
The Camp David talks failed spectacularly. No agreement was reached at Camp David or in subsequent negotiations, and many people believe that failure led directly to the Second Intifada on the Palestinian side and to Israeli support for Ariel Sharon's reoccupation of the West Bank and Gaza in 2002. The Second (or Al Aksa) Intifada was a mass uprising by Palestinians throughout the occupied territories that began in September 2000 and by some measures continues today. In its initial phases, the second intifada resembled the first (1988-1991) in the use of the typical tactics of street protest -- marches, rallies, street fighting, and occasional gunbattles between militants and security forces. Quickly, however, the Palestinians moved to terrorist bombings targetting civilians inside Israel, leading to a serious breakdown in Israel's domestic security. In 2002, following particularly a series of vicious and destructive bombings inside Israel, Prime Minister Sharon ordered the Israeli Defense Force to reoccupy the territories it had handed over to the Palestinian Authority as part of the Oslo peace process. The peace process effectively came to an end, and despite the later development of the US-sponsored "roadmap" it has not yet been reinitiated. Instead of leading to peace, that is, the Camp David talks destroyed the Oslo process and intensified the military conflict between Israelis and Palestinians.
Why did Camp David fail? That's a controversial issue. Bill Clinton has publicly blamed Arafat for being unwilling to compromise with Barak during the negotiations. The pro-Israel website palestinefacts.org offers a succinct summary of the conventional wisdom in Israel and the United States:
The meetings were difficult and almost ended prematurely, but President Clinton kept the parties at the negotiating table. The final status issues were the most difficult to resolve: Jerusalem, security, borders and refugees. Sessions lasted late into the nights. Under intense pressure from President Clinton, in an effort to reach a final agreement, and with promises of American support and security guarantees, Prime Minister Barak offered the most substantial concessions and far reaching proposals, going beyond all the long-standing Israeli "red lines", especially as regards Jerusalem. The US team called Barak "courageous" for these offers. When these terms were later revealed in Israel, people were stunned at the extent of the concessions Barak offered and it is unclear whether the Israeli public were prepared to support the deal. However they were never given the opportunity to endorse or reject the proposals; Arafat rejected them out of hand.
Others, however, offer a more nuanced view. The most sophisticated analysis, perhaps, of the Camp David talks was written by Hussein Agha and Robert Malley and appeared in the August 2001 issue of the New York Review of Books. Agha, a Palestinian activist, and Malley, a member of the US team at Camp David, lay out a complex argument assigning blame to all parties in the negotiations. While the argument is difficult to summarize, it is safe to say that no party to the talks escapes blame.
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak is portrayed as a neophyte politician whose background as a soldier ill-prepared him for the subtleties needed in high-level, high stakes negotiations. Barak's often simplistic and instrumentalist approach led to frustration on the part of the US negotiators and mistrust by the Palestinians. Clinton, and the US team in general, comes off as too closely tied to the Israelis to be able to understand Palestinian perceptions of the process. While the others recognize Clinton's consummate political skills, they suggest that the closeness of the US ties with Israel blinded Clinton to the apprehensions felt by Palestinians, making it impossible for him to adjust adequately to meet their needs. Finally, Arafat and his team are portrayed as lacking the mental and political agility needed to keep up with the fast-changing and fluid environment of the negotiating process. Distrustful of the Israelis, and too focused on their own initial agenda, the Palestinians were unable to recognize just how much the Israelis were offering and were unable to come up with sufficient concessions to reach a satisfactory compromise.
Barak did make substantial concessions at Camp David, offering the Palestinians a part of Jerusalem, more than 90 percent of the West Bank, and territorial concessions carved out of Israel itself. What is often missed, however, is that Arafat also gave up a great deal at Camp David, allowing Israeli control over Jewish neighborhoods in the old city of Jerusalem and offering to compromise over the right of return of Palestinian refugees to the homes they had lost inside of Israel. Both of these issues prior to Camp David had been absolute deal brokers on the Palestinian side, so Arafat's flexibility on them shows real movement on his part.
The parties could not reach agreement on the final disposition of the Temple Mount/Al Aksa Mosque, which has tremendous religious significance to both Jews and Moslems. Agha and Malley argue, however, that this issue was not so much irresolvable as it became a flash point where the distrusts felt by the three sides could express themselves.
There's an awful lot more in the article, which I think has to count as the definitive analysis of why Camp David failed. I should point out, however, that Dennis Ross, one of the lead US negotiators at Camp David, has written that the article "is glaring in its omission of Chairman Arafat's mistakes." Based on the summary I've given here, you can tell I don't believe that criticism is accurate -- the way I read Agha and Malley, they assign blame equally to all three parties. But I invite any of you to go read their original article, which again you can find here. In fact, I urge you to do that because I can guarantee that my little summary here really does not do justice to the full complexity of their analysis.
The story of negotiations did not end in July, however. On December 23 Clinton presented a new final offer to Arafat, based in part on the progress made at Camp David and in part on the subsequent discussions that had taken place between Israeli and Palestinian negotiators. Clinton's offer resolved all the outstanding final status issue, in ways that appear to be equitable and even-handed. Arafat, however, was hesitant to sign on, because the Clinton's framework ignored the UN Security Council Resolutions that Palestinians had always relied on for international legitimacy. Arafat knew further negotiations would be needed to iron out final details, and he was not yet ready to make that big concession without knowing concretely what those final parameters would be.
Agha and Malley play down the Taba negotiations, but participants at the negotiations there in January 2001 consider it the "last, best chance" to work out a peaceful settlement. The talks at Taba built off the Camp David process, and came very close to reaching a final deal. By the point that happened,however, Bush was entering the White House and Sharon was replacing Barak. Neither man was interested in continuing the policies of his predecessor, and the peace process came to a close.
It was truly a lost chance. Osama bin Laden may not have any real interest in resolving the Israeli/Palestinian conflict, but he is interested in appealing to Moslem populations that feel outraged at the perception of Israeli discrimination against the Palestinians. The deepening crisis in Israel over the course of 2001 created propitious circumstances for a strike against the US. If instead of war Israel and Palestine had been ironing out the initial stages of their peaceful nascent two-state relationship, would bin Laden have been able to attack?
That's a counterfactual question, and historians try to avoid answering those...
Links:
http://www.palestinefacts.org/...
Palestine Facts is dedicated to providing comprehensive and accurate information regarding the historical, military, and political background to the on-going struggle between the State of Israel and the Palestinian Arabs. The situation is complex with deep and diverse roots. By using the resources of this large and growing site, you can become much more knowledgable about what is going on and why.
It is a pro-Israel site.
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/...
The Jewish Virtual Library is a project of the American Israeli Cooperative Enterprise, and features quotes from Ariel Sharon and George Bush on its homepage.
http://www.nybooks.com/...
This is the Agha and Malley article.
http://www.brook.edu/...
An interesting essay in Current History written by moderate Arab academic Shibley Telhami. I didn't cite it in the diary, but it's definitely worth reading.
http://www.merip.org/...
A brief essay outlining the Palestinian point of view by Joel Beinin, a pro-Palestinian US academic.
http://www.nybooks.com/...
Ross's response to Agha and Malley essay