Now just a week away from the Group of Eight Summit, the first Russia will host since it was formally invited to participate as an equal partner in the meetings, three large situations loom large on the meeting agenda - North Korea, Iran, and Iraq.
But underneath these more prescient topics, there is a festering of mistrust between the US and Russia over the expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to two states that were once part of both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union - Ukraine and Georgia.
It is unlikely that any consensus will be reached on these matters - be them Iran or Georgian membership in NATO - at the summit. But it is certain that they will be addressed on some level.
For Russia, the expansion of NATO into Georgia, and especially Ukraine, would be a hostile move by "the West" - the US, Canada, and European Union.
They see NATO as an inherently anti-Russian organization, and there is a suspicion - perhaps well founded - that NATO's ultimate goal is to induce a "color revolution" in Russia, such as those that occurred in Ukraine and Georgia in 2004 and 2003, respectively.
As Abbas Bakhtiar wrote in a recent Op-Ed entitled "Cold War II":
Cold War II started in 1999 by the expansion of NATO into the Eastern Europe. President George Bush's actions since then have pushed Russia and China together. America's invasion of Iraq, placing of troops in Caucasus, expansion of NATO into the Baltic area, and now the Iranian crises, have convinced both China and Russia that America's grand strategy is to contain both nations, and ultimately (if possible), to create another colour revolution in their countries as well.
America, having reached the Baltic border of Russia, is trying to reach its central border through Ukraine. Ukraine is and will be the main focus of attention for some time to come. Russia's only warm water naval base is in Crimea (Ukraine). Losing that base will deal a heavy blow to the Russian navy's ability to operate in the region.
Another area of contention is the Caucasus. The U.S., having successfully brought Georgia into its camp, is focusing on other small nations in the region. Control of oil in this region and the pipelines going through it is of vital importance to the U.S.. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan, having substantial reserves of oil, are going to be the battlegrounds for the opposing sides. Kazakhstan is particularly important since it borders both China and Russia, and is the main launching pad for nearly all of the Russian space vehicles.
But it isn't 1999 anymore, is it? It's not even 2005 anymore. The global climate has shifted after a few key events - the September 11, 2001 attacks, the March 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the rejection of the EU Constitution by French and Dutch voters last year.
The welcoming international environment that extended EU and NATO invitations to East Europe through the late 1990s, and fulfilled those invitations through 2004, has been replaced by a more inward-looking environment.
The Economist, generally supportive of NATO, recently discussed the debate over Ukrainian and Georgian membership in NATO, and its tone was lukewarm. From the
June 15, 2006 issue:
It is a decidedly odd race. Mikhail Saakashvili and Viktor Yushchenko, leaders respectively of Georgia's rose and Ukraine's orange revolution, are both eager to join NATO, despite grim warnings from Moscow about the dire consequences. The Georgians are desperate to get in, but are nowhere near ready.The Ukrainians look more eligible, except that most of Mr Yushchenko's countrymen do not much want to join.
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The Kremlin need not panic yet. The Americans want to bring in both Georgia and Ukraine, but other NATO governments are less gung-ho. One reason is that some of the democratic sheen has come off both revolutions. Another is that many Europeans feel that the alliance is already big enough, and that some newer members joined too soon. Some members also do not want NATO to move further and faster than the European Union. And a few are against because they fear antagonising the Russians.
At the same The Economist was positively sunny when it came to describing Baltic membership in NATO on the same page in the same issue:
The biggest lesson of bringing the Balts in is that it resolves security problems that might otherwise fester. "If they weren't in NATO, there would now be a huge tussle for influence here between the West and resurgent Russia," says a veteran observer. "Because the Balts are in, it's not really an issue."
And therein lies the crux of the NATO expansion debate. Because the Russians did the same dance over the 2004 expansion to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, and Romania.
In fact, current Russian Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov - and 2008 Russian presidential hopeful - made similar veiled threats in the run-up to Baltic NATO membership. As The Washington Times reported in 2004:
A few days later, with the alliance expansion an accomplished fact, Ivanov went further. Speaking on a visit to Washington Wednesday, he announced that Russia would take all measures necessary for its self-defense if NATO went on to establish a military presence in the Baltic states.
"With the Baltic states included in NATO and in the event of a military infrastructure created on their territory, any military-political actions by Russia will conform to the principles of self-defense," he said at Washington's Center for Defense Information.
Ivanov then interpreted the continued eastward expansion of the Atlantic Alliance into former Soviet territory in threatening terms that harked back to the most tense eras of the Cold War. "We entertain no illusions why the Baltic countries have been admitted to NATO and why NATO planes are already being deployed there," he said. "This has nothing to do with the fight against terrorism."
Ivanov also warned that the "'window of opportunities' for developing the Russia-NATO partnership" could "shrink to a breathing hole."
It is understood in some circles that, despite its history as an imperial power, the Russian worldview is characterized by intense feelings of victimization and paranoia. While the East Europeans - who have recent memories of being controlled from Moscow - see NATO as a guarantee of independence, Moscow views them as launching pads for a full-frontal assault on St. Petersburg.
But what is the United States to do? Does it leave possible democratic allies like Ukraine and Georgia high and dry? Is it sensible to listen to people like Sergei Ivanov - or are the Russians again full of hot air? And why does the US need to associate with Ukraine and Georgia by proxy instead of directly? Finally, what is the progressive position?
For 50 years, through Democratic and Republican administration alike, we fought a Cold War against the imperial interests of Moscow. And against its protests, we have enabled successful democracies large and small across East Europe to share responsibilities in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.
At the same time, our army is bogged down in Iraq. We have to resort to tedious diplomatic solutions in North Korea and Iran. And Ukrainian and Georgian domestic issues - separatism in Crimea, North Ossetia, and elsewhere - have European ramifications, but they are not as high on the list of the European agenda as working through the kinks of the 2004 addition of the ten new memberstates and resuscitating the constitution.
Also, the pro-Western governments in Georgia and Ukraine are just years old and there is uncertainty about the domestic appetite for expansion. Russia is also seen a crucial ally in dealing with Iran. But we should recall that the last time we allied with the Russians - in 1941 - that we gave away half of Europe to totalitarianism for 50 years.
Proceeding forward, the US and its NATO should tread lightly, especially wi. But at the same time it is important to stay true to our roots. We can only honor promises of NATO expansion or assitance if there is 1) consistent, long-term popular support for shouldering such responsibilities and 2) the government implementing the membership action plan is a stable democracy.
As appetizing as it is to reach out to new friends or to contain and old foe - pro-Western or pro-Kremlin, NATO should remain a people-powered organization.