Discussions of presidential tickets always revives an old interest of mine: The Vice Presidency. Yes, an interest in this much-maligned office is like an interest in silver medalists or sedans rather than sports cars. It is like watching Orca rather than Jaws.
My interest is not in the office itself per se. There is no defined role for a VP. The role is defined differently by each president so studying it as an office, detached from the holder, is problematic. Carter relied on Mondale’s DC experience extensively. Bush sent Quayle to funerals. Good roles for each, but apples and oranges. The vice president is also, by statute, a member of the National Security Council as well as a member of the Board of Regents of the Smithsonian Institution. Technically the VP presides over the Senate but can only vote to break a tie. They are also required, by law, to stand behind the President and smile, nod and politely clap (and sit in a catatonic state while the President meets with Congressional leadership). Indeed, the framers thought so little of the office that they failed to provide a mechanism to replace a VP who died in office or resigned. The Kennedy assassination prompted the 25th Amendment. Before 1967, there were large slices of time when we had no VP. In fact, all-tolled, we existed without a VP for more than 35 years. We survived.
My interest is in how the VP is selected, what considerations were given and who were the runners-up. Admittedly, it’s a niche interest and not a real ice-breaker at parties. Surprisingly, no one cares how Estes Kefauver ended-up on the ticket with Stevenson. So, I’m taking a trip through recent history to try and determine how the VP winners and losers were selected. But first, some background.
Our Recent Vice-Presidents
Lets look at the modern era, 1960 — present. We have had twelve VPs:
Johnson (JFK)
Humphrey (LBJ)
Agnew (Nixon)
Ford (Nixon)
Rockefeller (Ford)
Mondale (Carter)
Bush (Reagan)
Quayle (Bush)
Gore (Clinton)
Cheney (Bush)
Biden (Obama)
Pence (Trump)
All white males. Fifteen Protestants, one Catholic. Six sitting senators, three sitting governors, one former cabinet member and George HW Bush who was a career bureaucrat and party functionary of sorts. Two are from the south, two from the mid-Atlantic, one from the northeast, three from the industrial Midwest, two from MN, one from the west and I have no idea where HW was from. Born in MA, moved to CT, time in ME, lived in TX and had a unique accent, as if a defrocked New England pastor fathered a child by a down-on-her-luck Texan. Two, Ford and Rockefeller, were not elected.
In terms of straight-forward experience on national issues and knowing the DC game, I think it fair to say that six of the twelve surpass their bosses (Mondale, GHW Bush, Gore, Cheney, Biden, Pence). LBJ was around longer than JFK but JFK had been kicking around DC for well over a decade when he was elected President. Nixon and Ford were somewhat even, with Nixon holding two positions to Ford’s one. Bush didn’t need Quayle’s insider cred. Nixon didn’t need Agnew, Ford didn’t need Rockefeller.
None of the twelve were the types to outshine their bosses in terms of personality, charm or oratorical skills. Some probably could. LBJ was a type A but was smart enough to play the role he accepted. Biden could be quite warm and charming but not one to outshine his boss. The one that no one ever had trouble seeing in the Oval Office (whether they wanted to see him there or not) was Rockefeller. From everything I have read, no one, not even enemies, thought Rockefeller was a lightweight or not suited to the presidency.
Do You Even Want the Job
So, what is the value of the VP as a road to the top job? Lets look at it from 1960 on.
From Johnson to Biden, only three sitting VPs have become top dog. Johnson ascended via murder. Ford via resignation. Only GHW Bush won election as a sitting VP. Biden could, theoretically, get there but is no longer VP. Pence could theoretically become President as well (I just threw up).
So, less than 30% of sitting VPs become president and 1-in 11 gained the presidency through an election.
Nixon, a former VP won the nomination twice, once as a sitting VP, and then in 1968, having been out of office for eight years. Nixon won the Presidency on the heels of two losses, the Presidency in 1960 and CA governor in 1962.
Historically, the electoral road from the vice-presidency to the presidency is dicey at best. There are probably a number of reasons for this. The most cited theory is that after eight years, the country just wants something new. That, and the fact that the President tends to lose popularity towards the end of a second term, with notable exceptions.
Perhaps the biggest problem is that a VP must be a team player and work for the President’s goals. That’s the deal and this subordinates the VP’s own thoughts, ideas, positions, goals and ideals to the President’s agenda. You have to be loyal in public and this makes the VP feel less like a leader and more like a cipher. The longer you're the number two, the less people see you as a possible number one.
The plus side is that the VP, no matter how anonymous before the nomination (Agnew comes to mind), has instant name recognition forever after.
Does being VP help secure your party’s next open nomination? Yes, when they go for it. VP’s or former VPs have secured their party’s nomination four times: Humphrey, Mondale, Bush and Gore (you can add Nixon but he took a round off). One, Bush, was elected, two if you count Nixon.
