On Saturday morning, January 12, just as a meeting of the Pennsylvania Democratic State Committee was about to get under way at the Host Inn near Lancaster, Bob Freeman, my good friend of two and a half decades who is my fellow legislator and state committeeman, stopped by my seat to discuss the New Hampshire primary and needle me a little about my campaigning there for Barack Obama.
He tried to establish that Obama was winning until I got there, but the chronology was on my side. I told him that Obama was by seven points when I first went to New Hampshire November 30, 2007, and then down by only six points a few days later. When I went back there on January 5, one poll had Obama slightly trailing, but when I left on election day, January 8, Obama was leading in all the polls, and leading big in most polls.
"So our House Democratic Caucus meeting (on January 9, the reason for my leaving New Hampshire on the January 8 election day) was the reason Obama lost New Hampshire," Bob Freeman concluded with mock seriousness as we both laughed heartily.
Obviously, the influence of any single volunteer in a major primary is quite limited. But the cumulative effects of many volunteers can be highly significant.
The volunteer experience though can give one insights into the process of voter decision-making. After reading numerous accounts and pondering my experiences, I offer the following suggestions as to what went wrong for Obama. It should be kept in mind, however, that Obama lost New Hampshire by far less than Bill Clinton did in 1992, and that because of the presence of Tom Harkin, Clinton did not even meaningfully enter the Iowa Caucuses.
First, there was no organized discussion with voters about Obama's poor ballot position. Clinton was high on the ballot, and Obama was low. As far as I know, this fact was not mentioned in any of the Obama literature, or in any recommended script. It should have been. As crazy as it seems to some, good ballot position helps those who have it, and bad ballot position hurts those who have it. Talking about one's bad ballot position (and giving out a candidate's location on the ballot) reduces the number of votes that will be lost as voters do not readily see the name of the candidate they prefer and look elsewhere.
Second, McCain's strong showing hurt Obama. In New Hampshire independents and same day registrants can vote in either primary, and the registered Independent men I--and my fellow canvassing team members from Philadelphia Andrew and Kim--were assigned to talk to overwhelmingly for McCain. Had McCain not surged, Obama would have gained votes from some of this group. To whatever degree Joe Lieberman helped the McCain surge, Hillary Clinton owes him big.
Third, many women skeptical of Clinton were not sold on Obama. In canvassing undecided women previously identified by the Obama callers, Andrew, Kim and I found many with criticisms of Clinton but lack of commitment to Obama. We elicited a commitment for Obama from a woman who admired Obama with some reservations and had a politically divided family that she would join her sons in being for Obama, but various other somewhat anti-Clinton women had either concerns or confusions about the primary system that we could not readily persuade them to put aside. Polling data indicates that undecided women as a whole broke for Clinton.
Fourth, the awareness of the importance of the New Hampshire primary worked against Obama among last-minute undecideds. A vote for Obama was accurately viewed by many as a vote that could help wrap up his nomination, as winning both Iowa and New Hampshire had always been tantamount to winning the nomination in the past, while a vote for Clinton was a vote to keep the competitive process going at least through February 5. Those undecided but determined to vote felt comfortable with a vote to keep the process going. That sentiment worked for Obama in Iowa, where a decisive Clinton victory would have seriously undermined the Obama campaign.
Fifth, Clinton's decision to break through the cautious, calibrated scripts of her advisers and open herself up to the media and to the voters paid off big. Up to a point, people like candidates who expose their vulnerabilities to the public. That Clinton felt somewhat hurt and disrespected by the treatment she received from her fellow candidates, media, and the public made her a more sympathetic figure to some, and not the cardboard caricature that her often distancing rhetoric coupled with negative characterizations by others made her appear to be.
Sixth, Obama's assuming the front runner's mantle, and employing some of the same kind of above the fray rhetoric that Clinton had repeatedly employed to her detriment, limited his ability to grow his base of support at the end. Obama too must find ways to show himself as a person without undermining his Presidential aura of gravitas, empathy, and a sophisticated ability to handle the modern world.
Of course, Obama's campaign did many, many things right. He would not be in the position of possible victory that he is in today without his having deep wellsprings of wisdom, resourcefulness, eloquence, empathy, and common sense. He is running the best funded and best organized progressive Democratic insurgent campaign in the history of our country.
Like many millions of other Americans, I am deeply proud to be supporting him, and I look forward to many victories and other strong showings for him on the way to the White House.