DISCLAIMER: I am not a historian nor a political scientist. I do have a fascination and interest in the Constitution and so I started reading the Federalist Papers and posting my interpretation on my own blog. I thought it might be of some interest here. Your interpretations and thoughts are greatly appreciated in the comments!
You can find the Federalist Papers in their entirety at The Library of Congress website.
Federalist No. 16 and links to previous Federalist Papers entries below the fold and previously posted at LiveJournal
Federalist No. 1 here
Federalist No. 2 here
Federalist No. 3 here
Federalist No. 4 here
Federalist No. 5 here
Federalist No. 6 here
Federalist No. 7 here
Federalist No. 8 here
Federalist No. 9 here
Federalist No. 10 here
Federalist No. 11 here
Federalist No. 12 here
Federalist No. 13 here
Federalist No. 14 here
Federalist No. 15 here
The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
From the New York Packet.
This paper is a continuation from the previous paper from Hamilton. The theme here is the ability of the government to enforce laws and maintain order.
Hamilton begins by stating that the current Confederation was born out of anarchy and that dissent among the union is a natural consequence. The only answer to this situation is the use of force which would result in a civil war. The question then is essentially how much power should the government possess in the form of an army to preserve the union against such internal conflict.
If there should not be a large army constantly at the disposal of the national government it would either not be able to employ force at all, or, when this could be done, it would amount to a war between parts of the Confederacy concerning the infractions of a league, in which the strongest combination would be most likely to prevail, whether it consisted of those who supported or of those who resisted the general authority.
The effectiveness of the federal government in containing such a rebellion is then dependent upon the size and power of the state(s) involved in the rebeliion. Hamilton says that such delinquencies would most likely involve multiple states that would unite for a common defense. In the situation where a sole powerful state should precipitate the trouble, that state would likely have enough influence to coerce others to join in their cause.
Specious arguments of danger to the common liberty could easily be contrived; plausible excuses for the deficiencies of the party could, without difficulty, be invented to alarm the apprehensions, inflame the passions, and conciliate the good-will, even of those States which were not chargeable with any violation or omission of duty. This would be the more likely to take place, as the delinquencies of the larger members might be expected sometimes to proceed from an ambitious premeditation in their rulers, with a view to getting rid of all external control upon their designs of personal aggrandizement; the better to effect which it is presumable they would tamper beforehand with leading individuals in the adjacent States.
Again, this goes back to the idea expressed in the previous paper that absolute power absolutely corrupts. In this case, the power is that invested to the state(s). Failure to recruit other states by the powerful state might result in the recruitment of foreign powers to the conflict. Hamilton says that a foreign power would likely be successful since the foreign power would benefit from the internal conflict of the confederacy. He then says that such a resulting conflict would likely prove the end of the current union:
When the sword is once drawn, the passions of men observe no bounds of moderation. The suggestions of wounded pride, the instigations of irritated resentment, would be apt to carry the States against which the arms of the Union were exerted, to any extremes necessary to avenge the affront or to avoid the disgrace of submission. The first war of this kind would probably terminate in a dissolution of the Union.
That situation Hamilton calls the "violent death of the Confederacy". But he then goes on to describe the current path of the union into a slow decline due to a lack of refinement and improvement. In fact, he says, the stronger states would not even use force to bring the less inclined states along. Instead, they would likely choose to imitate the weaker states thereby weakening the union as a whole. Hamilton uses an example of failing to pay obligations to the federal government. There are two possibilities why this might happen - not wanting to, or unable to. Determining which of those possibilities were at hand would be quite difficult and nature would incline folks to suppose the first. The burden of proof for such an attitude would indeed be high to forcing compliance. Hamilton then says that it is easy to see how such an issue would arise and give way to jealousies and coercion within the confederation.
He continues saying that no one would want a Constitution that could only that requires the almost constant enforcement by a large standing army. But this is exactly the situation that would arise if the power of the federal government did not extend to the individual. Hamilton concludes that such a situation would quickly lead to a military despotism. He also notes that the government could not financially sustain an army that had to keep in check the largest of the states and there would be no agreement from the states to even form such a military. Hamilton points out that even in the cases of confederacies made up of smaller units than the small states in the United States, such a system of military coercion failed.
We then arrive at the most important portion of this paper. Hamilton says that the federal government MUST have the power to execute "the powers with which it is entrusted".
The result of these observations to an intelligent mind must be clearly this, that if it be possible at any rate to construct a federal government capable of regulating the common concerns and preserving the general tranquillity, it must be founded, as to the objects committed to its care, upon the reverse of the principle contended for by the opponents of the proposed Constitution. It must carry its agency to the persons of the citizens. It must stand in need of no intermediate legislations; but must itself be empowered to employ the arm of the ordinary magistrate to execute its own resolutions. The majesty of the national authority must be manifested through the medium of the courts of justice. The government of the Union, like that of each State, must be able to address itself immediately to the hopes and fears of individuals; and to attract to its support those passions which have the strongest influence upon the human heart. It must, in short, possess all the means, and have aright to resort to all the methods, of executing the powers with which it is intrusted, that are possessed and exercised by the government of the particular States.
Opponents might argue that in the case where an individual state is disaffected by a federal law the state could obstruct the law and bring about the use of force by the federal government. However, Hamilton says that this objection disappears when the method of obstruction is considered. There are two possibilities he says - "mere NON-COMPLIANCE and a DIRECT and ACTIVE RESISTANCE." If state legislatures act as an intermediary for the implementation of a federal law, then the states can passively kill the law and in that manner, not raise alarm within the union. However, if the federal laws are enacted directly, then only by direct, violent exertion of unconstitutional power could the states try to stop it.
They would be obliged to act, and in such a manner as would leave no doubt that they had encroached on the national rights. An experiment of this nature would always be hazardous in the face of a constitution in any degree competent to its own defense, and of a people enlightened enough to distinguish between a legal exercise and an illegal usurpation of authority.
For such a scenario to succeed, Hamilton says there would need to be a conspiracy between the state legislatures, the courts, and the people as a whole. Otherwise, the courts would declare the acts of the state(s) unconstitutional and the people would also rise up as defenders of the Constitution.
Hamilton then closes this paper by saying that if individuals threatened the government they could be dealt with in manners similar to how the states would deal with such problems. Under the Constitution, the local magistrates in these cases would also feel a sense of duty to the federal law in much the same way they would for local laws. If larger groups of individuals posed a threat, they could be dealt with in the same manner. And lastly,
And as to those mortal feuds which, in certain conjunctures, spread a conflagration through a whole nation, or through a very large proportion of it, proceeding either from weighty causes of discontent given by the government or from the contagion of some violent popular paroxysm, they do not fall within any ordinary rules of calculation. When they happen, they commonly amount to revolutions and dismemberments of empire. No form of government can always either avoid or control them. It is in vain to hope to guard against events too mighty for human foresight or precaution, and it would be idle to object to a government because it could not perform impossibilities.