—
What would you do, if and when, you go to vote in the next Election, and the County clerks tell you your Voter Registration is “not on file” … or that it’s “in a different precinct” … or that “the registration Name’s spelling DOES NOT MATCH the Name on your Photo ID” ?
Would you shrug, and walk away?
Or would you get mad as hell, and ultimately walk away — without Voting?
What, I can’t Vote now? This country is going to Hell, on a escalator.
Either way, the result of such wide-spread infiltration into America’s Voter Databases, will be the same: 4 More Years of President Sharpie!
—
According to this Florida Representative, this denial-scenario is viable. And this scenario is worth preventing … if we can.
Stephanie Murphy: Let Florida voters know which election systems were hacked by Russians
Murphy was briefed on the matter in May by the FBI and the Department of Homeland Security. She said she was told which counties were the targets but has not named them at the request of government officials.
Adding to the mystery, Murphy told Hayes that a recent U.S. Senate Intelligence Committee report suggested that as many as four Florida counties could have been hacked. But she added that she wasn’t sure just how many counties were involved.
"The drips and drabs of information that are coming out about this very serious attack on our democracy are not helpful in helping us prepare how to respond," she said.
She said the government’s desire to maintain secrecy was uncalled for because the Russians already know that the U.S. is aware of which counties’ elections systems were broken into. She said the voters, not government officials, were the true victims in the case.
Got that? A Representative of US Citizens has been briefed on Elections being hacked — involving her state’s Citizens — and she is NOT ALLOWED to let those affected Citizens know.
All to “protect the interests” of the bumbling Government Officials who let the Hacks happen (as Murphy told Chris Hayes) ...
What country are we living in? … Russia? … Give it time.
Senate intelligence report adds to confusion over Russian elections hacking in Florida
Three months after Florida’s state government was blindsided by the release of previously classified information that two local elections offices were hacked ahead of the 2016 presidential elections, Gov. Ron DeSantis and members of Congress have been caught off-guard once again by a newly released intelligence report on Russian elections interference.
On Thursday, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence released a heavily redacted 67-page report that appears to include new information about efforts by Russian hackers to probe and target elections networks in Florida — including the FBI’s suspicions in 2018 that, in fact, four county elections systems had been hacked rather than two.
The report, which mentions that hackers may have carried out cyber reconnaissance missions across all 50 states, details attempts by the Russian intelligence GRU syndicate to probe elections systems in Illinois and 20 other unnamed states. It specifically discusses those efforts in Illinois and an unnamed “State 2,” where details about meetings and cybersecurity efforts appear to mostly jibe with what’s previously been disclosed about the election system hacking attempts in Florida.
Here are some of the highlights of that “What Country are we Living-in?” Senate Report ...
Senate Intelligence Committee Report
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/sites/default/files/documents/Report_Volume1.pdf
REPORT OF THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ON
RUSSIAN ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS AND INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 U.S. ELECTION
VOLUME 1: RUSSIAN EFFORTS AGAINST ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE
WITH ADDITIONAL VIEWS
[Poster's note: I have unable to determine what the (U) designations mean; Since it begins nearly all readable text -- perhaps it means, somehow yet still (U)n-redacted.]
[emphasis added]
II. (U) FINDINGS
1. The Russian govemment directed extensive activity, beginning in at least 2014 and carrying into at least 2017, against U.S. election infrastructure [1] at the state and local level. [REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED]. The Committee has seen no evidence that any votes were changed or that any voting machines were manipulated.[2]
2. [FINDING 2 COMPLETELY REDACTED. FINDING 2 COMPLETELY REDACTED. FINDING 2 COMPLETELY REDACTED. FINDING 2 COMPLETELY REDACTED. FINDING 2 COMPLETELY REDACTED.]
3. (U) While the Committee does not know with confidence what Moscow's intentions were, Russia may have been probing vulnerabilities in voting systems to exploit later. Alternatively, Moscow may have sought to undermine confidence in the 2016 U.S. elections simply through the discovery of their activity.
[...]
