Austin, Texas
4 Dec. 1961
In the Sophist, the stranger of Elea defines the distinguishing mark of reality as the power to act and to be acted upon. Further questioning from Theaitetos brings him to assert that his doctrine implies that reality must contain some changing things, since according to him knowledge is an action by the knower upon the known. (The writer dissents, maintaining that the reverse is the case); obviously reality contains some changing things that are known. That multiplicity is also real the definition obviously demand, since for interaction to be possible reality must be plural. The stranger chooses this particular definition of reality to cover the philosophies of both the materialists and the idealists. The definition easily satisfies the description of “body” given by the materialists, the two characters in the Sophist agree.; it satisfies the conditions set down by the idealists, for knowing is one form of acting or of being acted upon. Moreover, in any instance “act” means to cause change. Therefore the definition precludes the doctrine (Eleatic) that the true reality is unchanging. The stranger of Elea then decides to reject the thinking of both the parties who champion a universe containing no real change [Eleatics] and one in constant change [Herakleitos]; sensibles he declares are changing, and ideals he declares to be unchangeable, but real because of their ability to act upon sensibles. In the dialogue he thereby sets the foundation for a further discourse on the problems resulting from the theory of ideals.
The validity of the definition with regard to material bodies is rather easily seen. Bodies are characterized by their resistance to being penetrated by each other. Fluids, though not impervious to being penetrated by bodies and by each other, still are examples of the definition — the confluence of two rivers results in a deflection of both. This resistance to penetration is a power to act on the motion of another body. Repulsion, or even resistance, after all is the inflicting of negative acceleration. The fact that bodies do not usually repel each other at a distance is of no matter; it is simply true that a body is an enclosed portion of space at whose boundaries a repelling force very abruptly becomes significant. The ancient would have been able to demonstrate this for themselves about all bodies with which they were familiar. We moderns have more examples at our disposal. Superfluid liquid helium is a completely frictionless fluid, yet its individual atoms are just as resistant to proton bombardment as those of helium gas. All particles repel each other when they are brought sufficiently close together, except for such particle pairs as the electron-positron pair. There two particles act on each other in a different manner, i. e. in transforming each other into gamma rays. All pieces of matter, even the neutrino can act on each other. Thus the Elean’s definition is still valid for all things that come under the investigation of physics.
Suppose there is a portion of space containing various bodies, where a certain part of the space contains an indetectable object which neither influences the bodies around itself nor is influenced by them. Two conclusions can be drawn: (1) The indetectable object is not a body; (2) It is meaningless to say that the object has such a location. Location is defined (according to Relativity Theory) in terms of the time required for interactions between bodies. The situation mentioned simply does not exist.
Although an indetectable object can have no location relative to any group of detected objects, let no one be content that it is not real. There is a way to take what seems a serious exception to the Elean stranger’s definition of reality. Let there be a collection of universes belonging to completely separate continua, i. e. where bodies in one universe do not belong to the same space as objects belonging to another. There is no possibility of interaction between universes, no possibility for men to know about universes outside their own. The heavens and hells of several religions cannot serve as examples because there is supposed to be constant passage of souls from earth to the other lands. These religious conceptions are hardly as interesting as the possibility of universes whose physical behavior duplicates that of humanity’s own! The situation poses a dilemma about whether any of these universes are real, also whether they are real in relation to each other. One can claim, moreover, that each universe is both real and not real. One way to abolish the dilemma is to prove that the universes are phylogenetically related. Unfortunately nothing is known about the origin of the universe, if such has occurred. Another workable way is to posit a world of Forms acting as the loom on which all possible universes are woven. The universes are then all real because the Forms act upon them. Let this system not be a finite collection of fundamental discrete qualities, as in Plato’s dialogues, but an infinite series of interrelated arrangements or combination. This World would include the patterns for the construction of every conceivable chemical compound, e. g. the whole series of aldehydic hexose sugars allose, altrose, glucose, mannose, etc. Each universe is at any moment a model of one very complex member of the Ideal world. One stipulation, however, is very important, that each universe and each of its simpler contents must jump from one member of the great infinite series to another in a limited possibility of sequences, rather than capriciously. Whatever constitutes universes must possess this limitation. This theory which was posited for solving one dilemma resulting from the Eleatic stranger’s definition of reality is a starting point for a very fertile field of investigation. It leads to a search for the building constituents of the Ideal-world,and to an investigation of that principle which causes universes to arise out of the Ideal-World. Theologians would like to try construing the Ideal-World as the “mind of God.” However, the Ideal-world is a collective entity, has no unitary possessor or creator. It is timeless and was not created; the universes swim in an irregular circle among its confines, not teleologically. Thus there is no place for a theory of God the creator, although a theory of a non-creating, coexistent God, such as occurs in the Yoga and Vaisesika systems, is not precluded.