It's time for progressives to start proposing their own ideas about the future for Iraq. We need an answer to the conservative "then what" question. Simply stated, what should we do after we withdraw from Iraq?
Before proposing our own plans, it is useful to read the major policy proposals that are circulating already.
To start, the most well known and well read of these plans is the Iraq Study Group Report. The report was commissioned by Congress and facilitated through the United States Institute of Peace. The group was made up of well respected and bi-partisan experts. The report was released in December, 2006.
Though the report is well over 9 months old, large portions of it ring very true today. It is the product of a long and thorough study by extremely knowledgeable people. Though it is not entirely progressive, large parts of it can be appropriated into progressive plans.
Cross posted at The Seminal
For the purposes of this argument, the report will be evaluated against four main criteria that I’ve proposed. If a plan takes into account the four assertions below, it is worthy of progressive support. The four assertions are:
- The Iraq War was a mistake.
- Our presence in Iraq is making things worse, not better.
- Iraq is a political problem, and it requires a political solution.
- Our goal in Iraq should not be to “win,” but to leave responsibly.
Because the report was released so long ago, some large aspects of its recommendations feel dated and some assertions no longer apply. In general though, the report does a great job outlining an international way forward. It falls short in other areas, most notably by not admitting mistakes and by feeling outdated when discussing internal Iraqi politics.
The Iraq Study Group Report, not surprisingly, doesn’t dwell on the past. Therefore, it fails to admit that the Iraq war was a mistake, the whole idea of assertion number one. This admission is crucial for progressives, not because we want to play the blame game, but because an admission of fault by the U.S. is crucial to building up our credibility with the international community, regional powers, and the Iraqis themselves.
Without that admission, we will constantly be fighting the perception that America wants to occupy Iraq indefinitely, that America only invaded Iraq to weaken a strong Arab state, and that America is only looking out for its own interests in the Middle East. The Iraq Study Group Report alludes to these problems, but it never comes out and admits that the U.S. was wrong to invade in the first place, nor does it recommend that admission to others. This failing makes it hard for the report to be completely progressive.
Looking beyond that, however, the Iraq Study Group Report gets a lot of things right. For one, it acknowledges in various ways the fact that our presence in the country is making things worse, not better, the main thrust of assertion number two. The report constantly says that withdrawal is not just an option, it is the only way forward. One of the most important recommendations made is to withdraw no matter what happens on the ground:
It is clear that the Iraqi government will need assistance from the United States for some time to come, especially in carrying out security responsibilities. Yet the United States must make it clear to the Iraqi government that the United States could carry out its plans, including planned redeployments, even if the Iraqi government did not implement their planned changes.
This point, coupled with statements like, “Current U.S. policy is not working, as the level of violence in Iraq is rising and the government is not advancing national reconciliation. Making no changes in policy would simply delay the day of reckoning at a high cost,” make it clear that the Iraq Study Group believes America should leave Iraq now. This thinking thoroughly represents a progressive viewpoint.
The Group espouses an idea that I’m not sure is progressive, yet it is worth mentioning here. They advocate a reverse of the “when they stand up, we’ll stand down” rhetoric of Bush, saying that if the Iraqis move towards political reconciliation, the U.S. should support them more fully, and if the Iraqis move away from that reconciliation, the U.S. should withdraw its support.
The above points are repeated throughout the document, along with admissions of the basic third assertion that Iraq requires a political solution. Throughout, the problem in Iraq is characterized as political. In fact, the report believes politics needs to come first, before security, in direct opposition to George Bush’s failed approach:
The security situation cannot improve unless leaders act in support of national reconciliation.
In fact, 34 pages of the report are devoted to political and economic solutions, while only 14 deal with security measures. It is here that the Iraq Study Group adheres most fully to a progressive view of Iraq. The Group overwhelmingly sees politics as the way out of Iraq, not military force.
While the group does lay out extensive Iraqi political benchmarks to be met, this method has already been tried and it has failed. Consequently, the internal political recommendations feel a bit dated. However, the report deals heavily with international solutions, and these are by and large top notch.
The Iraq Study Group advocates for a large international diplomatic movement in conjunction with Iraqi political progress. The report calls on the U.S. to convene a “New Diplomatic Offensive” including talks with all regional powers and the U.N. to discuss supporting Iraqi security and sovereignty, stopping destabilizing actions by neighboring states, securing the borders with joint patrols, and promoting economic assistance.
In addition, the report recommends the creation of an “Iraq International Support Group” made up of Iraq’s neighbors and other key players. Recognizing that Iraq’s neighbors will fill the power vacuum left by a retreating America no matter what, the Support Group would work closely to control the way that power grab would occur. It would take into account each state’s competing interests and offer incentives and disincentives to come to a mutually agreeable solution.
Last on the international front, the Iraq Study Group recommends special high level talks with Iran and Syria without preconditions (like abandoning nuclear programs), something I regard as essential to the withdrawal process. The report correctly points out the powerful incentives the U.S. still has to convince Syria and Iran to help our cause:
i. An Iraq that does not disintegrate and destabilize its neighbors and the region.
ii. The continuing role of the United States in preventing the Taliban from destabilizing Afghanistan.
iii. Accession to international organizations, including the World Trade Organization.
iv. Prospects for enhanced diplomatic relations with the United States.
v. The prospect of a U.S. policy that emphasizes political and economic reforms instead of (as Iran now perceives it) advocating regime change.
vi. Prospects for a real, complete, and secure peace to be negotiated between Israel and Syria, with U.S. involvement as part of a broader initiative on Arab-Israeli peace as outlined below.
As alluded to above, the Iraq Study Group also recommends the U.S. try to form a Palestinian state and solve the crisis between Israel and the rest of the Arab world, or at least make concrete steps towards that goal. Though it may seem far fetched, solving Israel/Palestine might have to be a crucial component of any international Iraqi plan. It will be next to impossible to get anything done in the larger Arab world without at least discussing this option.
The Study Group’s international recommendations just barely mention the possibility of troop commitments by other countries, something which I wish were more fully discussed. However, by and large the Iraq Study Group recommends a robust and thoroughly progressive diplomatic approach to Iraq, and one that probably still has a large chance of succeeding.
Finally, thankfully, the report throws out the notion of “winning” and “losing” in accordance with assertion number four. In fact, the report begins with these words:
The situation in Iraq is grave and deteriorating. There is no path that can guarantee success, but the prospects can be improved.
It is in fact clear from the beginning that the Iraq Study Group isn’t trying to “win” in Iraq. The tenor of the recommendations is to try and control the chaos and leverage the last of our legitimacy to greatest effect. It relies heavily on international support to make real change happen, something that the U.S. has no choice but to rely on now. It concludes that the vast majority of troops can be withdrawn within a year and a half after the reports recommendations are implemented.
Because of its tone, and because of its robust international ideas, the Iraq Study Group Report is very progressive in its recommendations, conforming to three out of the four progressive assertions provided above. However, because the report was released 9 months ago, the recommendations concerning internal Iraqi politics are hopelessly out of date. Still, large portions of this report will no doubt be useful in putting together a unique progressive plan for Iraq, in conjunction with ideas from other policy proposals that I will be reviewing in the coming weeks.
Your thoughts? After reading the Iraq Study Group Report, how feasible do you think its recommendations are? How progressive?