This article is part of a series on World War I. To read other posts in the series, please go here.
July 29th - July 30th 1914, Berlin and St. Petersburg
“The whole weight of the decision lies solely on your shoulders now, who have to bear the responsibility for Peace or War.”
-Willy (Kaiser Wilhelm II) to Tsar Nicholas II by telegram on July 30th
An early morning telegram was delivered to the Neues Palais in Potsdam, residence of the Kaiser. It was from his cousin Tsar Nicholas II of Russia. As fighting began in Serbia, Nicholas asked for the Kaiser’s help, explaining: “very soon I shall be overwhelmed by the pressure forced upon me and be forced to take extreme measures which will lead to war.” He begged Kaiser Wilhelm II to “stop your allies [Austria-Hungary] from going too far.” The Tsar signed the note affectionately as “Nicky.”
Before the Tsar’s telegram had arrived, the Kaiser was writing to his cousin in St. Petersburg. German Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg believed that his sovereign could gain international sympathy by sending a peace note. As if anticipating the Tsar’s words, the Kaiser started “it is with the gravest concern that I hear of the impression which the action of Austria against Serbia is creating in your country.” The Kaiser then blamed Serbia for the murder of Franz Ferdinand and argued that as sovereigns they must “insist that all the persons morally responsible for the dastardly murder should receive their deserved punishment.” However, he pledged that he was “exerting my utmost influence to induce the Austrians…to arrive to a satisfactory understanding with you.” He signed it, “your very sincere and devoted friend and cousin, Willy.”
The True Causes of Austrian Intransigence
On the afternoon of July 29th, German Ambassador Pourtalès met Russian Foreign Minister Sazonov. Despite Germany’s urging, Austria-Hungary had rejected direct talks. Sazonov stated that Russia now backed Britain’s proposal for a Great Power conference. In the meantime, Russia would be required to mobilize against Austria-Hungary. This mobilization did not mean war, Sazonov stressed.
Pourtalès knew Russian mobilization would cause the hawks in Berlin to demand counter-mobilization. Then, war would be inevitable. Politely, he explained that Germany would consider Russian mobilization “a grave mistake.” He strongly cautioned Sazonov against mobilization. Sazonov exploded: “now I have no more doubts about the true causes of Austrian intransigence!” Hurt, Pourtalès responded: “I protest with all my power…against such an offensive assertion.” There was nothing more to say. Pourtalès left.
Around the same time, Wilhelm sent Nicholas a telegram filled both with hope and warning. He began “I think a direct understanding between your Government and Vienna possible and desirable.” Although Vienna had rejected talks, the Kaiser promised that Berlin was trying to drag her stubborn ally to the bargaining table. However, “military measures on the part of Russia would…jeopardize my position as mediator.” The message was clear: if Russia wanted to avoid war with Germany, she must not mobilize.
The Tsar Wavers
What Kaiser Wilhelm did not know was that Tsar Nicholas had already signed two imperial orders, one for full mobilization, one for partial mobilization. Nicholas planned to issue the full mobilization order. However, upon receipt of Wilhelm’s “conciliatory and friendly” telegram, the Tsar lost his nerve. Declaring, “I will not become responsible for a monstrous slaughter,” he canceled the general mobilization order.
The cancellation sent his ministers into an uproar. Partial mobilization was impossible, Army Chief Yanushkevich explained. It would be the worst possible option. Partial mobilization would make it harder for Russia to move to full mobilization if needed. Far from deterring her enemies, the half measure would leave Russia vulnerable. Marshaling his limited willpower, the Tsar stood firm. The Tsar’s decision had saved the peace of Europe: for now.
The Kaiser saw things quite differently. Early on the morning of July 30th, Nicholas attempted to send Wilhelm a calming message. Thanking him “heartily” for his quick reply, Nicholas explained that “the military measures which have now come into force [partial mobilization] were decided five days ago for reasons of defense.” Nicholas requested that Wilhelm exert “strong pressure on Austria to come to an understanding with us.”
The mercurial Kaiser flew into a rage. “The tsar has simply been tricking us with his appeal for my assistance,” he fumed. If Nicholas had ordered mobilization five days ago, Germany’s preparations were nearly a week behind. “Then I must mobilize too,” the Kaiser announced. Wilhelm had misunderstood his cousin’s note. Preparations for mobilization had begun five days prior, but the actual mobilization had not begun then.
