Still more combat ahead even with the recent disinformation battle prompting the fear of a Russian attack on a NATO country.
Frederick W. Kagan may have the best take on any talk of peace negotiations:
Discussions about the desirability of Ukraine negotiating from a position of strength, while its forces are winning, are based on a mistaken premise. Ukraine has liberated nearly half the land Russia has seized since renewing its invasion in February 2022—meaning that Russia still has more than half the territory it illegally occupies. Ukraine has momentum in this conflict, but not yet the upper hand. Its negotiating position is stronger than it was when Russian forces were advancing on additional critical cities and regions, but not yet strong enough to have created good conditions from which to negotiate.
[...]
Even conceding these lands would not end the war, moreover. Putin did not invade Ukraine to gain territory. He invaded because he rejects the idea of an independent Ukrainian state or a Ukrainian ethnicity. He attacked because he refuses to tolerate a government in Kyiv that is not under de facto Russian control. He has built these ideas deeply into his ideology and will not remove them. Putin will never stop trying to regain control of Ukraine by one means or another. Neither the Ukraine nor the West can change Putin’s ambitions—so they must create reality in which even Putin understands that he must not pursue them by war and in which he lacks the capability to continue fighting even if he wanted to.
How can that reality come about? The West should help Ukraine liberate the areas that are strategically vital to its security and economic well-being and then build up the Ukrainian military and economy to a point that deters future Russian invasions. Moscow will continue to pursue means short of invasion to undermine pro-Western Ukrainian governments and coerce Ukrainians to surrender their independence. Success for Ukraine and the West lies in turning this hot war into a cold war on terms that leave Ukraine strong enough to survive and ultimately win it.
[...]
The current lines are thus neither defensible nor acceptable. Ukraine must push on, and the West must help Kyiv create conditions on the ground that are sustainable over the long term. Ukraine must first establish the military facts on the ground that it needs to survive and only then, with the backing of its partners, turn to Russia to codify those facts in a diplomatic agreement.
www.understandingwar.org/...
The S-300 missile strike in Poland and the bombing of the Nord Stream pipeline resembles another recent example of disinformation: reports of Russia severing a Crimea submarine cable in 2014.
www.nytimes.com/...
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Russia unleashed another wave of rocket, drone and missile strikes across Ukraine on Thursday morning. The latest strikes mark the sixth mass attack since early October, which Ukrainian authorities say are aimed at destroying the country’s energy system.
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Winter’s first snow fell in Kyiv while authorities said they were working to restore power nationwide after Russia earlier this week unleashed what Ukraine said was the heaviest bombardment of civilian infrastructure of the war.
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The Donetsk region experienced the heaviest fighting of the war so far. Russian forces were reinforced by troops pulled from Kherson city in the south which Ukraine recaptured last week. Russian forces fired artillery on the towns of Bakhmut and nearby Soledar, among others, the Ukrainian military said.
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About 10 million people were without power, President Volodymyr Zelenskiy said in a Thursday evening video address. Authorities in some places had ordered forced emergency blackouts, he said.
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A deal brokered by the UN and Turkey in July aimed at easing global food shortages was extended for four months on Thursday, though Russia said its own demands were yet to be fully addressed.
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Strikes on critical infrastructure in Odesa and Dnipro were confirmed by the presidential administration and the regional heads. Three people were reportedly injured in Odesa region, while another 14 people were injured in the strike on Dnipro city, according to its mayor, Borys Filatov.
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Two people were killed in a missile attack overnight on the south-eastern region of Zaporizhzhia, according to local officials. Three were wounded in an attack on the north-eastern city of Kharkiv, they added.
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Investigators in recaptured territory in the area uncovered 63 bodies bearing signs of torture after Russian forces left, Ukraine’s interior minister was quoted as saying. Russia denies its troops target civilians or have committed atrocities. Mass burial sites have been found in other parts previously occupied by Russian troops, including some with civilian bodies showing signs of torture.
www.theguardian.com/...
- Russian forces conducted another massive wave of missile strikes across Ukraine on November 17
- Russian forces in eastern Kherson Oblast are likely partially vulnerable to a Ukrainian interdiction campaign such as the one Ukrainian forces successfully exploited to retake western Kherson Oblast.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin signed a decree changing the composition of the Russian Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights (HRC) on November 17.
- Russian sources continued to claim that Ukrainian troops are conducting counteroffensive operations along the Svatove-Kreminna line.
- Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut, Avdiivka, and southwest of Donetsk City.