1964 — Johnson v Goldwater
So lets travel back to 1964. It would eventually be a Johnson v. Goldwater match-up and Goldwater would suffer a defeat of historic proportions. Johnson won 61.05% of the popular vote to Goldwater’s 38.47%. Johnson took 482 electoral votes. Goldwater managed 52 (SC, GA, MS, AL, LA, AZ). Aside from AZ, Goldwater’s home state, the remaining Goldwater states were lost to Johnson due to the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Goldwater’s low water mark was Rhode Island, where he failed to get even 20% of the vote.
1964 offers a good contrast in how the VP selection was made by the presidential candidates.
When the Republicans met in San Francisco in 1964 it was not a forgone conclusion that Goldwater would be the nominee. At that time not all states held primaries. Indeed, many states remained in the grip of party leaders that could hand over all their state’s delegates to a candidate. Primaries were gaining traction however, and it was a positive to not only have the backing of party bosses but to also flex your electoral muscle with a few strategic primary victories.
Arizona Senator Barry Goldwater entered the convention a favorite and the darling of those Republicans known as Primitives. These were mainly conservatives from the west, the mid-west and south. He was opposed, sort of, by New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller, who simply did not have the votes. An ‘anybody but Goldwater’ rebellion started with the GOP governors, a mostly moderate group from the north, along with many pro-Civil Rights Senators from the northeast. Romney (MI), Scranton (PA) Rockefeller (NY), Hatfield (OR) and others loathed Goldwater and wanted to put up an alternative to Goldwater. Like all other “Anybody but” movements, they lacked the ‘anybody’ to put forward as an alternative to the Arizona Senator. They failed and Goldwater won the nomination.
By the time the Democrats met in Atlantic City, Goldwater was the Republican nominee. Suddenly, with Rockefeller, Scranton and Romney out of the way, President Johnson was liberated in his choice of VP. Against Rockefeller, LBJ thought he would need to worry about his flank. The President was never the favorite of labor, the Jewish community, or the Irish and Catholics, the backbone of the northeast Democratic coalition.
The President’s thoughts had turned to his selection of Vice President just a few weeks after the Kennedy assassination. Two names loomed large: Attorney General Bobby Kennedy and Defense Secretary Robert McNamara. RFK was seen as a stand-in for his brother, a deeply loved man among the rank-and-file, suddenly struck down. RFK, at that time, was no JFK but the idea of placing RFK on the ticket was popular in the party.
As for McNamara, many, including Johnson, saw the Secretary of Defense as the ablest executive of his generation. If LBJ was to choose the person he believed most able to govern the nation if he suffered another heart attack, he named McNamara. Chicago’s Mayor, Richard Daley, reminded Johnson that the choice was Johnson’s but did he want to put a man that had been a Republican until 1960 one heart attack away from the Presidency? Johnson moved on. His thoughts turned towards Maine Senator Muskie (a Catholic popular with labor), Connecticut Senator Ribicoff (Jewish and popular with labor), Governor Brown of California (another Catholic) and Eugene McCarthy of Minnesota (again, Catholic). Avoiding an all WASP ticket was important to Johnson and that meant looking for a Catholic.
After the GOP committed ritual suicide in San Francisco, all bets were off. Goldwater was unpopular in almost every region of the country and the northeast led the way. Being outflanked by a moderate GOP governor was off the table and Johnson was free to expand his VP choices.
Johnson had been thinking about Minnesota Senator Hubert Humphrey for his VP choice for months. The two shared similar backgrounds as small-town boys that made good. Both entered the Senate the same year and both were networkers and deal makers. The similarities stopped there. LBJ entered the Senate as a segregationist. Humphrey’s address on Civil Rights at the 1948 convention caused Strom Thurmond and the Dixiecrats to walkout and form a third party. Humphrey had labor and was trusted by African Americans and big city Democrats. Despite this, the two became friends in the Senate. Johnson tried to bring Humphrey into leadership, then a largely Southern group. Johnson would tell his southern friends that Humphrey was his “link to the bomb throwers.” Humphrey often defended LBJ within the liberal wing of the party.
Humphrey had run for President in 1960. He had hoped to stop Kennedy in largely-protestant West Virginia. Kennedy won, effectively ending Humphrey’s chances in 1960. Humphrey still wanted the Presidency and Johnson knew it. Up to 1964, the VP had a good chance of ascending to the Presidency: Teddy Roosevelt, Calvin Coolidge, Harry Truman, Lyndon Johnson. The one question that Humphrey needed to answer was “would he be Johnson’s guy?” Would he back the administration’s policies and choices and positions 100%. Humphrey answered ‘yes’, simultaneously guaranteeing his election as VP in ‘64 and his presidential loss in 1968.
In Humphrey, Johnson found someone he liked personally and respected politically while disagreeing on a number of issues. If Humphrey said he was on-board with the Johnson agenda, Johnson could rely up Humphrey’s word. Other contenders had a variety of issues that Humphrey did not have. Abraham Ribicoff (CT-Senator) was Jewish, a chance LBJ was not going to take. Muskie (ME-Senator) was known to be cranky and thin-skinned. Eugene McCarthy, the other Minnesota Senator, was a political philosopher, did not suffer fools gladly and, on a personal level, not particularly likeable in the opinion of the Johnson people.
