First, a little history, the airline industry knew that their aircraft and the airports they served were not secure for decades. Bombing, hi-jacking and the possibility of using aircraft as weapons have been discussed by the industry since the 1970's. The FAA and American air carriers knew the available fixes and were aware that American airlines were at risk. IATA, ICAO, DOT, FBI, INS (now ICE) ATF all knew that smuggling, terrorism and in flight destruction or hi-jacking of aircraft were a present and significant threat prior to 9/11. So what held us back from taking the necessary steps to defend against these threats: ideology, bureaucracy, industry lobbyists and money.
Understanding the symbiotic relationships between airlines, regulators and manufacturers is central to comprehending the current state of airline "security".
Airlines are interesting hybrids of private sector entities with significant public sector money invested in them and direct federal support. Airlines are accustomed to the government providing almost all the infrastructure necessary for them to survive, airports, security, air traffic control, pilot training (almost all airline pilots are ex-military pilots),weather forecasting and aerospace research eg NASA and Air Force research done by military contractors that also supply civilian transport aircraft. Not to mention federal programs of direct assistance like CRAF (Civil Reserve Air Fleet), fuel supports, safety and maintenance regulatory rule modifications and tax incentives by all levels of government to attract and keep airline service.
Aircraft may be enrolled in the CRAF program prior to their being built, in which case the government will pay for the modifications necessary to make the aircraft comply with the program's requirements. This program has been in effect since the 1950's and is a jointly administered and funded program between the DOD and DOT. The federal government has been setting engineering standards for aircraft safety and durability since the 1930's. Why didn't we use this program to redesign cockpits to limit entry from the passenger cabin and armor the pilot entry door and cabin bulkhead of the aircraft to prevent unauthorized cockpit entry on all enrolled aircraft?
Safety, training, infrastructure, security, engineering standards, research and development are all either supplied to the airline industry by government directly or indirectly. The federal government regulates the industry in the areas of safety, operations, flight qualifications of pilots, health qualifications of aircrew, maintenance and now security.
American aircraft are built to general engineering specifications set by the government that require certain capabilities for safety and durability. Aircraft manufacturers work within the American commercial and regulatory framework building aircraft to the specific requirements of their customers and the FAA/DOT. Why doesn't the government change their aircraft specifications to make cargo compartments and cargo containers more bomb resistant and pilot's cabins only able to be entered from the exterior of the aircraft?
Why did US airlines refuse to install security programs that were both effective and non-intrusive as the Israeli's did after Munich? Money. The deregulation of airlines under the Carter Administration put tremendous cost pressures on them, service, maintenance, facilities and personnel spending was cut. Destabilizing the financial structure of the airlines by abrupt and disruptive deregulation and the introduction of predatory competition took a high revenue stable industry and plunged it into chaos. Resistance to any additional cost burden was therefore viewed as a primary requisite for survival by airline management.
The Reagan Administration's focus was on further deregulation and breaking the Air Traffic Controllers Union, completely disregarding the effect of these moves on public safety and security. The airline's position during this era was that public safety should be a public burden, not a cost to be heaped on private companies struggling to survive. The federal government's position was that the airlines inherently were supposed to be primarily concerned with their own security and should bear the cost of increasing security requirements. Fought out in the halls of the federal bureaucracy and congress for decades these positions led to gridlock and inaction while the terrorist threat loomed.
While America tried to determine whether private interests superceded public security and safety, Israel was developing a system of airline security using design modifications to the pilot's cabin, personal interviews of passengers, 100% inspection of cargo and spot inspection of carry on and checked baggage that has proven cost effective, non-intrusive and 100% effective in stopping terrorist incidents on El Al, the Israeli national airline.
America on the other hand waited until after Lockerby and 9/11 to do anything about airline security. A pathetic record of government and industry indifference to public safety that was both shameful and catastrophic. After 9/11 the airlines got their way and shifted the burden of safety to the government and the government chose the most ineffective and costly method to provide security. Creating a technology dependent, impersonal, bureaucratic and reactive system that is needlessly expensive, intrusive, inefficient and offensive to travelers and aircrew alike. Badly documented "no fly" lists, terrorist watch lists that don't stop terrorists, coupled with over worked poorly trained security personnel and inordinately expensive rule driven procedures and technologies of questionable value. Imposing delay and discomfort on the public while making the public pay billions of dollars for it.
The question is not should the TSA be allowed to "touch my junk" but should the TSA's policies, procedures and methods be junked.