The initial flurry of publicity over the movie American Sniper is long over at this point. The movie's focus on one sniper's-eye view of the conflict keeps the movie narrative tight. But there is one aspect of the story that bothered me, which can provide a springboard for a wider discussion of the proper use of the sniper in particular, and the military in general.
The thing that sounded an odd note to me. a retired commo NCO, is the part where the sniper left his assigned post (an apparent violation of the soldiers general orders) to jump in with the assault team of door-kickers moving house-to-house in Military Operations in Urban Terrain (MOUT), clearing out enemy forces. Not that it couldn't happen that way, but it seemed strange that an team that trained together would on the spur of the moment want an X factor introduced into the equation at a high-adrenaline point. Below the fold, we'll explore that question, and bigger ones...
Let's explain where I'm going with this. The first part of the diary is to try to give people who had the same question I did (was he really leaving his post?) a bit more background on the subject than can be explained in a movie, quoting from sources. The second part of the diary is to elevate the discussion from tactics to strategy, as the second Iraq conflict involved a difference in views by civilian oversight of Defense (Donald Rumsfeld) against that of the Joint Chiefs (The Powell Doctrine), a debate very much alive today. And the third part of the diary addresses the other factors not included in the movie, such as the diplomatic and economic arenas. All of these factors are very much alive today, as the West contemplates the question of what to do about Iran, and its potential for nuclear weapons. And given the recent Congressional flap over the GOPs inviting Israel's Prime Minister to address Congress, this is a debate that has broad ramifications for democracy in general.
Was he leaving his post?. In basic infantry training, one rifle position lays down covering fire, while the second rifle moves, and they continue leapfrogging to the objective. In the movie, sniper Chris Kyle's assignment is to provide covering fire as a sniper, as an assault group does it's house-to-house clearing operations. The twist is that at one point, Kyle apparently decides on his own to join the house clearing operation, which in theory takes the covering fire position away. In the movie, it appears condescending, as if the assault team needed the help. The book Shooter by Gunnery Sgt Jack Coughlin USMC, Cpt. Casey Kuhlman USMC and Donald Davis, goes into great detail about the origins of the newer high-mobility tactics of sniping, and shows how this had been integrated into the training of assault teams. IMO, Shooter is a well-written book, and airs very well the pros and cons of fast-moving tactics versus the more traditional crawl, shoot, and slip away. Additional illumination for why a sniper might leave an assigned position comes in the book by Chris Martin, St Martin's Press; NY, 2014 p. 143. That answers the first question.
The second question is how does the military option fit into strategy? In the second Iraq conflict, Shooter observes the split between SecDef Rumsfeld's desire for fast- moving strategy, and the Joint Chief's preference for the Powell Doctrine:
overwhelming force, specific objective, clear exit strategy. Shooter, St Martin's Press; NY; 2005, p. 117
. The book explains how the fast-moving idea almost snarled by getting too far ahead of the supply lines, as in the capture of Jessica Lynch (p.103).
One answer seems to be that if the conflict is low-intensity, the military solution relies more on special operations types--Green Berets, SEALS, Delta Force, etc. The downside is that things can go horribly wrong--the hostage rescue from Iran that cost Jimmy Carter the presidential re-election campaign to Ronald Reagan; Black Hawk Down, etc. If the civilian leadership relies on that option, there is always the reality of interservice rivalry anyway. This is spelled out extensively in Modern American Snipers, although IMO the book is a hard read even for military types, as it is loaded with acronyms without a glossary, and lacks maps to follow the narrative, so you have to pull them up on your own, and is quite disjointed, but does have lots of insights into both tactics and strategy--just not coherently presented, IMO.
The other answers is, if the conflict is high-intensity, as one with Iran would presumably be, the military solution relies more on conventional strategy and tactics. When Gen. Shinseiki wanted to go big in Iraq, with hundreds of thousands of combat troops, it cost him his job, as it was deemed politically unacceptable. With the many year of war already in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is a real political question whether the American public would support a large land war with Iran (or anyone else, say North Korea).
One of the common problems of decision makers is that they over-estimate the ease with which victory can be won. The Powell Doctrine comes from lessons allegedly learned in the Vietnam War. One insight worth citing, IMO, is the following:
Their (NVA) decisive superiority against both the US and ARVN was their strategy in accurately assessing the opposing political leaders-- Inside The VC and the NVA: The Real Story of North Vietnam's Armed Forces, by Michael Lee Lanning and Dan Cragg, p. 207
. Which argues for not just good military intelligence on military opposition, but good diplomatic information on foreign political opposition. And On the point of getting a clear military mission, the book cites BG (Ret.) James S. Timothy as saying:
The US never gave its forces the mission of winning the war (in Vietnam) . p. 207).
Lessons on how hard it can be to win a conventional war are easily found in the tales of trench warfare in WWI, now being remembered in Centennial events, and in the many books and movies on World War II, such as those describing D-Day's invasion of Normandy. Less well known, at least to most Americans, were the tremendous battles up to and including the battle of Stalingrad, where the Soviet army plus the Russian winter halted the German army advance, and turned the tide of battle on that portion of the Eastern Front. There was an excellent book on that by Anthony Beevor (The Battle of Stalingrad: The Fateful Siege, July 1998), which added details from then recently declassified Russian eyewitness records and accounts, making the book a best-seller at the time. And for those interested in the role of snipers in Russian Army tactics and strategy, there is an epic film available on the internet entitled The Battle of Stalingrad, running over two hours, which shows how their army used snipers in large numbers, in fighting so fierce that at points the Russian army was very close to the river's edge before getting desperately needed supplies and reinforcements.
In conclusion, these are some thoughts to consider by issues raised, indirectly, by the movie American Sniper. It is my hope that this contributes something worthwhile to the discussion.
Thu Mar 26, 2015 at 6:54 AM PT: Also worth reading is the book The Reaper, which happens to be about a Ranger Sniper's experience in Afghanistan. It shows the trade-offs that have to be made on the fly. While that sniper did not write about injecting himself into door-busting operations, it gives a sense of how fluid the situation can become in maintaining overwatch positions and then maneuvering to support an attack.