- Ukrainian troops continued targeting Russian military assets and concentration areas on the east bank of Kherson Oblast and in the rear areas of Zaporizhia Oblast on November 17.
- Russian authorities continue to face discontented mobilized personnel and low morale on the front lines.
- Russian occupation officials continued to destroy Ukrainian culture in Russian-occupied territories.
www.understandingwar.org/…
Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued to prioritize offensive operations in Donetsk Oblast on November 17. Ukrainian Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Directorate, Brigadier General Oleksiy Hromov, stated that the most difficult situation is in eastern Ukraine, where Russian forces are attempting to cross the administrative border of Donetsk Oblast.[17] Hromov stated that there have been 500 combat clashes between Ukrainian and Russian forces in Donetsk Oblast within the last week alone.[18] ISW has previously reported that the Russian military is likely trying to use mobilized personnel and troops who were previously deployed on the west bank of Kherson Oblast to revitalize the Donetsk offensive but will likely continue to fail to achieve operationally significant gains.[19]
Russian forces continued offensive operations around Bakhmut on November 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian Forces repelled Russian assaults within 34km northeast of Bakhmut near Verkhnokamianske and Soledar.[20] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces also attacked Vesele and Bilhorivka to cut the road in the Soledar area.[21] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Wagner Group formations southeast of Bakhmut retain control over Vesela Dolyna, Odradivka, the western outskirts of Opytne, and the southeastern outskirts of Bakhmut.[22]
Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area and western Donetsk Oblast on November 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults within 28km southwest of Avdiivka near Nevelske, Marinka, and Pervomaiske.[23] A Russian milblogger claimed that the 100th Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) People’s Militia established control over a stronghold on the southeastern outskirts of Nevelske that they claimed would allow Russian forces to control the Krasnohorivka-Pervomaiske-Avdiivka supply road.[24] The Russian milblogger also claimed that Russian forces southwest of Avdiivka are clearing the northern outskirts of Opytne and the eastern part of Vodiane.[25] Another Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces attacked a Ukrainian stronghold within the city limits of Avdiivka itself.[26] Russian milbloggers claimed that the developed network of Ukrainian strongholds in the Avdiivka-Donetsk City area makes the Russian advance in the area particularly slow.[27] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also claimed that Russian forces took full control of the road between Pavlivka and Mykilske (47km southwest of Donetsk City).[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces deployed 400 personnel from the Rosgvardia rapid response special forces units to Mariupol, Donetsk Oblast.[29] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces continued routine indirect fire along the line of contact in Donetsk Oblast on November 17.[30]
www.understandingwar.org/…
Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)
Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in the directions of Svatove and Kreminna on November 17. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian air and artillery strikes prevented Ukrainian forces from attacking in the direction of Novoselivske and Kolomychikha (both within 15km northwest of Svatove); near Makiivka, Ploshchanka, and Chervonopopivka (all within 22km northwest of Kreminna); and near Dibrova (5km southwest of Kreminna).[10] The Ukrainian General Staff reported on November 17 that Ukrainian forces also repelled Russian assaults within 16km northwest of Svatove near Stelmakhivka and south of Kreminna near Bilohorivka.[11] Russian mibloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces tried to attack Russian defenses near Svatove and conducted offensive operations near Kuzemivka (13km northwest of Svatove) on November 16.[12] A milblogger cited a BARS-13 (Russian Combat Reserve) commander who claimed that Ukrainian forces are preparing for a large offensive along the Orlianka-Zatizhne-Svatove line, although ISW offers no assessments about future Ukrainian operations.[13]
www.understandingwar.org/...
