This article is part of a series on World War I. To read other posts in the series, please go here.
July 20th-July 23rd 1914, St. Petersburg, Russian Empire
“Serbia has some very warm friends in the Russian people. And Russia has an ally, France.”
-Raymond Poincaré, President of France 1913-1920
French Ambassador Maurice Paléologue had only just arrived when he was set upon by the two Grand Duchesses. Although originally from Montenegro, the sisters were eager to warmly welcome their French allies. Anastasia gestured to the flowers, “look at the table of honor, they’re Lorraine thistles, planted in real Lorraine soil!” Alsace-Lorraine had been lost to Germany in the 1870 Franco-Prussian War, and its redemption fueled the dreams of French nationalists.
At dinner, Grand Duchess Anastasia spoke further with Ambassador Paléologue, moving from passion into prophecy. “There’s going to be war! They’ll be nothing left of Austria, you’ll get back Alsace and Lorraine, and our armies will meet in Berlin!” She continued until her eyes met the Tsar’s disapproving gaze. “I must restrain myself,” she said bashfully.
The Summit
The battleship, France, steamed into Kronstadt Naval Base to wild cheers. The imperial Russian band struck up the republican “Le Marseillaise” to greet President Raymond Poincaré and Prime Minister Rene Viviani. Poincaré and Viviani were graciously ferried onto the Imperial Yacht, where the Tsar and Tsarina eagerly awaited them. The coming days would reaffirm their alliance and formalize a coordinated response to German and Austro-Hungarian aggression.
Poincaré and Viviani were a study in contrasts. Poincaré was a son of Lorraine and a conservative nationalist, who saw Germany as France’s great foe. If his French republican sensibilities were hurt by Tsarist autocracy, he didn’t show it. While he touted the military value of Russian support, his critics alleged that he was taking bribes from St. Petersburg. At home, Poincaré grew the French army by extending conscription. Although the Presidency was a largely ceremonial role, Poincaré exerted massive political influence, especially in foreign policy.
Ironically, the reserved Viviani was actually Foreign Minister, yet the boisterous Poincaré had spent the voyage to St. Petersburg lecturing his new Prime Minister on foreign affairs. Unlike Poincaré, Viviani was a moderate socialist, who had become premier somewhat by accident. The Left had won big in recent elections, which should have made the pro-German Joseph Caillaux Prime Minister. However, during a nasty campaign, Caillaux’s enemies began publishing his love letters to his mistress in Le Figaro. His wife, incensed, marched down to Le Figaro’s offices and promptly shot the editor. Now all France was gripped by her trial, the biggest scandal in Paris since the Dreyfus Affair. Since Poincaré refused to appoint other Radicals as Prime Minister, Viviani was put forward as a compromise candidate.
A pacifist, Viviani was increasingly alarmed at the bellicosity of Poincaré and the Russians. When Poincaré met the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to St. Petersburg he sharply warned Austria-Hungary against attacking Serbia. “Serbia has some very warm friends in the Russian people. And Russia has an ally, France. There are plenty of complications to be feared!" This was a remarkably provocative threat from a visiting foreign leader to the representative of another nation. Poincaré’s contempt showed how little regard France and Russia had for Austria-Hungary.
From Viviani’s perspective, the visit only got worse. Amid the seemingly endless military parades and patriotic marches, French and Russian leaders pledged unified support for Serbia. It was all too much for Viviani, who grew increasingly withdrawn. The stifling summer heat probably did not help either. As Poincaré noted in his diary: “Viviani is more and more sad, and everyone is noticing it.”
A Strange Partnership
Russia and France were far from natural partners. The 1894 defense alliance between Autocratic Russia and Republican France shocked Europe. Just over 100 years earlier, the French revolution had beheaded Louis XVI and Marie Antoinette. Twenty years later, Napoleon had marched deep into Russia, burning Moscow, before the Russian army and the Russian winter took their deadly toll. In the 1850s, France and Britain had fought Russia in the Crimean War. After German unification, part of Bismarck’s plan to keep France isolated involved creating the Three Emperors’ League, binding the conservative monarchies of Russia, Germany, and Austria-Hungary. As recently as 1890, Germany and Russia had a secret reinsurance treaty.
