Last summer I posted a diary entitled "The Lesson of Munich and the Lesson of Mossadegh." The diary closely analyzed and compared two historical "lessons" and their impact on current thinking. Given the recent events in Iran, The Lesson of Mossadegh needs a update and a re-visit. I'm skipping the Munich part this time, as Obama seems to be trying to stay out of this domestic struggle in Iran.
In modern politics, many widely received historical lessons replace actual debates on policy. They derive their strength from the ease in which they communicate a point, and unfortunately they tend to stifle debate rather than enhance it. Moreover, they oversimplify and they carry an almost binary logic with them that allows people who use them to apply them in relatively unrelated circumstances. Everyone ascribes to the idea that, "Those who do not know history are doomed to repeat it," and yet while this expression does contain significant truth, the reality remains that history does not really repeat; instead, it contains patterns that allow similarities from the past to inform the present. The problems come up because many who invoke the "History Repeats" line tend to use it to provide the appearance of solid "historical" justification, while the origins of their intentions and motives come from elsewhere--something personal, ideological or downright self-serving. I prefer Mark Twain, "History doesn't repeat itself, but it does rhyme." This insight requires knowledge of the details of history including nuance and the ability to recognize crucial differences as well as similarities when comparing various courses of events.
The Lesson of Mossadegh enshrined a number of political imperatives for any Iranians watching the 1953 coup that re-instated the Shah as a US backed dictator. 1) A thinly supported government provides an invitation for foreign intervention. 2) A government must be ruthless to maintain independence for Iran 3) Failure to use force reflects weakness. The following description provides some historical detail for The Lesson of Mossadegh.
In the late 1940s, Iran's political environment experienced significant upheaval. World War II had been a period of heavy foreign intervention with troops from the US and the Soviet Union stationed on Iranian soil. Iranians put a high priority on getting foreign troops out and a strong nationalist movement gained significant traction in the postwar years. The other target issue of the nationalist movement was the exploitative relationship with the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). The AIOC played all kinds of games and did not pay what was due to Iran under an already exclusive concession agreement that was a poor one for Iran to begin with. In many years AIOC paid more to the British government in taxes on their profits than they did in royalties to Iran. One of the major sticking points was the fact that AIOC would not let Iranian government officials inspect their accounting books. In 1951 this issue came to a head. In March, assassins cut aspiring dictator then Prime Minister General Ramzara's life short. On the 15th the Majlis nationalized Iranian oil operations and Muhammed Mossadegh became Prime Minister on April 29th. The coalition that supported Mossadegh shared very little other than hatred for the British and dislike for the Shah. They included Tudeh (communist) Party members, Western educated elites, and various religious and workers parties and they were heavily nationalistic. Over the next two years Britain managed a boycott of Iranian oil, the Truman administration failed to broker a new oil agreement between Iran and Britain and Iran's economy declined while Mossadegh's diverse political coalition gradually disassembled. (Keep in mind that "sanctions" ring the successful British oil boycott bell for many Iranians. Economic weapons were used to de-rail their nationalist aspirations.) In the summer of 1953, with a new administration in Washington DC, the US and British ousted Mossadegh and instated the Shah with more power than ever.
Twenty-five years later social and political unrest in Iran took the form of street protests and subsequent government suppression. By the end of 1978 the Shah's violence and lack of any real reform united all of the former Mossedegh coalition and more against him. On January 16, 1979 he flew out of Iran never to return. Ayatollah Khomeini returned to Iran in February and the Iranian Revolution swept into power. Khomeini and those around him remembered the failure of Mossadegh and they made certain to avoid his mistakes. Although the political environment of 1979 proved markedly different from '51-'53, the new leaders took no chances. The diverse and sometimes violent factions of the Revolution contained a wide array of people. On one end of the continuum stood communist leftists and on the other socially conservative religious parties. The person of Khomeini united them all. Over the course of the next few years Khomeini and his inner circle of leaders consolidated power in an Islamic State. Although in the initial months Khomeini tried to influence from a distance in Qom, the events of the summer and fall of 1979 eventually paved the way for the establishment of the role of Supreme Leader which Khomeini embodied until his death in 1989. It was actually moderate leaders like Mehdi Bazargan and Bani Sadr that relied on Khomeini for their influence; the bulk of the Revolution held more radical views.
