So, I've spent much of the last week following the Tunisian elections and providing updates on the elections for the Witnessing Revolution Liveblog Series (#261, #262.) In spite of a few setbacks resulting in the three-month postponement of these elections, and a few technical hitches on Election Day itself, the movement toward democratizing institutions in Tunisia seemed to be progressing apace. While early registration was disappointingly low--one of the reasons for postponing the originally scheduled elections in June--turnout and same-day registration seem to have been good, with estimates in some districts as high as 80% of eligible voters. The consensus among international observers at the polling-stations was that the polling was fair, orderly and transparent. There may, however, now be a bit of a hiccup in the wake of the decision last night by the national election authority (ISIE) to invalidate what appears to be at least 130,000 votes.
Follow me after the squiggley-thingama-doodad...
The Elections
I view with grim humor the number of stories and opinions I've read and heard over the last week regarding the Tunisian election in which concern--'concerns'--for the results outweighs the responsibility to explain the purpose of the election. Some clarity, then, beyond the 'Islamist Victory'...
Tunisians (in Tunisia and citizens abroad) were voting to elect representatives to the 217-member National Constituent Assembly (NCA), a body charged with appointing an interim government to serve until presidential and parliamentary elections are held according to terms of the new constitution which the NCA will draft. All but one of the major parties (CPR) have endorsed a one-year term for the NCA to complete its work.
The 217 representatives in the NCA have been drawn from 33 electoral districts, of which 6 were assigned to represent Tunisians living abroad. Cartographically, districts were designed insofar as possible to correspond to the existing boundaries of governorates. Each district was allocated a maximum of 10 seats with each seat representing ~60,000 people. Low-population rural districts were assigned either one or two additional seats in an effort to provide some rural/urban balance. Overseas voting took place from 20-23 October, while domestic voting took place on 23 October.
The electoral method was a closed-list proportional represention system employing largest remainders. Candidates, whether running independently or as representatives of an official party, were required to run on a list with as many candidates as there were seats in the district. Each list was required to alternate between male and female candidates and each list was required to field at least one candidate below the age of 30. Former senior officials were barred from running.
The number of seats assigned to each list of candidates (most typically a single party) was calculated by dividing the total number of votes cast by the number of seats in order to establish the quota. The total number of votes for each list was then divided by the quota and one seat was assigned for each resulting whole number. Remaining seats were assigned to lists with the largest remainders.
Pre-Election Polling and Major Parties
The latest available public polling dated from late September, at which point four long-established parties (of the > 60 parties fielding candidates in addition to lists of independents) were drawing > 5% support. With some minor fluctuations, the support for these four parties was relatively stable over the course of the Summer and early Fall. The four parties are:
1. en-Nahda (alternatively al-Nahda, an-Nahda, Ennahda) - 'The Renaissance' party currently led by Rachid Ghannouchi and Hamadi Jebali was founded in 1981 by Rachid Ghannouci and Abdelfattah Mourou as the Islamic Tendency Movement. The party was barred from the 1981 elections and 107 members were jailed; most were freed after three years although Ghannouchi served 11 years. The party adopted the current name in 1989 and stood for legislative elections. The ruling party of Ben Ali took all legislative seats and en-Nahda candidates were punished severely. Upon leaving jail, Ghannouchi went into exile first in Algeria and then in London. Ghannouchi returned from exile on 30 January and en-Nahda was certified as a legally recognized political party in March. Polling consistently indicated that en-Nahda would draw ~25% of the popular vote.
2. Parti Démocrate Progressiste (PDP) - The Progressive Democratic Party currently led by Ahmed Nejib Chebbi and Maya Jribi was founded in 1983 as The Socialist Progressive Rally (RSP) and adopted its current name in 2001. The party was legalized in 1988 and fielded candidates in several legislative elections under the Ben Ali regime while boycotting several others. The PDP was oppressed under Ben Ali, yet not actively persecuted to the same degree as en-Nahda. Chebbi and Jribi are most recognized for their 2007 hunger-strike to draw attention to government repression. Jribi is also recognized for being the first female Secretary General of a major political party in Tunisia. Although the roots of the PDP are in secular leftist politics, the party is best described now as center-left and, through the leadership of Chebbi, as pro-business. Public support for PDP was highest in January (~25%) but in light of both a campaign of directed criticism of en-Nahda and the pro-business stance of Chebbi support fell over the Summer to the ~10-15% support maintained in the latest polling.
