Last night, the Allegheny County Council held one of its regular meetings. On the agenda was a resolution that would be of interest to many here. The text is as follows:
Motion Expressing the Sense of Council of Allegheny County urging the Allegheny County Board of Elections to conduct a random sample audit of software currently loaded onto the County's electronic voting machines in order to ensure that such software meets applicable federal and state requirements, and to implement a public video monitoring system in the facilities in which the County's voting machines are stored once the software has been verified. [emphasis mine]
Yes, it's sad that in this day and age, the people in charge of running our elections have to be told to do simple things like the above, but it must be done.
Join me below the fold for my statement to the Council in support of this motion, and more:
Oh, are you wondering why we should care about a county called Allegheny? It just so happens to be the largest county in southwestern Pennsylvania, home to the city of Pittsburgh. We must win Allegheny County if we hope to win PA, not to mention the nation -- and with significant anti-Obama sentiment among registered Dems here, the battle will not be easy... but I digress.
Following is my statement to the Council:
I am a student at [a major Pittsburgh university], and have served on its Student Government Elections Board. The story I am about to tell you is true.
As background, the elections board is responsible for ensuring that all aspects of the election run without incident, including validating petitions, organizing debates, administering the election, and reporting results in a timely manner.
When the election itself finally began, after a few false starts, all seemed to go smoothly. In fact, turnout was higher than usual, which was a good sign. When we went to unlock the results, however, it became clear that all of our efforts had been for naught, as disaster had struck. The results had been rendered worthless, due to unauthorized access to the server the results were being stored on.
Two thousand votes were lost, the election had to be repeated, and any confidence in the system that voters might have had was shattered. All because one computer system was compromised.
I tell this story because it highlights the importance of voting machine integrity and accountability, and more importantly, of voter confidence in them. In order for us, the voting public, to have confidence in our voting machines, we need to know that our votes are secure: that they will be recorded accurately, that they will not be tampered with, and that they cannot be rendered unreadable due to problems with the machine. We cannot have this confidence if we do not know exactly what the voting software is doing.
In the past, manufacturers of voting machines have balked at allowing researchers access to the inner workings of the machine, in the name of their intellectual property. While I can understand their desire not to lose competitive advantage, their unwillingness to let us verify for ourselves that our votes will be secure reduces our confidence in the process, thereby reducing our confidence in our democratic system itself.
The County Council owes it to every resident, worker, and student; every man, woman, and child within Allegheny County, to ensure that we know our votes will be secure. Audit the voting software.
The story I told as the first portion of the statement is, of course, a shortened version of the diary I posted a couple of days ago. In that light, I would like to clarify a couple of points:
- My story deals directly with my experiences administering an online voting system. At this time, Allegheny County has no plans to move to online voting. At the very least, it has none that I know of. Given the statements at last night's meeting, I imagine that such a move would cause a massive outcry.
- That said, a number of the issues that afflict internet voting apply to electronic voting in general, particularly the security of the machines. While an electronic voting machine probably won't be connected to a network, or especially the Internet, its physical security during storage can be an issue. Thus, the clause in the CC motion requesting video monitoring of the storage facility is absolutely necessary.
Now, dear readers, I imagine you're wondering what happened with this motion. As soon as the public comment period ended, the motion's sponsor moved to discuss it as the first item of official business (rather than the last). This was accepted, then as multiple members of the Council requested to add their names as co-sponsors, every member present voted to become a co-sponsor. Finally,
the motion was approved by unanimous consent. That's the good news.
The bad news? This motion doesn't actually force the Allegheny County Board of Elections to actually do anything. As one Councilman (who also happens to sit on the BoE) pointed out, the Board lacks the authority to take almost any kind of action that is not explicitly stated as its responsibility. The one exception is that it will act on the directive of the Council and Executive.
Therefore, I see the following course of action, now that this motion has passed:
- Make sure that the audit and monitoring occur; if necessary, pass a resolution unequivocally directing the BoE to do so
- If the audit fails (that is, the software is not in compliance with federal and state regulations), require the manufacturer to update the software so that it does comply
- On Nov. 5, replace (or retrofit) the existing machines with those that keep paper receipts -- that is, establish a Voter Verified Paper Trail
Thoughts and discussion are welcome.