However, with the fall of Bismarck in 1890, German policy had shifted away from a Russian alliance. Instead, Germany doubled-down on its commitment to Austria-Hungary, who was increasingly at odds with Russia in the Balkans. The end of the Three Emperors’ League and the lapsing of the reinsurance treaty opened the door for French overtures to Russia. Following the Franco-Prussian War, a defeated France looked at growing Germany with hatred and fear. Economics and demographics clearly favored the younger and more industrialized German Empire. The massive population of Russia could provide the French Republic with an invaluable counter-weight to German power.
In the 1890s, Russia was the most backwards nation in Europe. For too long, the conservative tsarist regime had refused to reckon with the powerful forces of change reshaping the world. The military was in shambles, terribly equipped and poorly led, facts that would become glaringly apparent in the Russo-Japanese War. By the 1890s, despite her size, Russia had built fewer miles of railroads than Germany, France, or Britain. However, even a supreme autocrat like Tsar Alexander III recognized that Russia could not hold off modernity forever.
Alexander III embarked on an aggressive plan to industrialize, urbanize, and modernize his vast realm. To fund these grand ambitions, Russia borrowed heavily from other European powers, especially France, who soon became Russia’s largest creditor. With foreign funds, Russia underwent a breathtaking transformation, becoming Europe’s fastest growing economy. Russia needed French loans to keep growing, and France needed Russian soldiers as insurance against Germany. To Germany’s chagrin, mutual necessity had allowed her neighbors to set aside their ideological differences.
The Changing Tides
By 1914, relative strength of the allies had shifted somewhat. While French liberals continued to detest the alliance with reactionary Russia, moderates and conservatives feared Russian disillusionment with France. After the ruin of the Russo-Japanese War, Tsar Nicholas II had embarked on a series of military, educational, and economic reforms to further modernize Russia. Once completed, would Russia still have use for her French ally? Poincaré and Viviani wanted to reaffirm the continued relevance of the Franco-Russian alliance. As Poincaré knew well, few topics were more motivating to his Russian partners than German aggression.
Poincaré’s anti-German views found a particularly receptive audience in St. Petersburg. After Austria-Hungary had humiliated Russia in the Bosnian Crisis of 1908, Russian conservatives resolved to take a harder line in Balkan affairs. Minister of War Vladimir Sukhomlinov had advocated mobilization against Austria-Hungary during the Balkan Wars but was overruled by the Tsar and his moderate Prime Minister Vladimir Kokovtsov. To the militarists, these episodes represented the capitulation of Russia to Germany and Austria-Hungary. These militarists increased their influence in early 1914, when Kokovtsov was replaced by the weak and pliable Ivan Goremykin.
The Tsar’s Council of Ministers demanded that Russia stand firmly behind her Slavic ally Serbia. Clear Russian support for Serbia would hopefully dissuade Austria-Hungary from aggressive action. Further, the threat of Russian intervention might inspire Berlin to restrain Vienna. In no scenario did the Tsar’s ministers believe that Austria-Hungary had the right to punish Serbia for the Archduke’s murder.
The Russian decision to back Serbia might have left France in an awkward position. By the terms of her treaty obligations, France would aid Russia if she were attacked by Austria-Hungary or Germany. However, if Russia attacked Austria-Hungary in retaliation for an invasion of Serbia, French responsibilities were less clear. Poincaré and the French delegation eliminated any uncertainty in their meetings with the Russians. France and Russia would both fully support Serbia.
Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov cabled his ambassador in Vienna with a warning for Austria-Hungary. It would be “very dangerous” for Austria-Hungary to “ask for anything which would be incompatible with Serbia’s dignity.” Furthermore, “France is also very concerned and has no intention of allowing Serbia to be unjustifiably humiliated.” In a couple days, these commitments would be put to the test when Austria-Hungary delivered her ultimatum.
Read More
French President Raymond Poincaré and Ambassador to St. Petersburg Maurice Paléologue wrote postwar memoirs. Both were French patriots who valued the alliance with Russia and strongly disliked Germany. Their accounts, while sometimes biased and self-justifying, provide a tantalizing glimpse into the discussions during the crucial July summit. Poincaré discusses the lead-up to WWI from his vantage point as President of the Third Republic, while Paléologue describes the Imperial Russian Court up until the 1917 February Revolution. Paléologue’s experiences are a must for those interested in the fall of the Romanovs.