3. Ettakatol (alternatively al-Takkatul, FDTL) - Ettakatol ('The Coalescence'), also known as Forum Démocratique pour le Travail et les Libertés (FDTL), was founded in 1994 by current party leader Mustafa Ben Jaafar. The party was legalized in 2002 and occasionally fielded a small number of candidates in legislative elections. Ettakatol defines itself as center-left and secular with a social-democratic ideology. On 17 January Ben Jaafar, a medical doctor, had been appointed to the position of Minister of Public Health in the interim government but he resigned the post the following day to protest the inclusion of former Ben Ali regime officials in the government. Ettakatol published the most comprehensive platform of any of the major parties, focusing particular attention on issues related to transparency, combatting corruption and women's rights. Public support for Ettakatol had grown slowly but steadily over the course of the Summer so that, in the latest polling, the party drew ~10-15% of the public support.
4. Congrès pour la République (CPR) - Congress for the Republic is a secular center-left party established in 2001 by human-rights activist and professor of medicine Moncef Marzouki with the slogan "we exercise of freedom, we do not ask for it." The party was banned under Ben Ali in 2002 and the leadership either jailed or forced into exile. Since legal recognition in March, CPR has run a vigorous campaign on the values of human rights, civil liberties and campaign-finance reform. Per CPR's platform, the party aims to defend "the sovereignty of the people, the dignity of the citizen and the legitimacy of the state." CPR consistently drew ~5-10% of popular support in polling and was thought to hold greatest appeal amongst the middle class.
The Election Results
Complete results of the NCA elections by political party as announced by the ISIE between Tuesday and last night are represented below. Some specific results by individual districts will be discussed as necessary later in the diary/post. These results are provisional in the sense that there is the possibility of litigation related to violations of election law in a very small number of cases.
Party: # seats (pctNCA)
en-Nahda: 90 seats (41.47%)
CPR: 30 seats (13.82%)
Ettakatol: 21 seats (9.68%)
al-Aridha al-Chaabia: 19 seats (8.76%)
PDP: 17 seats (7.83%)
al-Moubadara: 5 seats (2.30%)
PDM: 5 seats (2.30%)
Afek Tounes: 4 seats (1.84%)
PCOT: 3 seats (1.38%)
Mouvement du Peuple: 2 seats (0.92%)
Independent List, Sidi Bouzid: 2 seats (0.92%)
Liberal Maghrebin: 1 seat (0.46%)
Democratic Nation: 1 seat
National Tunisian Front: 1 seat
al-Adalah: 1 seat
MPD: 1 seat
Social Struggle: 1 seat
Social Democratic Movement: 1 seat
al-Wafa: 1 seat
Hope Party, Kef: 1 seat
Justice et Equite: 1 seat
Neo-Destour: 1 seat
PPUM: 1 seat
PCUN: 1 seat
Sawt el-Mostakol: 1 seat
Democratic Socialist Movement: 1 seat
National Democratic Movement: 1 seat
UPL: 1 seat
Loyalty to the Martyrs: 1 seat
Progressive Struggle: 1 seat
Before parsing these results, it has to be noted that al-Aridha al-Chabbia ('The Popular Petition') was stripped of nine seats across six districts (Jendouba [-1], Kasserine [-2], Sfax 1 [-1], Sidi Bouzid [-3], Tataouine [-1], France 2 [-1]) by the Tunisian national election authority (ISIE) for violations of election law. Recalculation of those districts resulted in gains for en-Nahda (+2), PDP (+2), CPR (+1), Ettakatol (+1), al-Wafa (+1), National Democratic Movement (+1) and the Independent List in Sidi Bouzid (+1).
