An arguement for non-intervention on the part of the United States government concerning the unfolding human drama occurring in Iran.
The return of protests this week In Iran should serve as a beacon of hope for those concerned with the advancement of freedom from totalitarian regimes. Nearly six months after the disputed election in June, the citizens of Iran remain very much engaged in the ongoing battle for the political direction of that beleaguered nation.
As was the case in June however, there has been a concerted effort from certain sectors of the chattering political class here in the US to see the United States cripple the government of Iran through sanctions ,or some other effort, in a desperate attempt to aid the overthrow of the regime there.
Any such reaction on our part however would be the worst possible course of action to take at this moment. What is required at this time from the US is patience, and a show of solidarity with those who have taken to the streets, and nothing more.
Our past history of interjecting ourselves into the internal affairs of the nation of Iran should serve as a reminder for those who are demanding a tougher course of action from the president. Beginning in 1953, with the overthrow of the duly elected Mohammad Mosaddegh by the CIA, the US hitched its wagon to the repressive regimes of General Fazlollah Zahedi, and later Mohammad Reza Kahn, otherwise known as the Shah.
And what was the sin for which the CIA organized and carried out the coup d’état that led to the overthrow of the Mossadegh government? In the immediate years prior to Mosaddegh’s ascent to the Premiership, the great issue of the day in Iran was principally concerned with the question of royalties from the British Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC).
Recently, in nearby Saudi Arabia, the government there was able to secure a 50-50% revenue sharing agreement with the Arabian-American Oil Company (ARAMCO), a subsidiary of Texaco. Realizing that the 5% take they were receiving from AIOC amounted to the outright theft of the nation’s resources, the government of Iran demanded a better deal.
The British government however, rejected any overtures to negotiate a better deal, and anger spread throughout the Iranian countryside over the virtual theft of her resources. Soon, nationalization of the oil wells became a populist theme that surged throughout the nation.
The Shah of Iran’s self appointed Prime Minister however advocated against the full nationalization of AIOC in March, 1951. He was assassinated four days after his appeal for restraint.
It was in this charged political atmosphere that Mohammad Mosaddegh came to power in April, 1951. In June of 1951, Mosaddegh nationalized the assets of AIOC, and he explained his decision in a speech to people of Iran:
"Our long years of negotiations with foreign countries... have yielded no results this far. With the oil revenues we could meet our entire budget and combat poverty, disease, and backwardness among our people. Another important consideration is that by the elimination of the power of the British company, we would also eliminate corruption and intrigue, by means of which the internal affairs of our country have been influenced. Once this tutelage has ceased, Iran will have achieved its economic and political independence. The Iranian state prefers to take over the production of petroleum itself. The company should do nothing else but return its property to the rightful owners. The nationalization law provide that 25% of the net profits on oil be set aside to meet all the legitimate claims of the company for compensation..."
With this act of deliberate provocation, as perceived by the US and British governments, the fate of Mosaddegh’s government was sealed. The relationship between Iran and the British government quickly deteriorated, and the British promptly implemented a series of crippling petroleum related sanctions in order to bring down the government of Iran.
The same sort of sanctions the chattering class here wants to impose on the government of Iran today.
Almost immediately, Mosaddegh’s populists appeal grew throughout Iran. A long simmering political crisis there deepened between conservative forces tied to the ruling class and the Shah, and the people who sentiments were more in line with those of Mosaddegh.
A proxy war soon developed between Mosaddegh and the Shah, with Mosaddegh increasingly assuming dictatorial powers in Iran, in response to the numerous plots against his government, orchestrated by the CIA, and carried out by the Shah.
Finally, Mosaddegh overplayed his hand with the dissolution of Parliament in August, 1953, and a CIA inspired military coup overthrew his government, placing General Fazlollah Zahedi in charge. For the next twenty-six years, the people of Iran suffered as the ruling Junta, backed by the United States, held a virtual monopoly on wealth and power in Iran.
It was, of course, in this context that the Iranian revolution came to fruition in 1979. In response to the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran, the US government made a secret pact to supply arms to the neighboring government of Iraq, led by a man by the name of Saddam Hussein.
Saddam Hussein soon invaded the nation of Iran over a long-held dispute over a strip of land that would provide greater access to the Persian Gulf for Iraq’s oil facilities. A decade long war ensued and the rest is history.
It has been thirty years since the Iranian revolution overthrew the despotic government of Mohammad Reza Kahn, a US ally, and de facto puppet of British-American oil interests. And throughout those twenty-six years, US-Iranian relations have been strained, to say the least.
Now, it would appear the Iranian people, in response to the tyranny of their existing government, presumably have had enough. And while it would be wonderful to help the Iranian people establish a democracy rooted in the rule of law, and offering equality of opportunity, the simple truth is that such action on our part would likely have the opposite effect of our intended result.
Any involvement in the internal affairs of Iran on our part at this juncture would merely provide the Iranian government with the necessary foreign enemy to consolidate public opinion in the hinterlands of Iran against the decidedly more urban groundswell that currently threatens to topple the regime.
Evidence, in fact, suggests that the recent attacks on demonstrators on the holy day of Ashura, the day that marks the martyrdom of the grandson of the prophet Mohammed in the modern-day Iraqi city of Karbala, and which ultimately led to the Islamic schism between Sunni and Shia, may be a tipping point in the battle for the hearts and minds of the rural populace in Iran.
Time will surely tell on this matter, but as goes the rural population in Iran, so goes the government.
Which is why at this moment, if the US government truly wishes to see freedom on the march, as was often the rallying cry of the previous administration in Washington, then the US will take no action in response to recent events in Iran, other than to offer our collective support, and solidarity with the people there.
President Obama often likes to cite what he terms "teachable moments," moments in time and place where we must pull back, resist the urge to act on our base impulses, and discover a more nuanced path forward, a path rooted in both sound reason and judgment.
The political crisis in Iran must be a teachable moment for the Obama administration, if it is to remain true to its electoral promise of a humble US foreign policy that respects the rights of self-determination for all peoples. The rest will be up to people in Iran.