On May 27, 2011, the Pakistan Bureau chief for the Asian Times Online, Syed Saleem Shahzad, published the first of a two-part investigative report on the attack on PNS Mehran Naval Air Station in Karachi, Pakistan. On May 31, 2011, after (unconfirmed) rumors that he had been arrested by the ISI, Shahzad's body was found dumped in a canal not far from his vehicle.
One of the core beliefs of liberalism is speaking truth to power. And I think most recognize that doing so sometimes entails certain risks...to freedom, or even to life. The only way to fight against such crimes as what happened to Saleem Shahzad is to make sure that the truth he was speaking through his reporting becomes a deafening roar in the halls of power, whether they be in Washington, D.C. or Islamabad.
In that spirit, this diary is about the truths that Saleem Shahzad uncovered and reported on. I don't know yet if he ever had a chance to write the second article in the series, but if he did I strongly urge the Asia Times Online to publish the piece as scheduled, and I will cover that too.
The first bombshell dropped by Mr. Shahzad:
Al-Qaeda had warned of Pakistan strike
By Syed Saleem Shahzad
This is the first article in a two-part report.
ISLAMABAD - Al-Qaeda carried out the brazen attack on PNS Mehran naval air station in Karachi on May 22 after talks failed between the navy and al-Qaeda over the release of naval officials arrested on suspicion of al-Qaeda links, an Asia Times Online investigation reveals.
There are two revelations here. First, based on claims of responsibility and Pakistani government statements, the Pakistani Taliban...known as the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, or TTP...had been credited with this attack, though there were some (especially in the military and CT community) who doubted the TTP had the caliber of soldier to carry out that operation. The revelation that the attackers were al Qaeda and not TTP means that, despite beheading the beast on May 2, al Qaeda maintained a level of operational ability that allowed it to not only invade PNS Mehran successfully, but hold off the Pakistani equivalent of the Navy Seals for 15 hours, with at least 2 of their number escaping in the end. Many in the CT community were hoping beyond hope that these commandos turned out to be Indian, to be honest. It would be soothing, in a way, to know that such skilled and hardened soldiers were the product of a nation-state. The revelation that they are al Qaeda shows that we are no longer dealing with radical teenagers and young men who attend a kind of boot camp or two (like the ones we've all seen on tv). It means we are now dealing with a highly trained military force, made up entirely of special forces type operatives that can strike at any time, anywhere. It means that, instead of decimating al Qaeda, we have created a force truly to be reckoned with...soldiers with the skills of a special forces operative combined with the belief that his mission is ordained by God.
The second revelation, of course, is that the Pakistani government had discovered an al Qaeda cell in its Navy, arrested some of those involved, and then engaged in negotiations with al Qaeda for their release. Shahzad continues:
At least 10 people were killed and two United States-made P3-C Orion surveillance and anti-submarine aircraft worth US$36 million each were destroyed before some of the attackers escaped through a cordon of thousands of armed forces.
An official statement placed the number of militants at six, with four killed and two escaping. Unofficial sources, though, claim there were 10 militants with six getting free. Asia Times Online contacts confirm that the attackers were from Ilyas Kashmiri's 313 Brigade, the operational arm of al-Qaeda.
Three attacks on navy buses in which at least nine people were killed last month were warning shots for navy officials to accept al-Qaeda's demands over the detained suspects.
The May 2 killing in Pakistan of Osama bin Laden spurred al-Qaeda groups into developing a consensus for the attack in Karachi, in part as revenge for the death of their leader and also to deal a blow to Pakistan's surveillance capacity against the Indian navy.
The deeper underlying motive, though, was a reaction to massive internal crackdowns on al-Qaeda affiliates within the navy.
For those of you who follow CT (counter-terrorism) news, you may recognize the name Ilyas Kashmiri. David Headley, who is currently testifying in a trial in Chicago in relation to the 2008 Mumbai Attacks, once told federal agents he could plant a tracker on Kashmiri (an indicted co-conspirator) to enable them to target him with a drone strike. His name was also mentioned by some analysts as a possible successor to Osama bin Laden as head of al Qaeda.
The "massive crackdown" against al Qaeda in the Pakistani Military actually shows that Pakistan was trying to do the right thing...trying to purge their ranks of militants as General Kayani has sworn to do. Not an easy task:
Volcano of militancy
Several weeks ago, naval intelligence traced an al-Qaeda cell operating inside several navy bases in Karachi, the country's largest city and key port.
"Islamic sentiments are common in the armed forces," a senior navy official told Asia Times Online on the condition of anonymity as he is not authorized to speak to the media.
"We never felt threatened by that. All armed forces around the world, whether American, British or Indian, take some inspiration from religion to motivate their cadre against the enemy. Pakistan came into existence on the two-nation theory that Hindus and Muslims are two separate nations and therefore no one can separate Islam and Islamic sentiment from the armed forces of Pakistan," the official said.
