ACS recently published a paper by Ron Klain, former Chief of Staff to Vice-President Al Gore. In it, he argues that gerrymandering always hurts progressives, even when the district lines are draw by liberals to elect other liberals. According to Klain, progressives thrive when "citizens can unite to combat the influence of powerful forces in the political arena," but gerrymandering divides voters into "districts that do not respect the lines of traditional political subdivisions, and do not represent a true community of interest."
In other words, Klain argues that gerrymandering hurts the grassroots because it places district boundaries between voters of similar interests. These boundaries prevent collective action, giving an advantage to conservatives.
But this Essay’s contention is this: even if partisan gerrymandering worked out to be a "wash" for the two parties nationwide—i.e., even if Democrats gained as many seats from pro-Democratic plans as Republicans gained from pro-Republican plans—the long-run effect of such districting practices would be to lessen public support for progressive government and to tilt the political landscape in favor of conservatism. This view rests on four theses set forth below.
Admittedly, these theses are more the product of a career of observation, rather than the result of social science research. They undoubtedly reflect certain biases, and they flow from the perspective—again, admittedly, a personal and ideological one—that progressivism thrives when citizens can unite to combat the influence of powerful forces in the political arena, and that by coming together this way, progressives can build support for activist government action to promote social and economic equality. While the same could be argued, in some cases, for populist conservatism— which also employs popular organizing as a key tool, and also seeks activist governmental action (albeit of a different sort)—progressivism is generally more dependent than conservatism on grassroots support, collective action, citizen engagement with elected officials, and a connectedness to (and confidence in) the institutions of government.
With this as a backdrop, the ways in which gerrymandering is particularly corrosive of progressivism include the following:
(1) There are fewer shared objectives and needs among voters in gerrymandered districts. Non-contiguous, non-compact districts that do not respect the lines of traditional political subdivisions, and do not represent a true community of interest, are more likely to be filled with voters who do not share common needs or objectives. Voters in a compact area are more likely to come together to petition their representative for some activist governmental measure that would benefit that area—new schools, new roads, new social services—thereby creating a cohesive public pressure for progressive governmental action. By contrast, voters in a noncompact district are less likely to see action on behalf of any one part of that district as benefiting them.
For example, voters in a district composed solely of citizens from County A will, unsurprisingly, urge their representative to support governmental action that advances social progress in County A. But voters in a district composed of citizens from Counties A, B, and C, especially if those voters are spread out in a long, non-compact district, are less likely to build support for governmental action to beneªt one particular county. Indeed, these voters are more likely to believe that such projects are a waste of their tax money and are likely to prefer candidates who support lower taxes over those who support progressive community action. As a result,support for governmental action erodes, undermining a key component of a progressive movement: popular support for an activist government.
(2) Gerrymandering creates obstacles to progressive organizing. As a movement, progressivism depends upon organized and concerted public action as a counterweight to powerful private forces, such as corporate or elite interests, that are inherently well-organized. But popular organization rests, at least in part, on geographic compactness and public cohesion—a shared sense of place and interests—that is undermined when geographically compact or cohesive voters are split among multiple political jurisdictions due to gerrymandering. While atomizing otherwise contiguous voters into multiple voting districts is a less dramatic form of crowd dispersion than using a fire hose, it may, in the long run, be even more effective.
Consider a group of voters who want governmental action to halt the polluting activities of a powerful business in their area. As a result of gerrymandering, these voters (who would otherwise live in the same district) are divided among multiple districts and will therefore find it difficult to organize and gain political inºuence. In contrast, the company may find it less challenging to deal with the phenomenon of being "represented" by multiple representatives. Unlike the citizens, who are disseminated over a wide area, the company is a concentrated and well-organized entity. Moreover, its impact on the political process is likely to depend less on organized grassroots efforts and more on influence through lobbying and campaign contributions. Hence, the dispersion of a single matter of concern into multiple districts can create a non-reciprocal impact on the prospects for political action in response to that concern. This imbalance between organized interests (both economic and otherwise) and dispersed citizen groups tends, in general, to tilt toward the conservative side.
(3) Voters perceive less connection with their elected officials due to gerrymanders. Progressive governmental action requires voter confidence in government. A lack of confidence breeds cynicism, which, over time, undermines support for progressive governmental action. Unlike the old saying, when it comes to popular representation, familiarity does not breed contempt, just the opposite: even voters who are cynical about the system generally tend to view their own representative more favorably and with more confidence if they are familiar with him or her.
Repeatedly moving voters between districts—a phenomenon that is likely to become more common as intra-decennial redistricting increases— tends to further weaken the connection between voters and their elected officials. Indeed, while it is impossible to know for sure, it seems conceivable that the 2002 election—the first held after the most recent redistricting cycle—was the first election in modern times where more Americans found themselves with a new congressional representative because they had been moved into a new district than because they had elected a new representative. The same may be true for many state legislatures as well.
For the same geographic and shared-interest reasons discussed above, voters subject to gerrymandering are not only less likely to know their incumbent representatives, they are also less likely to know challengers to those representatives and are less likely to share common geography or interests with either candidate. Hence, partisan gerrymandering maximizes disconnectedness between elected representatives and their constituents and thereby weakens a valuable link for galvanizing support for progressive governmental action.
(4) Gerrymandering leads to lower participation and a dampened sense of "ownership" in government. Public support for progressive governmental actions may require a greater sense of public "ownership" of the political system. For example, public support for raising taxes to fund governmental action almost certainly requires a greater sense of investment in the political system than does support for lowering taxes. Support for other progressive programs—greater social spending or initiatives to advance economic equality—likewise requires a greater sense of public conªdence and legitimization of political decisions than their ideological opposites.
Yet countless studies have shown that as elections become less competitive, voters are less likely to participate. Even voters whose preferred candidate is likely to win are less likely to vote because they believe the election outcome is preordained. Hence, because political gerrymandering lessens electoral competitiveness, it also has the effect of dampening political participation. Likewise, the sense (that gerrymandering creates) that government is structured for the benefit of the governing class, rather than the governed—with districts created to advance the cause of political parties and their leaders, rather than the voters of the district—further exacerbates this problem. Over time, disenfranchised voters, seeing a "corrupt" electoral system with little chance to truly choose their elected officials, provide a very weak base for innovative, progressive governmental action.
Again, each of these four theses are general tendencies: for each, there are exceptions and counter-examples. Yet taken as a whole, they suggest that, over time, partisan gerrymandering will prove more corrosive of progressivism than conservatism.
Progressive lawyers and activists therefore must take the lead in combating this practice.