I could find no information on why Edmund “Pat” Brown, the governor of CA was a non-starter. Humphrey was the guy LBJ always had in mind and he ultimately went to Humphrey. When Humphrey feigned surprise when LBJ popped the question Johnson told him, “If you didn’t know three months ago that you were my choice maybe you’re too dumb to be vice president.”
Goldwater’s choice for VP was William Miller, a western-tier New York Congressman (Buffalo area). A Notre Dame graduate who later attended Albany Law School, Miller was first elected to Congress in 1950 and later served as Chairman of the Republican National Committee (1961-1964). Miller was known to be an arch-conservative and a loyal party man. He was charming, intelligent and considered something of a wit and political brawler rather than a statesman.
In 1942 Miller had entered the US Army as a private, later attended Officers Training School and was commissioned a Lieutenant. After the war he was assigned as an associate counsel to the War Crimes Trials.
Why Miller? This one was tough to track down. Miller was (here we go again) a northern Catholic that would balance the ticket. According to Theodore White in The Making of the President 1964, Goldwater wanted an attack dog that could hammer Johnson and Humphrey throughout the campaign. Miller fit that bill. So, Goldwater found geographical balance as well as his hit man in Miller.
Others said that Goldwater only knew that Miller annoyed LBJ and that was good enough.
Goldwater’s people had tossed around the idea of unity. Some suggested it might be wise to ask one of those Eastern Establishment governors. There was two problems with that idea that stopped it cold. First, no Eastern Establishment figure wanted to go down with the ship. As Goldwater sailed ever closer to the nomination, many in the party saw the iceberg that would sink the ship. They thought Goldwater would be a disaster and they were proven correct.
Secondly, Goldwater didn’t want any of them. He remained bitter at their attitude towards his ideas and candidacy and threw down the gauntlet at them in his convention speech:
“Anyone who joins us in all sincerity we welcome. Those who do not care for our cause, we don’t expect to enter our ranks in any case.” And then:“Extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice. Moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue.”
These lines were directed not at the Democrats or the public at-large but rather at elements of his own party. Goldwater had no such reservations about Miller.
From Miller’s obituary (New York Times, June 25, 1983):
After President Johnson's landslide victory, Mr. Miller quickly dropped from public view, emerging only occasionally, in interviews, to joke about his short stay in the spotlight.
Most memorably, in a 1975 television commercial, Mr. Miller cheerfully announced that wherever he went, he was not recognized without his American Express credit card. In 1979, he told a reporter that strangers sometimes reminded him that he was a celebrity, but not because he was Barry Goldwater's running mate. Remembered For Commercial
''They remind me more of the American Express card commercial,'' he said. Among those who knew him, Mr. Miller was a successful man with a strong personality long before 1964. He was known as an acid-tongued extremely conservative Republican, a natty dresser and an expert at billiards, bridge and golf.
One of Miller’s children is Stephanie Miller, host of the Stephanie Miller show, a liberal talk radio show out of Los Angeles.
Johnson chose a personal friend that did not reflect his original political ideology, that knew DC and was a serious legislator. Johnson could make the argument that Humphrey was qualified to step in and assume the role of President on day one. This was no mere lip-service either. Johnson had already suffered one heart attack and his dietary habits almost guaranteed a second.
Goldwater was never under any illusion that he could win. He merely wanted the GOP to represent conservative values. He wanted to preach the conservative gospel. I don’t find anything to suggest he really cared who his choice would be as long as it wasn’t one of those damned Country Club types. Goldwater knew that Miller was not an olive branch to the establishment. He knew Miller would not bring him anywhere close to being competitive in New York. Goldwater chose an attack dog, Johnson gave serious consideration to a balanced ticket and to ability.
Goldwater was a voice in the wilderness in 1964. Twelve years later, Ronald Reagan, pretty much adopting Goldwater’s platform (with a sunnier disposition and a smile), would almost wrestle the nomination from Ford. We all know what happened after that.
Most of the information here was gathered from Theodore White’s great Making of the President series, in this case 1960 and 1964, readily available on The Nook and on Kindle. A high recommend if you like that type of thing. White’s books differ from modern campaign books because modern campaign differ from those decades ago. There are fewer documents to review, no tweets, e-mails and no facebook posts. The campaign organizations were much smaller and there were only three networks and no around-the-clock coverage.
White was sometimes in the room when things happened. Otherwise, much of his works rely upon news accounts and interviews with those involved.
Jules Witcover’s The American Vice Presidency — From Irrelevance to Power, is another source. Witcover’s book contains chapters on every VP and is a broad survey of those office holders, not a deep dive on any one individual.
I have not read any Goldwater biographies. I have a natural skepticism of all movement politicians in general and conservative movement politicians in particular, as well as limited time. However, a depiction of life, in the west, in the early 1900’s could have points of interest. If you have read a Goldwater biography and have more information on his selection of Miller, do tell.