"Nonetheless, we observed an uneasy grouping on different naval bases in Karachi. While nobody can obstruct armed forces personnel for rendering religious rituals or studying Islam, the grouping [we observed] was against the discipline of the armed forces. That was the beginning of an intelligence operation in the navy to check for unscrupulous activities."
The official explained the grouping was against the leadership of the armed forces and opposed to its nexus with the United States against Islamic militancy. When some messages were intercepted hinting at attacks on visiting American officials, intelligence had good reason to take action and after careful evaluation at least 10 people - mostly from the lower cadre - were arrested in a series of operations.
"That was the beginning of huge trouble," the official said.
Soldiers...of whatever nationality, have a right to have religious beliefs, and to practice those beliefs. Figuring out who, among religious sailors, are radical al Qaeda members as opposed to just conservative Muslims has to be a very difficult problem, but one that General Kayani was nonetheless trying to tackle. The attack on PNS Mehran was a backlash to that effort.
Also notice the catalyst for these arrests. Intercepted messages hinting at attacks on American officials. This also shines a favorable light on Pakistani efforts to get its house in order. By making these arrests, they thwarted the planned attacks...and paid dearly for it.
Those arrested were held in a naval intelligence office behind the chief minister's residence in Karachi, but before proper interrogation could begin, the in-charge of the investigation received direct threats from militants who made it clear they knew where the men were being detained.
The detainees were promptly moved to a safer location, but the threats continued. Officials involved in the case believe the militants feared interrogation would lead to the arrest of more of their loyalists in the navy. The militants therefore made it clear that if those detained were not released, naval installations would be attacked.
It was clear the militants were receiving good inside information as they always knew where the suspects were being detained, indicating sizeable al-Qaeda infiltration within the navy's ranks. A senior-level naval conference was called at which an intelligence official insisted that the matter be handled with great care, otherwise the consequences could be disastrous. Everybody present agreed, and it was decided to open a line of communication with al-Qaeda.
Abdul Samad Mansoori, a former student union activist and now part of 313 brigade, who originally hailed from Karachi but now lives in the North Waziristan tribal area was approached and talks begun. Al-Qaeda demanded the immediate release of the officials without further interrogation. This was rejected.
The detainees were allowed to speak to their families and were well treated, but officials were desperate to interrogate them fully to get an idea of the strength of al-Qaeda's penetration. The militants were told that once interrogation was completed, the men would be discharged from the service and freed.
Al-Qaeda rejected these terms and expressed its displeasure with the attacks on the navy buses in April.
These incidents pointed to more than the one al-Qaeda cell intelligence had tracked in the navy. The fear now was that if the problem was not addressed, North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) supply lines could face a new threat. NATO convoys are routinely attacked once they begin the journey from Karachi to Afghanistan; now they could be at risk in Karachi port. Americans who often visit naval facilities in the city would also be in danger.
Therefore, another crackdown was conducted and more people were arrested. Those seized had different ethnic backgrounds. One naval commando came from South Waziristan's Mehsud tribe and was believed to have received direct instructions from Hakeemullah Mehsud, the chief of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (Pakistan Taliban). Others were from Punjab province and Karachi, the capital of Sindh province.
After Bin Laden was killed by American Navy Seals in Abbottabad, 60 kilometers north of Islamabad, militants decided the time was ripe for major action.
Within a week, insiders at PNS Mehran provided maps, pictures of different exit and entry routes taken in daylight and at night, the location of hangers and details of likely reaction from external security forces.
As a result, the militants were able to enter the heavily guarded facility where one group targeted the aircraft, a second group took on the first strike force and a third finally escaped with the others providing covering fire. Those who stayed behind were killed.
Based on what I know of the actions of the Pakistani Military and a healthy dose of common sense, I do not believe those who are spreading the story that the ISI arrested and then murdered Shahzad. I believe this was an al Qaeda operation intended to deepen the distrust between Pakistan and the United States, by making it appear as if Pakistan is violently suppressing journalists and hiding contacts with al Qaeda. To be sure, there is a lot of room for improvement for freedom of the press in Pakistan, but if you read the (extremely critical) local press in Pakistan you will understand that the idea that this article embarrassed or even bothered the ISI enough to make it do something like this is ridiculous on its face. The aim of al Qaeda in this appears to be to weaken a Pakistani state already reeling from the raid on May 2 (and resulting strain in relations with the US) and numerous terrorist attacks since then, along with very harsh criticism of all institutions of the Pakistani state in the local press.
On Sunday evening, Saleem Shahzad disappeared on his way to a television appearance. Forty-eight hours later, his body was found in a canal in the Gujarat district of Punjab province 150 kilometers south of Islamabad. In addition to his extensive work as a journalist specializing in terrorism, he was author of `Inside Al-Qaeda & The Taliban, Beyond Bin Laden & 9/11’, which hit stores earlier this month.
Syed Saleem Shahzad will be sorely missed, but he will not be forgotten. May he rest in peace.
UPDATE: I should clarify that, while it is my personal opinion that this was not an act carried out by the ISI, that is just an opinion. Whoever is responsible for this heinous deed should be brought to justice, whether it be al Qaeda or ISI.