On Friday, June 14th, Iranians will go to the polls to elect a new President, or assuming no candidate reaches 50% in the first round, select two candidates to move on to a runoff two weeks later. A runoff has only happened once in Iranian history, in the 2005 Presidential elections when the top-placing former President Ali Akbar Hashami Rafsanjani only received 22% of the vote and seemed headed for a second round with the eccentric Majlis(Parliament) Speaker Mehdi Karroubi, before late arriving results pushed the largely unknown Mayor of Tehran, Mahmud Ahmadinejad into second place. Two weeks later Ahmadinejad smashed Rafsanjani 63-37%.
This year there are seven candidates running. Eight were approved by the Council of Guardians out of more than 600 applicants, and one, former Majlis Speaker Gholam Hadad-Adal dropped out late last week. This article will provide both a background to the Iranian electoral process and political seen, profiles of the candidates, and make a few predictions.
It should be noted that sections of this piece draw from pieces I wrote for World Outline(http://theworldoutline.com/...) among other sites, so no need for accusations of plagiarism to the two of you who might come across them.
Wait a Moment, Isn't the President Just a Puppet for the Supreme Leader?
Its become common in international media to misunderstand the role of the Supreme Leader and President in Iran. The assumption is made that because an unelected figure exists outside the normal political process who has the final say on all key political disputes that this individual wields all of the power in Iran. This interpretation is in reality as absurd as similar suggestions during the 2009 election protests that the Supreme Leader was somehow bound to the constitutional oversight of the political branches by way of the Assembly of Experts.
The best comparison of the role of the Supreme Leader is to that of the Japanese Emperor before the Second World War. While the Emperor was briefed on key decisions including the formation of governments, military dispositions and questions of war and peace, his ability to initiate policy was limited by the fact that he was forced to choose among the options presented to him by his courtiers and officials. Custom prevented him from suggesting policies on his own; doing so might compromise the Imperial dignity by tying the throne to the unpopularity of a particular policy, its partisan connotations, or to its ultimate lack of success and legitimize the concept of opposition to the throne. In order to maintain the divine and absolute power of the Throne, the Emperor was effectively prohibited from exercising it except in a circumspect manner.
Nonetheless, if the Supreme Leader’s autocratic powers are limited, he still wields enormous powers through his control of appointments and his role as mediator of last resort, that if used with subtlety and wisdom can reshape national politics over the course of years. By manipulating the approval of candidates and backing one side and then another within domestic debates to ensure a balance of power and consistent deadlocks, the Leader can make himself indispensable for decision making on almost all critical issues. In this way he also functions like the US Supreme Court - by settling disputes in a manner befitting their ideology, that body can shift politics in whatever direction they wish with little popular input. Nonetheless they are limited by what cases are brought before them.
This is where elections matter - elections shake up the personnel in the government between whom the Leader will have to settle disputes. If all the roles in the state are occupied by one faction they can settle issues before they even reach the Leader, locking him out of power. Hence he has an interest in conflict. Of the positions of State, the President is the most important because he appoints the Cabinet and the regional governors.
Won't this Election Just be Rigged?
The 2009 elections did not do much for the reputation of the Iranian electoral system. In the interests of full disclosure I was one of those in contact with Nate Silver during those elections.
TFor the purposes of this diary however, I will assume that 2009 was largely a one-off event. and deal with any blatant fraud if and when it occurs this weekend. In my view 2009 was the result of unique circumstances, namely the alliance of Former President Rafsanjani, and Former Prime Minister Mousavi. Had someone been had access to Ali Khamenei's enemies list they would not have been able to design a political constellation more objectionable to the Supreme Leader, and my suspicion is that rather than a pre-planned operation(the process was the sloppiest rigging seen in a recent theft) the entire thing had something of a "will someone not rid me of this turbulent priest" about it. Khamenei likely expressed his horror at the prospect of Mousavi serving as President, and figures in his entourage eager to curry favor ensured it did not happen with limited if any involvement on the part of Ahmadinejad himself. Ahmadinejad, while stating his faith he represented the majority, certainly did nothing to defend the process itself or the crackdown after the fact, and earlier this year even suggested he had doubts about the integrity of the results.
Had the Interior Ministry been aware of the fraud in advance, it would have been a simply manner to post results within the following few hours. Instead we has to wait more than 36 hours for even highly questionable numbers to be posted in PDF form, numbers that were rapidly removed.
With That Said Who Is Running
Well not either Rafsanjani or Ahmadinejad's chosen successor Esfandiar Rahmim Mashaei, who attempted to build a movement based on Iranian nationalism, claiming that Iran saved Islam from the Arabs, holding public exhibitions on Pre-Islamic Iran, and even suggesting Iran could be friendly with Israelis. Both had their candidacies rejected by the Council of Guardians. Despite fawning international coverage of Rafsanjani(whose entourage is the primary source for insider information on Iranian politics for the Western media), this is a bigger deal for Ahmadinajed and the conservative secularists than the reformists. The former lack any candidate(except perhaps Qalibaf) whereas the latter at least have a B-lister and an A-lister tarred by close links to Khamenei.
So who was approved? Well
The Establishment Conservatives
Saeed Jalili – A former Intelligence official and deputy Foreign Minister who broke with Ahmadinejad in 2007, Jalili is probably the best representative of the Iranian Neo-Conservative Right, seeing in reform, democracy and pluralism the hand of Western subversion. The Washington Post has named him the frontrunner, but its unlikely he will achieve the 50% needed for a runoff without extensive falsification, or win such a runoff against most of the other candidates on the list.
