I just want to share this Washington Institute article, one of the most informative assessments on the use of no-fly zones in Iraq that I've found, and the lessons those episodes may hold for Libya.
Slippery Slope: Libya and the Lessons of Previous No-Fly Zones
Here is the referenced U.N. resolution 688.
And the related 'Risks and Benefits' Policy Review article.
One major difference I see between Iraq at that time and Libya now is the politics - Saddam had the national Ba'athist Party, a political reflection of a very broad Arab nationalism. Gaddafi rules over a tribal system of competing interests.
And I think we should encourage our leaders to hear more about those interests, their reactions to U.N. intervention, and their stakes in Libyas future.
If the U.S. made a single worst mistake in Iraq and Afghanistan, it was to completely overlook legitimate leaders and politically respected groups native to the country.
I believe this is where I say 'More below the fold...'
Admittedly, Knight's Washington Institute article describes the success of the Kurdish no-fly zone as due in part to the presence of ground troops and special forces, something forbidden in the current U.N. 1973 (and we are accepting 'success' as a relative term, as of course the Kurds suffered deeply since). edit: see comments
But Knight's article helps put certain complaints in perspective. For instance, now that strikes are being carried out the Arab League has sudden criticism (sudden for me anyway, I felt their approval was an important positive point)
"What is happening in Libya differs from the aim of imposing a no-fly zone..."
What this seems to be asking is that U.N. air forces be limited in more of the same ways that allowed massacres of rebels and their civilian supporters in southern Iraq. From the Washington Institute:
"When we saw the allied jets ignore the guns that were killing us and hit only the missiles that threatened their planes last year, we knew we had been abandoned."
So the capacity to engage air-to-ground is important, and brings up the importance of intervening before fighting entered Benghazi: air forces are quite useless (or extremely destructive) in urban fighting. To keep Western troops off the ground yet avoid a stalemate, either the rebels need to shape up an offensive, or Gaddafi forces must retreat or collapse.
Neither was possible for Kurds or rebel Iraqis, but the Free-Libyans are facing tribal and mercenary forces, not a national army. This has very few impacts when the war is a campaign of slaughter, and accordingly once Gaddafi's offensive really began, reports of dissent among his forces fell off. But if intervention can generate some give-and-take, loyalties may come into question.
I know very little about Libyan tribes, but however we feel about the current events, I think we should all start finding out more immediately and insist on an awareness of those tribal politics in both the popular and political discourse.
Here are articles about their roles in the current situation from Arab and UK perspectives.
We knew the major Warfala tribe had effectively revolted, but I would love to find out more, or if anyone is seeking out particular reactions from the Zentan, Bani Walid, Obeidat, or Warfala groups since the U.N. intervention.