7. (U) Russian activities demand renewed attention to vulnerabilities in U.S. voting
infrastructure. In 2016, cybersecurity for electoral infrastructure at the state and local level was sorely lacking; for example, voter registration databases were not as secure as they could have been. Aging voting equipment, particularly voting machines that had no paper record of votes, were vulnerable to exploitation by a committed adversary. Despite the focus on this issue since 2016, some of these vulnerabilities remain.
[...]
III. (U) THE ARC OF RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES
[...]
[REDACTED] Evidence of scanning of state election systems first appeared in the summer prior to the 2016 election. In mid-July 2016, Illinois discovered anomalous network activity, specifically a large increase in outbound data, on a Illinois Board of Elections' voter registry website.[12] Working with Illinois, the FBI commenced an investigation.[13] [REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED] The attack resulted in data exfiltration from the voter registration database.[16]
[Poster’s note: “Data exfiltration: Data exfiltration is the unauthorized copying, transfer or retrieval of data from a computer or server. Data exfiltration is a malicious activity performed through various different techniques, typically by cybercriminals over the Internet or other network.” — www.techopedia.com]
[Poster's note: Here are two footnotes, whose text referencing them, was REDACTED in previous paragraph.]
— —
[14] [REDACTED] According to the United States Computer Emergency Readiness Team (US-CERT), an SQL injection is a technique that attempts to subvert the relationship between a webpage and its supporting database, typically in order to trick the database into executing malicious code."
[15] (U) DHS IIR 4 0050006 17, An IP Address Targeted Multiple U.S. Slate Government's to Include Election Systems, October 4, 2016
— —
(U) On August 18, 2016, FBI issued an unclassified FLASH [17] to state technical-level expert on a set of [REDACTED] suspect IP addresses identified from the attack on Illinois's voter registration databases. [REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED]. [REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED]. The FLASH product did not attribute the attack to Russia or any other particular actor.[21]
[Poster's note: Here are the footnotes, whose text referencing them, was REDACTED in previous paragraph. For the search results of that Document number in footnote 18, scroll down further in the Post.]
— —
[18] [REDACTED] Number T-LD1004-TT, TLP-AMBER, [REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED] [9] (U) Ibid.
[20] (U) Ibid.
— —
(U/[REDACTED]) After the issuance of the August FLASH, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and the Multi-State-Information Sharing & Analysis Center (MS-ISAC)[22] -- asked states to review their log files to determine if the IP addresses described in the FLASH had touched their infrastructure. This request for voluntary self-reporting, in conjunction with DHS analysis of NetFlow activity on MS-ISAC internet sensors, identified another 20 states whose networks had made connections to at least one IP address listed on the FLASH [23]. DHS was almost entirely reliant on states to self-report scanning activity.
[REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED]. [REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED]. [REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED]. [REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED]. [REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED]. [REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED]. Former Special Assistant to the President and Cybersecurity Coordinator Michael Daniel said, "eventually we get enough of a picture that we become confident over the course of August of 2016 that we're seeing the Russians probe a whole bunch of different state election infrastructure, voter registration databases, and other related infrastructure on a regular basis."[25] Dr. Samuel Liles, Acting Director of the Cyber Analysis Division within DHS's Office of Intelligence and Analysis (I&A), testified to the Committee on June 21, 2017, that "by late September, we determined that internet-connected election-related networks in 21 states were potentially targeted by Russian government cyber actors."[26]
[Here is the footnote, whose text referencing it, was REDACTED in previous paragraph.]
— —
[24] (U) SSCI Transcript of the Interview with John Brennan, Former Director, CIA, held on Friday, June 23, 2017, p. 41
— —
[End Report snippets.]
— —
By the way, I could not locate the Transcript mentioned in Footnote 24, after much searching. I suspect it was a closed-door hearing with John Brennan, before the the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI), sometime in June 2017.
However this next story, points to a similar report, based largely on the research of John Brennan, Former Director, of the CIA:
https://investigaterussia.org/players/john-brennan
[...]
