On the English-language Web site of the Israeli newspaper Yediot Ahronot today was a column by Gadi Taub suggesting that a Bibi-led coalition of the right can do no real harm, although it certainly won't advance the peace process any. Taub wrote that Netanyahu will not tell his coalition the truth, i.e., that "all the Qassams in the world won’t return the Greater Land of Israel"; meanwhile, and more importantly, he also writes that Labor and Meretz will continue to promote themselves in the opposition as peace parties when, in fact, there is a middle ground: partition.
It's an interesting thought. My wife bought me, for Chanukah, a copy of S.I. Hayakawa's Language in Action — the first edition of what eventually became a classic text on analyzing political language — and that book contains a long section on what's called the "two-valued orientation." Within logical circles, the two-valued orientation is called the "false dilemma." Logicians tell us that, when faced with a false dilemma, we need to "go between the horns" (of a dilemma) and find the middle ground, which is usually there.
Taub is suggesting just such a solution, at least in the short- or mid-term. Israelis, Palestinians, and everyone watching the conflict have assumed that the only "solution" to the conflict is annexation (the solution offered by the nationalist camp and some of the religious camp, not to mention many Likudniks) or a peace treaty. But what do you do when annexation is something that clearly is not feasible (for a number of reasons) and peace is also off the table?
Partition, Taub says, is what needs to be done. He's not terribly specific, so it needs to be borne in mind that what this would entail would be itself present a number of options.
Clearly, if what is meant by "partition" means more unilateral disengagement, then there is going to be vigorous debate about the pros and cons of such further action. Speaking only for myself, I have always been a very strong proponent of unilateral disengagement from all occupied territories from the '67 war. As I have argued in the past, the IDF could take the money and resources used in the occupation of these territories and station a soldier every 100 feet along the border and shoot anything that tries to cross over. It would certainly be as effective at stopping suicide bombers as the "security barrier" that Israel has been building has been, which has been quite effective. It would have the added bonus of not expropriating Palestinian territory to Israel.
But there are significant detractors from unilateral disengagement, and they are not just Greater Israel advocates. As pointed out to me in a recent discussion with an Israeli reader, Israel's disengagements from both Gaza and, much earlier, southern Lebanon (in 2000) have resulted in guerrilla organizations lobbing missiles at sovereign Israeli territory. Clearly this is unacceptable and clearly IDF soldiers along the border are not going to stop missiles. So what's the solution?
Apologists for Hamas will say that Israel had no right to bomb the tunnels that Hamas was using to smuggle the very rockets they launched into Israel. "They were using those tunnels for food also!" they cry. Well, sure, Hamas was using those tunnels for food, and that's partly Israel's fault, because Israel essentially had Gaza under blockade, which is, in itself, an act of war. (It was Israel's casus belli against Egypt in 1967, as a matter of fact.)
The problem with this argument is that you don't use the same tunnels to smuggle both weapons and food. Want an analogy? Look no further than the Altalena incident of June 1948. David Ben-Gurion, the new head of the infant Israeli state, had, as part of his responsibilities in forming the IDF, the responsibility to shut down alternative militias, most notably Menachem Begin's Irgun. Begin resisted and attempted to smuggle in weapons for the Irgun using a ship called the Altalena. The problem was that Jewish volunteers were also on the boat. Ben-Gurion shelled it anyway.
Now, I think that there's a middle ground to be found w/r/t these tunnels, and it's as simple as watching footage from the Civil Rights struggle in the U.S. South during the 1960s. Instead of bombing the tunnels, flood them with water cannons. If you're worried about wasting potable water, then pump the water in from the Mediterranean. You've got plenty of coastline to work with there.
Of course, that still doesn't solve the problem of what to do with missiles already in the areas from which Israel unilaterally withdraws. It's quite clear that, whatever Israel does to respond to rocket attacks, they will be excoriated by either their own press (either for disproportionate response or for not responding enough) or by the international press (guaranteed, no matter how reserved the Israeli response is, Israel will be condemned).
So here's my modest proposal: Let Israel do to Hamas or Hezbollah exactly what these "militants" do to them. Leave the F-14s in the hangars, and stock up on shoulder-fired rockets and fire them back at Gaza, Lebanon, or wherever. And here's the key: Fire only as many missiles back as are fired at Israel. The international press will accuse Israel of "terrorism," but at least they won't be able to accuse Israel of disproportionate response.
Am I serious? Yes, I am serious. I can find no other solution. But perhaps I'm being myopic.