As the sovereigns exchanged messages, reports continued from the German military attaché in Russia. He believed that Russia’s actions were driven by fear, “without aggressive intentions and are now frightened at what they have brought about.” Regardless of Russian intentions, a growing number of German leaders believed that the time for discussion was over. Foreign Secretary Jagow argued that “Germany is obliged to mobilize…the diplomatists must now leave the talking to the cannon.”
Smash my Telephone
Tsar Nicholas was had never wanted to be Tsar. A weak man and poor leader, upon the death of his powerful father, Nicholas declared despondently, “what is going to happen to me…to all Russia?” Despite his fecklessness, in July 1914, Nicholas wanted to preserve peace.
Foreign Minister Sazonov, Minister of War Sukhomlinov, and Army Chief Yanushkevich all demanded mobilization. After Ambassador Pourtalès had demanded that Russia stop her military preparations, Sazonov noted, “as we cannot fulfill Germany's desires, it remains for us to speed up our armament.” On July 30th, Army Chief Yanushkevich warned the Tsar of the “the extreme danger that would result for us if we were not ready for war with Germany.” Nicholas remained unmoved.
Nicholas hated when his ministers ganged up on him, so that afternoon, only Sazonov was allowed to see him in person. As he left for the Tsar’s palace, Yanushkevich told Sazonov to call him as soon as he had secured the mobilization order. “Then I will smash my telephone,” the Army Chief announced, making it impossible for the indecisive Tsar to cancel mobilization again.
At the Tsar’s palace, Nicholas looked deathly pale. The Foreign Minister explained that Austria-Hungary was operating with Germany’s full support. If Germany did not want war, she would have restrained her ally. Sazonov then shared reports of German military preparations, which were either inaccurate or falsified as Germany had not even begun to mobilize. Nicholas stopped him. “Think of the responsibility you are asking me to take! Think of the thousands and thousands of men who will be sent to their deaths.”
A long silence hovered over the room. Then an aide spoke: “it is hard to decide.” Nicholas snapped, “I shall decide!" However, Nicholas, full of self-pity, had been worn down by his ministers and his fears. He reinstated the order for full mobilization. Sazonov immediately left to call Yanushkevich. “Now you can smash your telephone. Give your orders, general!”
The Tsar sent a conciliatory telegram to the Kaiser, explaining that “it is technically impossible to stop our military preparations.” There could only be one response to this message in Berlin: German mobilization. Nicholas tried to soften the blow, asserting “we are far from wishing war,” and promising that while negotiations continue Russian troops “shall not make any provocative action.” He concluded: “I put all my trust in God’s mercy and hope in your successful mediation in Vienna.”
The Tsar sent a final note, almost desperate in tone. He understood Germany’s need to mobilize, but “wish[ed] to have the same guarantee…as I gave you, that these measures do not mean war.” He closed by remarking on “God’s help” and the “long-proved friendship” between the cousins.
The Kaiser’s last reply was polite but distant. Russia had ignored his demand to stop her mobilization, so he was “obliged to mobilize.” He laid responsibility on the Tsar, stating that Russian de-mobilization “is the only way to avoid endless misery.” Unless that happened, there would be nothing more to discuss between Berlin and St. Petersburg. Now the cannons would do the talking.
Read More
The Willy-Nicky correspondence is remarkable. On the eve of a colossal modern conflict, the words of the two emperors seem both anachronistic and quaint. However, it would be naïve to consider their messages mere personal correspondence. There is good evidence that the German Foreign Office wrote some of the Kaiser’s notes with calculated political intent. The original telegrams (written in English) are fascinating to read and provide a tantalizing look at a vanished world. For more on the family relationship between the leaders of Europe, Miranda Carter’s Nicholas, Wilhelm, and George is an excellent source of information.
Some historians have laid significant blame for the final slide into war on Russia’s mobilization. Christopher Clark’s The Sleepwalkers notes that Russia mobilized before Germany had even declared a state of "danger of imminent war." However, it is essential to remember that unlike German mobilization, which meant war, Russia could remain mobilized indefinitely while diplomacy continued.