After the election, on January 6, 2017, the Director of National Intelligence released a comprehensive report on Russia’s interference based largely on the work of Brennan’s task force. The report explained why the Intelligence Community was in agreement that Russia’s government meddled in the U.S. election and offered the following warning: “We assess Moscow will apply lessons learned from its Putin-ordered campaign aimed at the U.S. presidential election to future influence efforts worldwide, including against U.S. allies and their election processes.”
Here’s the pdf behind the NYTimes Cloud document, originally cited above:
Intelligence Community Assessment
Assessing Russian Activities and Intentions in Recent US Elections
6 January 2017
DNI: The Director of National Intelligence
pg i
This report includes an analytic assessment drafted and coordinated among The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and The National Security Agency (NSA), which draws on intelligence information collected and disseminated by those three agencies. It covers the motivation and scope of Moscow’s intentions regarding US elections and Moscow’s use of cyber tools and media campaigns to influence US public opinion. The assessment focuses on activities aimed at the 2016 US presidential election and draws on our understanding of previous Russian influence operations. When we use the term “we” it refers to an assessment by all three agencies.
• This report is a declassified version of a highly classified assessment. This document’s conclusions are identical to the highly classified assessment, but this document does not include the full supporting information, including specific intelligence on key elements of the influence campaign. Given the redactions, we made minor edits purely for readability and flow.
pg 5
Election Operation Signals “New Normal” in Russian Influence Efforts
We assess Moscow will apply lessons learned from its campaign aimed at the US presidential election to future influence efforts in the United States and worldwide, including against US allies and their election processes. We assess the Russian intelligence services would have seen their election influence campaign as at least a qualified success because of their perceived ability to impact public discussion.
• Putin’s public views of the disclosures suggest the Kremlin and the intelligence services will continue to consider using cyber-enabled disclosure operations because of their belief that these can accomplish Russian goals relatively easily without significant damage to Russian interests.
• Russia has sought to influence elections across Europe.
We assess Russian intelligence services will continue to develop capabilities to provide Putin with options to use against the United States, judging from past practice and current efforts. Immediately after Election Day, we assess Russian intelligence began a spearphishing campaign targeting US Government employees and individuals associated with US think tanks and NGOs in national security, defense, and foreign policy fields. This campaign could provide material for future influence efforts as well as foreign intelligence collection on the incoming administration’s goals and plans.
[emphasis added]
-----
As promised ... here is the [Redacted] FLASH Alert details, partially referenced in Footnote 18:
TLP: AMBER
FBI FLASH
18 August 2016
Alert Number T-LD1004-TT
WE NEED YOUR HELP!
[...]
In furtherance of public-private partnerships, the FBI routinely advises private industry of various cyber threat indicators observed during the course of our investigations. This data is provided in order to help cyber security professionals and system administrators to guard against the persistent malicious actions of cyber criminals.
This FLASH has been released TLP: AMBER: The information in this product is only for members of their own organization and those with DIRECT NEED TO KNOW. This information is NOT to be forwarded on beyond NEED TO KNOW recipients.
Targeting Activity Against State Board of Election Systems
Summary
The FBI received information of an additional IP address, 5.149.249.172, which was detected in the July 2016 compromise of a state’s Board of Election Web site. Additionally, in August 2016 attempted intrusion activities into another state’s Board of Election system identified the IP address, 185.104.9.39 used in the aforementioned compromise.
Technical Details
The following information was released by the MS-ISAC on 1 August 2016, which was derived through the course of the investigation.
In late June 2016, an unknown actor scanned a state's Board of Election website for vulnerabilities using Acunetix, and after identifying a Structured Query Language (SQL) injection (SQLi) vulnerability, used SQLmap to target the state website. The majority of the data exfiltration occurred in mid-July. There were 7 suspicious IPs and penetration testing tools Acunetix, SQLMap, and DirBuster used by the actor, detailed in the indicators section below.
Indicators associated with the Board of Elections intrusion:
• The use of Acunetix tool was confirmed when "GET /acunetix-wvs-test-forsome-inexistent-file - 443" and several requests with "wvstest=" appeared in the logs;
[...]
The FBI FLASH Report goes on to make recommendations, and security precautions regarding:
"... all states take the following precautions to their state Board of Election databases."
— —
Isn't time to take seriously Mueller's dire warnings?
