I was thinking about the "experience issue" in the presidential campaign yesterday when I came to the rather unsettling conclusion that it really doesn't matter in the least how much experience (however you wish to define it) the president has, at least in terms of being able to implement his or her desired policies. And the example that really brought the conclusion home to me was the Bush Administration.
Say what you will (and boy, haven't we all!) about the flaws in the neoconservative agenda, but can anyone doubt that in spite of the gaping holes in George W. Bush's resume, the government under his nominal leadership has been effective in implementing said agenda? Bush's handlers may or may not be telling him what to say and do, but it really doesn't matter--the Executive Branch, in my opinion, has pretty much gotten its job done.
But if experience doesn't matter, then what does?
There has always been a tacit admission that no candidate can be fully prepared to assume the presidency. We refer to candidates' qualifications in relative terms. Every candidate will have areas in which he or she is lacking experience; most candidates acknowledge this and proudly introduce the advisers who have been chosen for their own expertise in these areas. These choices, along with the selection of a running mate (who may also be chosen to offset weaknesses in the presidential candidate's experience), certainly provide insight into the candidates' policies. As important, though, and perhaps more so, is what these choices reveal about the candidates' decision-making processes.
When I first heard about John McCain's choice for running mate, I thought, "Sarah who?" After the first couple of days of increasingly bizarre revelations about the Barracuda, the one thought I couldn't get out of my head was, "What the bleepin' fuck was this guy thinking?" An out-of-the-blue "maverick" pick is one thing, but the obvious lack of vetting showed me something else: This man is dangerous. A rational 72-year-old melanoma survivor with the best interests of the country at heart, aware of the actuarial odds that his running mate would indeed become president, would not have made this selection . . . unless, in his opinion, her decision-making processes would be a good fit for the White House.
Some of McCain's previous decisions had long since shown me that he was no longer the straight-talkin', aisle-crossin' maverick of yore but instead had morphed into yet another mouthpiece for those enriched by eight years of Bush & Co. Many of his subsequent ones have confirmed McCain's tendency to shoot first and regret (or maybe just reload) later. Taken as a whole, they reveal a mind that does not belong behind the desk in the Oval Office.
Fortunately, we have a choice.