While the nation's attention was focused on health care issues this week, the Supreme Court issued one opinion, heard oral argument in a number of cases, and issued an important order.
The Court dealt with questions of bankruptcy's effects on student loans and when condemned defendants are deemed to have waived otherwise valid issues, of the composition of the National Labor Relations Board and lawsuits that have an impact on state tax systems, of cargo carrier contracts and a state's right to withhold DNA testing from a man on death row. The work done by the Court this week illustrates how the least known branch of the Federal Government, undramatically (for the most part), affects virtually all aspects of our interactions with the government and with each other.
Here is what happened this week in the Supreme Court.
Decisions:
The Court only issued one opinion this week. In United Student Aid Funds v. Espinosa, Justice Thomas wrote the opinion for a unanimous court, holding that when a bankruptcy court discharges all or a portion of a debtor's student loans after the creditor has been given notice, that action cannot be challenged later even though the petitioner did not follow all of the procedural requirements dictated by law.
Why you should care: Actually, the most interesting thing about this case is the light that it casts on collection agencies. Mr. Espinosa's plan, ratified by the bankruptcy court, was to pay off the principal of his student loans, and then have the court discharge the interest. After he succeeded in paying off the principal, United Student Aid Funds went after him for the interest, even though it had not objected at the time that it was notified that this was Mr. Espinosa's proposal in bankruptcy court. In fact, United Student Aid Funds was willing to go to the Supreme Court over a $4500 debt in an effort to establish that it should be allowed to interfere with a bankruptcy court order whenever it wanted. Fortunately, the Supreme Court disagreed.
Oral arguments:
Hamilton v. Lanning
Under bankruptcy law, the court determines how much a debtor can pay her creditors by projecting her future income based on her income for the six months proceeding her bankruptcy filing. But what happens when the debtor gets a one-time windfall during those six months (as did Ms. Lanning, who received a one-off payout from her employer)? Or, on the other hand, if, in the last month, the debtor gets a new job that pays twice her prior income? The Supreme Court seemed willing in oral argument of this case to read some flexibility into the law that would allow a court to take such anomalies in account in devising a payment plan.
Why you should care: It is hoped that you will never need to care, but a ruling that a court can consider factors other than the income of a debtor for the six months prior to filing for bankruptcy would go a long way to ensuring that payment plans are more likely to work for both debtors and creditors.
Levin v. Commerce Energy:
Both case authority and Federal statutes generally bar the Federal courts from interfering with state and local tax systems. In this case, private gas companies attempted to sue Ohio in Federal court because public utilities providing gas pay lower taxes than they do. Ohio's position is that only Ohio state courts have jurisdiction over the issue.
Why you should care: You probably don't care whether Commerce Energy pays more state taxes than public utilities, but this case involves a minor variation of the philosophical struggle played out over the last hundred years of Supreme Court jurisprudence: the power of the Federal government over state governments. A rule that the Federal government has no control over state tax systems may seem appropriate in the abstract, but, as Justice Sotomayor asked during oral argument, would that mean that a state system that taxed African-Americans more heavily than whites could not be challenged in Federal court?
New Process Steel v. National Labor Relations Board:
This case deals with an issue that is now, thanks to recess appointments, not likely to recur soon. The NLRB is a 5 person board, and the law requires that it have a quorum of 3 to act. Until President Obama's recent appointments, there have only been 2 members on the board. To the extent that the NLRB has gotten anything accomplished the last year or so, it was because the law also allows the board to delegate its powers to a subcommittee of 3. Such a subcommittee was formed when the NLRB had more members, and the 2 remaining members constitute 2 of the 3 members of the subcommittee. Thus, the subcommittee has a quorum, although the full board does not. The issue is: can the subcommittee act for the board even when the board does not have a quorum?
Why you should care: The importance of a viable NLRB is illustrated by this case, in which a corporation is trying to evade an adverse NLRB finding, and in which the AFL-CIO has filed a brief in support of the NLRB's efforts to continue functioning in the face of political interference with its ability to perform at full strength. The NLRB remains a critical component of the protection of labor's rights, and thus its sustainued vitality is crucial. The Court seemed concerned that adoption of New Process' argument could result in the board shutting down altogether if it went down to 2 members. Interestingly enough, in discussing why the NLRB had had only 2 members for over a year, Chief Justice Roberts asked: "And the recess appointment power doesn't work why?" From his mouth to President Obama's ear, I guess.
Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha v. Regal-Beloit Corp.:
The microquestion in this case is: when a shipment that has been transported by both ship and rail is damaged in a railroad accident, are the damages governed by railway statutes or maritime law? The (much more interesting) macroquestion is how to interpret a Federal statute that states that it doesn't intend to substantively change the law, but which on its face substantively changes the law. Do the courts follow the plain language of the statute, or the Congress' stated intent to the contrary?
Why you should care: Admittedly, it is a little difficult to make a conflict between maritime and railway law relevant to most of our daily lives. However, the choices judges have to make in interpreting statutes, and how they make those choices, do have an impact on virtually all of our interactions with government. For that reason, the Court's navigation between Congress' stated intent and Congress' contradictory statutory language in this case may have implications for future litigation that is a little more germane to a few more people.
Magwood v. Patterson:
Mr. Magwood, a schizophrenic Vietnam War veteran, killed a sheriff. He was convicted and sentenced to death. His death sentence was reversed by a writ of habeas corpus, and his sentencing hearing was reheld. He was again sentenced to death. It was not until his second death sentence was on appellate review that his appellate counsel realized that Mr. Magwood was not statutorily eligible for a death sentence. Counsel raised this issue in Mr. Magwood's petition for writ of habeas corpus. However, the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) does not allow a petitioner to raise an issue on habeas that could have been raised in a previous habeas petition. Therefore, argues the state of Alabama, Mr. Magwood cannot raise this issue now because he could have raised it when he was litigating his first death sentence. Mr. Magwood's attorneys, including the incomparable Jeffrey Fisher, assert that Mr. Magwood's second penalty trial was a whole new action, and thus he is entitled to litigate the fact that he is not death-eligible in his request that the courts review that trial.
Why you should care: Well, you could care because AEDPA is so restrictive that it results in a great deal of injustice taking place in the name of streamlining the execution of people. You could care because one of the results of the law is that the success of constitutional claims is dependent almost completely on whether a convicted defendant is fortunate enough to be appointed a competent lawyer, rather than on whether the claims are valid. However, I think you should care because of the only questions asked by Justice Stevens during oral argument:
Let me just ask, is this the case in which the claim is he's ineligible for the death penalty?...And is that---is that a meritorious claim?...The merits of the claim have never been decided?
Any ruling that a person can be executed for a non-capital case solely because his lawyer was not smart enough to notice the issue in time is a ruling that exalts punishment over justice, and process over life.
Orders:
On March 24, the Court issued an order staying the execution scheduled in Texas that night of Hank Skinner. Mr. Skinner was convicted of raping and murdering his girlfriend and murdering her two adult mentally-disabled sons. On the night of the murders, Mr. Skinner was seen passed out in his girlfriend's house, due to what later toxicology tests showed was a near lethal amount of codeine in his system, along with alcohol and Xanax. His girlfriend went to a party, where an uncle of hers, who had previously made passes at her, again made advances. Later that night, Mr. Skinner either killed the victims, or was so drugged that he slept through the murders. People who saw him the next day confirmed that he was still heavily under the influence. For ten years, Mr. Skinner has been trying to have DNA testing done on such evidence as the victim's rape kit and the scrapings taken from under her fingernails. The State of Texas has refused to either do the testing or let Mr. Skinner's defense team do the testing. Finally, Mr. Skinner sued Texas, arguing that it is a violation of his civil rights not to allow him to test the DNA. The issue of whether Federal civil rights laws give convicted inmates the right to DNA testing is an open one, and it was this issue that was in front of the Supreme Court when it granted a stay. The Court still has to decide whether to grant certiorari and thus take the case for argument and decision, but as it takes 5 votes for a stay and only 4 to grant certiorari, it looks like Mr. Skinner will have his day in court.
Oh, and Mr. Skinner's trial counsel, who did not ask for DNA testing at the time of trial? He was Harold Comer, a former district attorney who had previously prosecuted Mr. Skinner for various felonies which were used at his murder trial as evidence in favor of execution. Mr. Comer was no longer a prosecutor because he had stolen $10,000 from a drug seizure fund.