Given the FACT that the "target" of those Russian Attacks have been systematically on Election-related databases, it would seem the "NEED TO KNOW recipients" should include the American Voters, whose form of Democracy is being directly threatened and attacked, by an unfriendly foreign power. (AKA Trump’s secret phone-pal.)
[Thus the above FLASH re-post … which “we voters need to know” about.]
The Threats against the American Voters are VERY VERY [REDACTED] REAL.
So too should be, our concerted [go-around Moscow Mitch] response to this Ongoing National Threat.
...
As report by Joan McCarter today:
Rep. Stephanie Murphy, a Democrat representing Florida's 7th Congressional District and a former national security specialist in the Department of Defense, alerted the nation in an op-ed in The Washington Post that there's a lot she can't inform the nation about concerning Russian election interference in 2016.
As quoted in the opening citation, with Rep. Stephanie Murphy:
She said the voters, not government officials, were the true victims in the case.
[...]
"We should let the voters know which counties were affected and let the voters themselves confirm that their information wasn’t changed," she said.
So serious are the compounding cyber-threats, Senator Warner recently called for a National Security paradigm-shift in thinking ...
Mark Warner, vice chairman of Senate Intelligence Committee, presented what he called “a new cyber doctrine,” advocating not only for a hardening of America’s digital infrastructure but for an approach to cyberwarfare [...]
Speaking at the Center for a New American Security, Warner advanced the idea that America’s cybersecurity is on the whole ineffectual; that its response to foreign adversaries is either too weak or too slow to matter; and that its vulnerabilities, in addition to past failures, are largely the result of existing in a state of complacency and overconfidence for decades. More specifically, he said, the U.S. has failed entirely to devise a substantive approach for mitigating an influx of information operations, in which private American citizens are chiefly the target.
The federal government, Warner admits, was caught “flat-footed in 2016,” though he places equal responsibility on companies such as Facebook for failing to “anticipate how their platforms could be manipulated and misused by Russian operatives.”
In recommendations offered later in his speech, Warner defined what he calls a “whole-of-society approach” to security, which relies partly on a self-regulating free press, but also “places limits on social media platforms.”
[...]
“I fear that we have entered a new era of nation-state conflict: one in which a nation projects strength less through traditional military hardware, and more through cyber and information warfare,” he says. “For the better part of two decades, this was a domain where we thought we had superiority.”
Warner further describes how confidence in this “supposed superiority” has left Americans virtually defenseless against cyberattacks “at every level of our society,” listing off examples of state-sanctioned attacks on a myriad of critical industries—health, energy, and financial—as well as constant intrusions into federal networks and a drastic uptick in global ransomware and denial-of-service attacks.
[...]
Senator's 'Cyber Doctrine' Calls for U.S. to Redraw the Blueprint for Information Warfare
https://gizmodo.com/senators-cyber-doctrine-calls-for-u-s-to-redraw-the-bl-1830943004
Got that?
The most effective weapons of the Future will be virtual, more so than military-hardware oriented.
Is it really any surprise ... given how much our Social and Financial interactions ... have moved.
Migrated into the 'virtual' world. We need only look at the scourge of Identity Theft to grasp the growing dangers.
Can the scourge of systematic and selectively-targeted Voter Theft, (or more accurately Voter Denials), really be that far behind [REDACTED REDACTED REDACTED] ... [its cyber-attack enablers] ?
— —
We’ve got an App for that!
Would-be Voters will shrug and return back to their ever-present Cellphone Apps. “Oh well” ...
Repeat Registration-infiltrations as often as needed.
(PS. Yes Mr Trump, ‘Russia IS Listening’ … Still.)
End Scene.
—
Would you put it past, Putin? … Assuming he had the knowledge, the personnel talent, and the Cyber-Opportunities, at his disposal … (I wouldn’t either.) … Let see, 5% Dem Voter-regs, in 10 Swing states ...
Afterall … If it CAN happen … it will probably happen here FIRST.
MAGA Volume II … is quietly waiting in the wings.
Bigger, Better, Badder than Volume I, ever dare imagine being — by a Ruskie-defense-probing-mile.
— —