En-Nahda clearly out-performed expectations based on public polling (~25%) and based on the party's own internal analyses (~30%.) Indeed, in all of the domestic districts save two (Kebili and Sidi Bouzid) and in four of the six international districts en-Nahda took the greatest number of seats; in the four remaining districts en-Nahda tied for the most seats. Commentators attribute en-Nahda's over-performance to three factors. First, it is undeniable that en-Nahda was the best organized and among the best funded of all parties contesting these elections. Second, en-Nahda has made it clear since Spring that it is committed to coalition-building with political parties and civil associations. Third, there is a general respect for en-Nahda among Tunisians for simply having endured the persecutions under the Ben Ali regime. In the end, en-Nahda's success was absolutely anticipated, though the magnitude of that success may have surprised some.
While en-Nahda's gain of 41% of the seats of the NAC is THE STORY (Eeek! 'Islamist Victory!') for most of the Western media, I submit that the most important stories to come from these elections are 1) the cratering of PDP and 2) the odd rise and subsequent treatment of al-Aridha al-Chaabia.
The secular center-left PDP of Chebbi and Jribi seemed in the early days of Spring to have natural affinities with the spirit of Tunisia's Jasmine Revolution and seemed best situated, in my opinion, to adapt itself as a destination for the electoral-politics of the Tunisian youth. The high visibility of the PDP relative to other secular and center-left parties also suggested that it would be the leading party in opposition to the religious politics of en-Nahda. Two factors seem to be in play in diagnosing PDP's collapse. First, the documented pro-business sentiments of Chebbi and intimations of campaign-funding improprieties with business connections weakened PDP's credibility with a public critical of such policies. Second, PDP's directed public criticism of en-Nahda's religious politics and expressed unwillingness to build a coalition with en-Nahda seem to have resonated negatively with many Tunisians for whom the constancy of en-Nahda in the face of the Ben Ali regime's persecution was a positive. The PDP, just prior to the election considered to be the principal party in opposition to en-Nahda, must now exercise reduced political power through their intended secular center-left coalition with PDM and Afek Tounes.
For many, the most surprising aspect of the Tunisian NCA elections was the completely unanticipated performance of al-Aridha al-Chaabia ('The Popular Petition'), the party of London-based TV-mogul and -personality Mohammed Hachmi Hamdi. The party was founded by Hamdi only in March of this year. Hamdi is originally from Sidi Bouzid and represents himself still as a man of the region, a man of the southern interior of the country as distinct from the metropolitan coastal cities. Hamdi owns two satellite-television channels and hosts a show ('Tunisian Conversations') on the al-Moustaqila channel through which he speaks directly to compatriots in a folksy southern dialect. Hamdi also elicits popular appeal by representing himself as a victim of the traditional Tunisian political elite. Hamdi's campaign rhetoric was a compelling mixture of folksy populism with promises of UK-style social support services and religious conservatism.
As noted above, nine of al-Aridha al-Chaabia's 28 seats were disallowed by election officials on Thursday evening due to violations of election campaign-financing laws. The ISIE indicated that al-Aridha al-Chaabia both spent beyond the set maximum and also improperly used foreign funds. The nullification of what amounts to a minimum of 130,000 votes is troublesome, as is the ISIE's swiftness to act on these violations, given that there is a twelve-day window following the announcement of the complete provisional vote (i.e., starting today) for hearings on potential violations and other irregularities. The ISIE's rapidity to act may have been nobly intended, but some commentators are now questioning whether the nullification of these votes was the correct process and also pondering whether the ISIE's quick and strong actions against al-Aridha al-Chaabia, when alleged infractions by other parties have yet to be investigated, might have been a decision of political expedience rather than legal necessity. Those participating in protests last night in Sidi Bouzid are certainly not shy about making similar assertions. The irony, of course, is that Sidi Bouzid is also the town in which Mohammed Bouazizi immolated himself last 10 months ago, an act which marked the beginning of the Jasmine Revolution.
I had hoped to be able to write a diary following the complete provisional assignment of seats in the NCA in which I could add my voice to those of the international observers at polling-stations in Tunisia last Sunday, echoing the praise for a fair, orderly and transparent election. Such praise, I fear, must remain tempered pending a full and credible explanation of the ISIE's decision to invalidate those nine seats.