I realize this is the weekend and not Wednesday, but life gets in the way of blogging sometimes. ;o)
DISCLAIMER: I am not a historian nor a political scientist. I do have a fascination and interest in the Constitution and so I started reading the Federalist Papers and posting my interpretation on my own blog. I thought it might be of some interest here. Your interpretations and thoughts are greatly appreciated in the comments!
You can find the Federalist Papers in their entirety at The Library of Congress website.
All previous entries in this series can be found in this mothership.
Cross-posted at LiveJournal
No. 20 below the fold.
The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union
From the New York Packet.
This is a continuation of the previous two papers by Hamilton and Madison.
They use The Netherlands as their last example of a confederacy that reinforces the points made in the last 2 papers. The paper begins with a description of the confedration:
The union is composed of seven coequal and sovereign states, and each state or province is a composition of equal and independent cities. In all important cases, not only the provinces but the cities must be unanimous.
The sovereignty of the Union is represented by the States-General, consisting usually of about fifty deputies appointed by the provinces. They hold their seats, some for life, some for six, three, and one years; from two provinces they continue in appointment during pleasure.
It is not hard to imagine that the requirement of unanimity amongst the states and all of the cities is going to present problems in coming to decisions. The body of representatives is an appointed body with a disparity in lengths of service - again this sets up a situation of inequity amongst the provinces.
The powers of the States-General body are then given and all are reasonable powers many of which are reflected in the proposed US Constitution - raising and arming a militia, generating revenues, entering treaties, etc. In addition, restrictions on the powers of the provinces are given - mostly those reserved to the States-General.
Next, the head of the union is described - the stadtholder.
The executive magistrate of the union is the stadtholder, who is now an hereditary prince. His principal weight and influence in the republic are derived from this independent title; from his great patrimonial estates; from his family connections with some of the chief potentates of Europe; and, more than all, perhaps, from his being stadtholder in the several provinces, as well as for the union; in which provincial quality he has the appointment of town magistrates under certain regulations, executes provincial decrees, presides when he pleases in the provincial tribunals, and has throughout the power of pardon.
It is clear from this description that this chief executive is in contrast to the office of President for the United States and that the hereditary nature of his position leaves much room for exploitation of his powers to his own desires. The ability to appoint local authorities is an expansion of his control.
The powers of the stadtholder are then given, including the settling of internal disputes between the provinces, the head of the military, and explicitly stated the head of the navy. His compensation as well as that of the military is also given.
So, that is what is written in principle about the union of the Netherlands. But practice was apparently an entirely different story:
Such is the nature of the celebrated Belgic confederacy, as delineated on parchment. What are the characters which practice has stamped upon it? Imbecility in the government; discord among the provinces; foreign influence and indignities; a precarious existence in peace, and peculiar calamities from war.
Now, after having read the previous arguments outlined in the Federalist Papers, who couldn't have seen that one coming? The paper continues giving accounts of how jealousies among the provinces were inflamed over disparate contributions to the treasury - several instances of which resulted in enforcement by bayonet.
In the cases of emergencies, the provinces often overstepped their bounds in response and examples of entering into treaties are given. Remember that whole idea of unanimity from above? Well that was thrown out the window on more than one occasion.
Then comes perhaps the most important part of this paper:
A weak constitution must necessarily terminate in dissolution, for want of proper powers, or the usurpation of powers requisite for the public safety. Whether the usurpation, when once begun, will stop at the salutary point, or go forward to the dangerous extreme, must depend on the contingencies of the moment. Tyranny has perhaps oftener grown out of the assumptions of power, called for, on pressing exigencies, by a defective constitution, than out of the full exercise of the largest constitutional authorities.
Essentially, Madison and Hamilton point out that public safety is often used as an excuse to consolidate powers and they explicitly state that tyranny comes most often from an assumption of powers rather than constitutionally explicitly outlined powers. We are still making that argument today in a post-9/11 United States as a result of the power grabs of the Cheney-Bush administration.
They conclude with examples of the inadequacy of the stadtholder and the statement that as long as governments are enacted over governments instead of individuals, violence and coercion at the expense of the rule of law is the likely outcome - because this is what experience, ancient as previously described, and recent as in this paper, teaches.