Ali Akbar Velayati – Probably the best the representative of the “Opportunist” tendency on the Iranian Right, Velayati served as Foreign Minister between 1981 and 1997, serving both under the Leftist Mousavi(later the Reformist candidate in 2009) and the Pragmatic Rafsanjani. Ditched by Khatami and the Reformists, Velayati reinvented himself as the Foreign Policy Adviser to the Supreme Leader and stresses every opportunity to publicly remind everyone of his current Principalist(aka Conservative) credentials.
The "Pragmatic" Conservatives
Mohamad-Bagher Qalibaf – Ahmadinejad’s successor as Mayor of Tehran, Qalibaf later broke with the President back in 2006 before doing so was cool on the Iranian Right and formed an alliance with local Reformists. Stressing his reputation as a pragmatic nationalist, Qalibaf referred to himself as the new Reza Shah, and provocative comparison in post-79 Iran, and was named international Mayor of the year in 2008. Charismatic, with a reputation for independence, Qalibaf has called for a restoration of ties with the United States. Running an aggressively populist campaign, he seems to have done the most to catch fire this year, and is probably the actual frontrunner. He was interviewed by the Financial Times in 2008(http://www.ft.com/...)
Mohsen Rezaee – Rezaee has impeccable revolutionary credentials as the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corp from 1981-1999, including during the heyday of the war with Iraq. Once a radical conservative. Rezaee sent his two daughters to the University of Southern California and reinvented himself as a moderate, running for President in 2009, and initially backing the Reformist challenge to the results of that year. He publicly favors a rapprochement with the United States, and greater independence of the judiciary and the electoral process with Iran, while retaining religiously conservative laws.
The Reformists:
Hassan Rowhani – Iran’s Chief Nuclear Negotiator under Khatami , Rowhani has little profile in domestic affairs. He recently authored a book on his experiences in which he suggested that George W Bush expressed a desire to restore normalized relations with Iran, and expressed a willingness to lead the talks himself, only for the initiative to be scotched by Ayatollah Khamenei. This undermined the traditional narrative that Bush, by placing Iran in the axis of evil, rejected Iranian overtures. Following Ahmadinejad’s election, Rowhani , who despite his reformist views is close to the Supreme Leader, became the latter’s advisory on nuclear issues. Rowhani, as a Reformist with close ties to Khamenei, is likely an insurance policy against a Reformist surge, or in the event one of the Conservative proves unruly, and Rowhani victory, assuming he makes the runoff, cannot be ruled out.
Mohammad Reza Aref – Aref served as Khatami’s Vice President from 2001 to 2005 after serving as both the Chancellor of the University of Tehran, and as Minister of Technology. From the Academic wing of the Reformist movement, Aref kept a low-profile both in office and out. While he withdraw from the 2008 Majlis elections in the basis that they were unfair, he was largely silent during the 2009 protests. This year he offered to withdraw from the race if former President Khatami declared his candidacy. Given his background, its unlikely that a President Aref would do much to challenge the Supreme Leaders power even as he would personally sympathize with liberalism, which would make him, like Rouhani, a safe backup pick for the leader.
The Unknown
Mohammad Gharazi – For someone who served as a Cabinet Minister for 17 years(1981-1997) remarkably little is known about the politics of the former Petroleum and Posts Minister. Appointed by Mir Hossein Mousavi, he served under Rafsanjani until resigning in 1997 after Khatami’s election.
The Withdrawn
Gholam-Ali Haddad-Adel – The Former Speaker of the Majlis until he was ousted in 2008 by Ali Lariiani, Haddad-Adel is also the son-in law of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. With a somewhat low-profile he never quite took off, and withdraw from the race last week after endorsing Jalili.
Polls?
Polls in Iran are notoriously bad. Its not a free country, people with cell phones try to change sims constantly to avoid surveillance, and many in the rural areas lack any connection. Nonetheless Wikipedia has a list of polls, most of which show Qalibaf in the lead around 30%, followed by Rowhani, Aref, and Jalili. Qaliabaf is probably well positioned for the runoff. Against Aref he will earn the votes of Conservatives; against Jalili of Reformists and young Iranians who fear Jalili's social conservatism and links to security hardliners. Rowhani would probably put up the greatest challenge.
If for some reason Qalibaf does not make the runoff things become more interesting, both in terms of the increased suspicions of official tampering such an outcome would produce, and the more polarized ideological conflict. In fair race, either Rowhani or Aref should easily dispatch Jalili - whether they would get one is more of an open question.
What does it mean for relations with America?
Almost any change would lead to improvement given the personal reputation Ahmadinejad has gained, and the manner in which that reputation makes it impossible for a rapprochement as long as he remains in office. Jalili has pledged not to surrender Iran's nuclear rights - Qalibaf and Rezaee have both called for direct talks with the United States, and both have direct experience with Americans, Qalibaf from international conferences of Mayors from which he has become acquainted with Bloomberg and former DC Mayor Anthony Williams, Rezaee from sending his daughters to University in the United States in the last decade. Rowhani was Iran's chief emissary to the West under Khatami, and had numerous meetings with George W. Bush, with whom he claims in his memoirs to have struck up something of a friendship. He has claimed that Bush offered to personally lead direct talks aimed at normalizing relations only to have Khamenei reject the offer. Aref has long favored full normalization.
That said, while the issue of whether Iran should build nuclear weapons divides candidates, all support Iran's abstract "right" to do so. Iranians resent foreigners telling them what they are fit and unfit to possess, especially when Pakistan, which they see as highly unstable, is allowed such weapons as well as large amounts of US aid. Anyone who accepted the current US position would be driven out instantly. Any agreement that ends Iran's enrichment in fact must acknowledge Iran's legal right to pursue it in theory,
12:35 PM PT: Today Mohamad Aref dropped out of the race, calling on Reformists to unite behind Hassan Rowhani. This move makes Rowhani's presence in a runoff highly likely, and in my view sets up a Qalibaf/Rowhani runoff as the most likely outcome