Cross-Posted at Democrashield
A lot of people have been asking this question recently, and I thought I’d do my best to try to sort this out using hard data. I looked at the number of U.S. wounded and casualties during the surge, as well as during the same period in the past two years. I would have liked to examine Iraqi civilian and military casualties, but there isn’t enough reliable information.
The philosophy of the surge is simple—by putting more troops in Iraq, we can fight and defeat more insurgents in more areas, and therefore foster more stability and less violence. If this were the case, then during the implementation of the surge there should have been a corresponding drop-off in violence. As the number of troops in Iraq increased, violence should have decreased.
We'll look at the numbers after the jump...
Let’s first look at the casualties:
Clearly, the surge philosophy doesn’t hold. In fact, we can see that the period of the surge has been far more violent than the same period in 2005 and 2006. The largest number of casualties since the beginning of 2005 was 131 this past May, which is extraordinarily high—the closest monthly casualty number since the beginning of 2005 is 127 back in January, 2005.
Proponents of the surge would most likely point to the decrease in casualties from May to July 2007 as proof that the surge is working, but keep in mind that this drop seems so steep only because it’s coming off of that exceptionally violent May. If you look past the spike in casualties from April to June of 2007, in July we ended up with casualty figures comparable to the beginning of this year—approximately 80 per month. Looking at the graph, this is still extremely high, especially when compared to the comparable periods in 2005 and 2006.
So did surge decreased the number of casualties? Or was there simply an unnaturally large spike in violence during the past three months that eventually petered out, leaving us with monthly casualty figures comparable to the beginning of the year? The latter seems far more likely than the former, especially when you consider that casualty figures also decreased from May-July in 2005 and 2006.
All in all, the surge has actually lead to more American casualties in Iraq, precipitating in a series of high-casualty months this past spring.
Let’s look at the number of wounded:
Again, we can see that the period of the surge has been far more violent than the same period in 2005 and 2006. Our highest monthly number of wounded during these periods was 744 this past June, rivaled only by this past April and May. During the period of the surge there appears to be a gradual increase in the number of wounded, spiking in June and dropping off slightly in July.
While proponents of the surge may point to the July drop-off as proof that the surge is working, even after the drop-off we’re still left with a monthly wounded rate comparable to what we had at the beginning of the surge—in the 600 to 700 range. The only point during the surge and it’s comparable periods that come close to July’s figure is February of 2007 (517 wounded) and April 2005 (597 wounded).
The period of the surge has been exceptionally bloody-especially when you compare it to the same periods in 2005 and 2006-culminating in an exceptionally violent spring and early summer. As the surge was implemented, the number of casualties and wounded decreased only as much as they increased, leaving us with a level of violence in Iraq comparable to the beginning of the surge itself.
Of course, the situation could change in the near future, but our lack of progress over the past six months is not particularly heartening. September is being touted as a pivotal month for Iraq, so the downtick in casualties and wounded in July would need to turn into a trend if there is to be any real good news to report.
As it stands, this doesn’t look likely—from August 1st to August 17th there have been 48 casualties in Iraq, averaging to almost 3 deaths per day; at this rate, we should have approximately as many casualties this month than last month, somewhere in the 85-90 range.
So, is the surge working? Apparently not. U.S. troops are being killed and wounded at extraordinarily high rates—a situation I would definitely not call making progress.