Russian forces conducted another massive wave of missile strikes across Ukraine on November 17. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops launched five airstrikes and 25 cruise missile strikes at civilian infrastructure objects in Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa, Kharkiv, Zaporizhia, Dnipropetrovsk, and Mykolaiv oblasts throughout the day.[1] Ukrainian Air Force Command noted that Ukrainian air defense forces destroyed four cruise missiles, five Shahed-136 drones, and two Kh-59 guided missiles.[2] Russian forces conducted the largest missile attack since the start of the war on November 15, and as ISW has previously assessed, such missile campaigns are consuming Russia’s already depleted store of precision munitions.[3]
Russian forces in eastern Kherson Oblast are likely partially vulnerable to a Ukrainian interdiction campaign such as the one Ukrainian forces successfully exploited to retake western Kherson Oblast. Several major ground lines of communication (GLOCs) run through eastern Kherson Oblast into other Russian-controlled areas in southern Ukraine: the southern T2202 Nova Kahkovka-Armiansk route, the southeastern P47 Kakovkha-Henichesk route, and the M14 highway that runs eastward into Melitopol, Berdyansk, and Mariupol. Geolocated satellite imagery indicates that Russian troops are establishing defensive positions along some of these critical GLOCs, and social media reporting indicates that Ukrainian strikes have already begun targeting Russian concentration areas and military assets on these routes.[4] The limited number of high-quality roads and railways in this area, particularly connecting Crimea to the mainland, creates potential bottlenecks that could be vulnerable to Ukrainian interdiction efforts that would gradually degrade the Russian ability to continue supplying its grouping in eastern Kherson Oblast and other areas of southern Ukraine. ISW previously reported the targeting of similar bottlenecks along key GLOCS--not just the bridges across the Dnipro River--during Ukraine’s Kherson counteroffensive in late August to mid-October culminated in the Russian withdrawal from the west bank of Kherson Oblast to positions further south of the Dnipro River. Ukrainian forces will likely find it harder to achieve such dramatic effects in eastern Kherson but may be able to disrupt Russian efforts to solidify and hold their new defensive lines.
www.understandingwar.org/...
This starts with @jserhmcyber’s piece published yesterday.
atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atla…
"When Russia illegally invaded and annexed Crimea in 2014, one of its first actions was to cut a submarine cable linking the peninsula to the outside world." That cites…
An article by LCDR Dennis E. Harbin III entitled Targeting Submarine Cables…
tjaglcs.army.mil/-/-targeting-s…
Which states:
"During the annexation of Crimea…, one of Russia’s first acts was to disrupt internet connectivity to the Crimean peninsula and isolate it…"
That cites…
This @Policy_Exchange article by then-Tory MP @RishiSunak, current Chancellor of the Exchequer of the UK.
policyexchange.org.uk/publication/un…
Which states:
When Russia annexed Crimea, one of its first moves was to sever the main cable connection to the outside world.
No citation, but…
We must do more to protect the indispensable yet insecure internet infrastructure provided by undersea cables, urges Rishi Sunak MP in a new report published by Policy Exchange, Undersea Cables: Indis…https://policyexchange.org.uk/publication/undersea-cables-indispensable-insecure/
The @Policy_Exchange received some push back from the subsea cable industry including this statement from the European Subsea Cables Association (@subseacables).
escaeu.org/download/?Id=3…
We’ve reached a dead end, but if we back up to the LTDR’s paper, he also cites…
A @lawfareblog post about the threat to subsea cables from Russia.
lawfareblog.com/evaluating-rus…
Which claims that Russia seized an IXP not a subsea cable:
"during the 2014 invasion of Crimea, Russian forces seized the peninsula’s main internet traffic exchange point"
And cites…
A
@chathamhouse report from March 2016
chathamhouse.org/sites/default/…
Which says
"Russia special operations forces … simply took over the Simferopol internet exchange point (IXP), and elsewhere selectively disrupted cable connections to the Ukrainian mainland"
And that cites…
A statement Ukrtelecom which stated on 28-Feb-2014 that its fiber cables sustained damage and it lost the technical ability to provide services to Crimea.
web.archive.org/web/2014030500…
This lead to media inquiries to me and the Renesys team to confirm. We responded…
We (Renesys) could not confirm any outages in Crimea and that the CR-IX was still reported traffic was flowing normally.
To be clear…
There were some outages in Crimea following the Russian takeover, but there was not an internet shutdown.
And then…
In March 2014, Prime Minister Medvedev traveled to Simferopol to give a speech.
themoscowtimes.com/2014/04/14/ros…
In it, he stated it was unacceptable that communications from Crimea was now traveling through foreign (Ukrainian) telecom companies.
Therefore…
Rostelecom Close to Completing Underwater Cable to Crimea Russian long-distance telecoms provider Rostelecom has nearly competed laying an underwater communication line across the Kerch Strait, which will connect Crimea with Russian regions and bypass Ukra…https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2014/04/14/rostelecom-close-to-completing-underwater-cable-to-crimea-a33938
In summary, Russia didn’t cut any subsea cables to Crimea when it was annexed.
There were brief outages but the peninsula stayed connected over the land bridge and later the Kerch Strait cable.
And finally...
It is concerning how unconfirmed assertions like those above can be accepted uncritically and circulated among news outlets, think tanks and security/military literature.
/End
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