Ironically, and unknown to most Americans, the Islamic Republic also destroyed the Tudeh Party for good in 1983. A Soviet defector to the British supplied them with nearly the entire Tudeh party membership. The Brits turned this information over to Khomeini's people and that spelled the end for them. This incident provides yet another example of the US choosing to overlook the vehemently anti-communist belief system of the Shia clergy. Ayatollah Kashani expressed similar anti-communist sentiments in the 1950s and his group initially participated in the Mossadegh coalition. Over the years, the Shah's anti-communist credentials provided one of the major pillars upon which US policymakers based their support for him. Moreover, many implied his irreplaceable role in that regard.
Like The Lesson of Munich, the nuance of 1953 contains some critical elements of difference from popular interpretation as well. Mossadegh spent the rest of his life under house arrest, and devoted followers insisted that Mossadegh lacked the ruthlessness required in such political circumstances. Further, they argue that his inability to act forcefully on his own behalf doomed his government and Iranian independence for the time being. There remains a great deal of truth to these observations, however, the Revolution of 1978-79 contained within it popular support and a fury that no foreign power could control or direct. It was much stronger than any Mossadegh coalition of the 51-53 period. That did not stop Iran's leaders, however, from pursuing policies that reflected the belief that a new coup lurked around the corner, and the leaders today still readily express beliefs that hidden foreign hands attempt to stoke the fires of conflict inside Iran.
As we look at the events in Iran continuing today it remains difficult to predict with certainty how this will turn out. The Khamenei/Ahmadinejad government and their allies certainly made numerous statements recently to play the old foreign interventionist line. This will no doubt continue, and the Reform movement will carefully watch their language, posturing and give no indication that they are being assisted by foreigners. They do not want to be accused of weakening the position of the State and inviting foreign meddling. They are being accused of this by the government now, anyway, but they certainly need to painstakingly avoid giving any real substance to these accusations.
So far it is likely that most Iranians don't think that Mousavi, Karroubi and Khatami are in the pay of foreigners. However, the government is shifting the language to more directly accuse the Reform leaders of treason. This policy, if pursued will force the issue. If the government gambles with this, they could lose. Recent arrests of many Reform leaders close to the top are a way of issuing a warning to Mousavi and Company. We'll have to see how this plays out. Reports of Mousavi's wife, Zahra Rahnavard being arrested, if true, would be a very big gamble by the government. Many of the Ahmadinejad/Khamenei coalition followers might find the arrest of a man's wife far from a sign of strength. They may be against expanding women's rights, but this is a weak move to them.
It remains critical to realize that what we see going on right now is not even close to a repeat of the '79 Revolution, yet. Divisions within Iran still make a 1979 style Revolution unlikely. No unifying coalition is close to emerging, and no figure in Iranian politics provides a unifying example and image even in the neighborhood of Khomeini. Who truly has the majority? It is difficult to tell, but sharp divisions remain, and in those circumstances the forces which control the power of the State possess the advantage. This remains true in light of yesterday's pro-government rallies. Even though they put pressure to supply participants, (see here:Chicago Tribune 12/31/09) there still are many who support the government. For those who think the Reformers should take up arms, unless you think that civil war will solve their problems, this is a very bad idea. It would be civil war they would likely lose at this point. It would also likely change the direction of the support among the populace that is probably growing for the Reformers at the moment.
In the late 70s the Shah did an unbelievable job of uniting nearly the entire population against him. Unpopular as this government is with many--it has not reached that point. The Islamic Republic, for all its' corruption and its' drift toward Revolutionary Guard control, has still managed to deliver to the masses. During Ahmadinejad's Presidency he visited villages and remote corners of Iran that no major political leader did previously. Earthquake relief re-built towns anew, and government spending has been directed to areas never before reached. People do not forget such things very readily. Now, if there is massive slaughter in the streets, they might start to change. If the idea that the current leaders are no longer legitimate within Islam continues to spread, the devout will definitely change their views. This takes time, however, and we should keep that in mind.
I find it particularly ironic, that in order for the US and Iran to move closer to resolving our differences, leadership on both sides will have to abandon historical "lessons" that put such emphasis on the use of force to avoid the appearance of weakness.