I think the burden of leadership is to lead.. To have a vision.. To put the ideas out there.. To work so that people begin to understand them.
Strategy.. Not Tactics.
Johns Hopkins School for Advanced International Studies
Stop talking about tactics. Stop talking about troop levels. That’s not the appropriate subject to be discussed. It’s wrong. It’s a political shorthand.
It’s like...it’s like what I witnessed in the Republican debate – what’s your stand on abortion. It’s a litmus test – ‘ah, you’re in favor of a troop pullout? Okay, that puts you over here. You’re in favor of an immediate troop pullout, that puts you further over here. You’re in favor of quibbling. Uh, you’re not sure when the troops are going to pullout, okay you’re here.’ It’s a political shorthand.
Who’s it good for? Who’s it good for? It’s not good for America. It doesn’t advance public understanding of the issues. It doesn’t make it easier for our government’s leaders to craft the right policy or our elected representatives to support it. It doesn’t help the people who are the occasional tuners-in to news shows and political commentary to understand what the issues are that we’re facing in Iraq.
http://securingamerica.com/...
Strategic Consent (Bosnia)
Meet The Press
It was Bosnia, at the time, in ’95. That was the policy, that was the intent, was to get the troops out in a year. We used that intent during the negotiations. It was productive to put pressure on Bosnian President Izetbegovic, who wanted to stall the elections. And we said to him, "Mr. President, you can’t stall because these troops are going to be gone in a year.
Now, you’ve got to move rapidly toward democracy here." So it was productive in terms of the negotiations. It wasn’t an accurate forecast. I had reservations at the time. But that was the policy of the United States government, that we would work toward that aim, and, of course, as we got in there and looked at the practicalities on the ground, it simply wasn’t possible to move that fast. There was an assumption when we did those negotiations that you would have strategic consent by all parties. That is to say that they would agree to the negotiations, they really wanted to live by their terms. And the only problems you might have would be the recalcitrance of some of the local bands of thugs who might not want to comply. In fact it proved not to be that way. We didn’t have strategic consent. The Serbs protected war criminals. They resisted the implementation of the accords. And so it’s been a long and grinding process.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/...
Timelines (Iraq)
"On The Issues" with Nick Ballasy
"The strategy has to be fixed by talking to some of Iraq's neighbors because Iraq's neighbors are part of the problem. They're all in there scrappin' because if we create a democratic Iraq that's dominated by the majority Shia in Iraq, that's a huge change in that region. And so, everybody's nervous about it, they've got their oars in the water pulling, some of them for it, some of them against it. They';re part of the problem, they have to be made part of the solutions, that's the single most important thing we need to do right now."
And when do you see a withdrawal?
"I wouldn't put a timeline on it, I think it's always a mistake to put a timeline on something like that because you put a timeline out when it gives you an advantage.. Leverage. Well, putting a timeline doesn't give the United States any leverage, it just says "Cooperate with us or we're going home". That assumes that all the Iraqis will say "Oh my goodness! We're going to have to cooperate with you or you're leaving!". Well, they won't say that, because their interest in what's going on there is greater than our interest. It's their lives, their future, their families that're at risk there. So some of them want us to stay. Some of them probably don't want us to stay. But what we don't want to do is do anything like putting a timeline on our activities there that can be used against us. It makes it harder for our troops over there to win their trust; to keep their support, and to use the leverage that the military power gives us to influence the political system. That leverage is greater if they think we could stay there forever."
http://youtube.com/...
Getting Out Now (Iraq)
DailyKos
There are three sets of issues in getting out: the logistical, the local Iraqi political security, and the strategic. Let's look at each one.
On the logistical side, there are 162,000 troops. If you just loaded them on airplanes, minus ALL their equipment, you could fly that many people out of Baghdad in - let's just approximate some numbers - 300 troops per aircraft average, a takeoff every 20 minutes, so 900 per hour, times 24 hours, so roughly,20,000 per day, or maybe a week and a half to fly everyone home. Of course, that's with nothing but their clothes on their back....if you start adding in what they should bring home, it adds up to several million tons of stuff that has to be moved, staged, and transported. If everything else just stopped, and we did nothing but backhaul, then maybe you could get out in six-eight months, plus a few more months for the clean-up of the sites. But everything won't just stop....
You have to imagine the psychological and political impact as we leave...at first, there's a diminution of violence and casualties....in back rooms and garages, and underground bunkers, the factions are planning and preparing, working to exploit the security and power vacuum that we will leave...They're asking themselves, how is the most effective and safest way to make their power known, and what do we have, as we're leaving *( and weaker on the ground) that they want? So as the drawdown progresses, the risks increase, until, by the end, we're left with a few thousand troops supported by airpower battling their way to Kuwait with their equipment, or clustered around the airport. Politically, what's left of the Iraqi government is unlikely to survive such an exit.
And so, this means that there will have to be political arrangements worked inside Iraq, and within the region, that can "cover" the withdrawal of the American forces. Maybe a series of understandings between neighboring states; maybe brokered agreements between factions, witnessed by neighboring states. Maybe there's a role for the Arab League, OIC, or UN.
But all of this has to be worked. And none of it has begun yet.
Al Qaeda will certainly claim to have driven us out, and around the world, Al Qaeda would gain new credibility as a powerful force, and win new adherents, perhaps. And this would have clear implications in Pakistan and Afghanistan...
And in the meantime, countries will be asking, "so, is this the end of America in the Mid East? Should we allow the Americans to continue to base their ships or land their aircraft here, or will that make us the next target? Must we make new security arrangements with other powers? Does this mean the Iranians will have a free hand in Iraq? Must we arm the Sunni's to resist? And the list of questions will go on....
So, all of this should give some pause to those who say, let's just pull out immediately, and demand that the troops come immediately.
http://www.dailykos.com/...
I hope that all these candidates will stop with the numbered happy meal selections and start talking about the reality that is Iraq, The conflicted factions, the potential for and options available for discussions and diplomatic engagement in that region, because all this timeline rhetorical gaming is going to push me over the fucking edge.
Some quick facts on Iran.. Some from CCN's own ms in la.
the 'Mullahs' or the "Council of Guardians" are actually comprised of six men that are nominated by the "Supreme Leader" Khamenei (not Ahmadinejad)- and the balance are six attorneys, who are nominated by the head of the Judiciary. Attorneys- to help interpret and enforce their laws and the Constitution.
The Supreme Leader (not Ahmadinejad) is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, controls the military intelligence and security operations; and has sole power to declare war. That would be Khamenei.
Ali-Akbar Hashemi-Rafsanjani was elected September 4 to chair Iran's clerical assembly. He's a conservative and a pragmatic political leader and has a grip of reality.
Please feel free to add more information to understanding our current problems in the comments, you'll be more valuable to the dialog than any of the people running for the highest office in America right now.
I also agree, in part, with Markos' suggestion. Turn off the tap, and let 'em work for and earn the money a bite at a time. Force a surge in diplomacy, not timelines! Timelines will neither be helpful nor useful with the actors in that region!
Thanks.