The major air attacks reported for several days have yet to materialize.
Eastern Ukraine: (Eastern Kharkiv Oblast-Western Luhansk Oblast)
Ukrainian and Russian sources reported that Ukrainian forces made localized breakthroughs southwest and northwest of Kreminna on December 2. A prominent Russian milblogger claimed that Ukrainian forces made marginal advances in the forests south of Kreminna and have reached the outskirts of Chervonopopivka (about 10km northwest of Kreminna).[25] The milblogger added that Ukrainian forces have intensified their counteroffensives along the entire frontline and in the area of the Svatove-Kreminna highway. Luhansk Oblast Administration head Serhiy Haidai vaguely noted that Ukrainian forces are “very close” to Kreminna and stated that Ukrainian forces “visited” the Kreminska power substation in the vicinity of the settlement.[26] Haidai added that the weather is finally changing on the Svatove-Kreminna frontline, noting that Ukrainian forces will soon be able to improve their maneuvers as the mud fully freezes in the area.[27] ISW had previously reported that fighting will likely intensify over that winter period given that frozen ground provides better conditions for maneuver warfare.[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Chervonopopivka and Bilohorivka (about 12km south of Kreminna).[29] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces defeated three Ukrainian company tactical groups that attempted to attack Chervonopopivka.[30]
Russian and Ukrainian forces continued to engage in localized battles west of Svatove on December 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults on Novoselivske and Stelmakhivka, both approximately 18km northwest of Svatove.[31] Geolocated footage published on December 2 showed Russian forces walking around Novoselivske, which indicates that Russian forces have likely regained their positions in the settlement.[32] Russian state media claimed that Russian forces are currently clearing Novoselivske of remaining Ukrainian forces.[33] Geolocated footage also showed a Russian serviceman surrendering to Ukrainian forces east of Stelmakhivka.[34] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks on Kotlyarivka (about 29km northwest on Svatove) and Kuzemivka just east of Novoselivske.[35]
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Russian Subordinate Main Effort—Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces continued to make minimal advances around Bakhmut amidst ongoing offensive operations on December 2. The Ukrainian Geneal Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults near Bakhmut, within 26km northeast of Bakhmut near Vyimka, and within 14km south of Bakhmut near Opytne, Kishchiivka, and Kurdyumivka.[36] Geolocated footage posted on December 1 shows Russian forces making minimal advances south and southeast of Bakhmut as well as near Opytne.[37] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are conducting reconnaissance around Klishchiivka and that fighting is ongoing near the settlement despite Russian claims that Russian forces completely occupy the settlement.[38] A Russian milblogger claimed that Russian forces have been advancing near Spirne (within 30km northeast of Bakhmut) and are preventing Ukrainian forces from transferring units to forward positions in the area.[39] Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces are rotating units from Zaporizhia Oblast into the Bakhmut area and suggested that this means that Ukrainian forces are facing a critical situation on this section of the front.[40] Ukrainian forces’ supposed rotation of units into the area would not be possible if Russian forces had the ability to interdict all roads in the Bakhmut area as a Russian source previously claimed.[41] The Ukrainian Joint Forces Task Force published an interview with a Ukrainian soldier in the Bakhmut area on December 2 in which the soldier states that conditions are incredibly harsh and that Russian forces continue to push offensive operations in the area despite the number of casualties.[42] ISW has previously assessed that the Russian effort to take Bakhmut is a high-cost effort concentrated on a city of limited operational significance.[43]
Russian forces continued to conduct offensive operations in the Avdiivka–Donetsk City area on December 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults within 28km southwest of Avdiivka near Severnye, Pervomaiske, Krasnohorivka, and Marinka.[44] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces also continued offensive operations southwest of Avdiivka near Nevelske, Vodyane, and Novomykhailivka.[45] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces advanced to the eastern outskirts of Pervomaiske, with one claiming that Russian forces entrenched themselves within the settlement itself.[46] Russian milbloggers also claimed that Russian forces made minimal advances in the southern outskirts of Avdiivka and that fighting between Ukrainian and Russian forces continues in the center of Marinka.[47]
Russian forces continued to conduct defensive operations in western Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts on December 2. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continue to maintain defensive lines in this section of the front.[48] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian counterattacks near Mykilske in western Donetsk Oblast (within 47km southwest of Donetsk city).[49] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces continued routine indirect fire along the line of contact in Donetsk and eastern Zaporizhia oblasts.[50]
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US interests in ending the current war on terms that minimize the risk of future Russian invasion can be fully separated from the moral and humanitarian considerations that motivate many people to support Ukraine. American interests flow from the NATO alliance and the obligations it imposes on the US as well as to the close and vital economic interdependence of the US with Europe. Europe and NATO will be profoundly affected by a future Russian invasion of Ukraine as they have been by this one, and the US will face the same imperative to support its allies in the future as it does today. American policymakers today must focus on the imperative of resolving the current conflict in ways that do not set conditions for renewed war for our own interests, not just Ukraine’s.
The likely durability of a cessation of hostilities rests on three fundamental questions:
- Will Russia’s objectives with respect to Ukraine, other former Soviet states, NATO, and the US change?
- Will the future correlation of forces favor Ukraine once the fighting stops?
- Will Western support for Ukraine remain firm?
[...]
Within a few years of the cessation of hostilities, therefore, the following conditions are extremely likely to hold:
- Ukrainian military power will be lower than it is now
- Russian military power will be greater than it is now and rising
- Western military support for Ukraine will be lower
- Western economic support for Ukraine will be insufficient and dropping
- General Western enthusiasm for supporting Ukraine will be lower
- Internal Ukrainian cohesion will be lower
- Russia’s aims toward Ukraine and the US will remain unchanged
Western leaders and Ukrainians should not simply accept these forecasts as givens, of course. Western political leaders should fight hard to sustain Western support for Ukraine, continuing to make the real and urgent case for defending the West’s interests by helping Ukraine rebuild and deter future Russian invasions. Ukrainians should also fight to rebuild as cohesive a state and society as they can, as well as to sustain the strongest defense posture possible in their post-conflict economic and social conditions. But a sober forecast based on normal historical trends and patterns requires assuming that such efforts will be at best partially acceptable, and future policy should be based on pessimistic sobriety rather than hopeful optimism.
One obvious conclusion follows from these observations: Any territory Ukraine does not retake now will likely be lost to it indefinitely. The de facto borders of Ukraine at a ceasefire in the near term will be the maximum territorial extent of the Ukrainian state for the foreseeable future.
We must also recognize that the risks of escalation driving the current push to press Ukraine to make concessions will be just as real whenever Russia renews the attack. Russia will always be a nuclear power. It will always be able to attack NATO with conventional or nuclear forces. Those facts will not be changed by a ceasefire now. If Putin or his successor concludes after a few years of rebuilding that he can try to conquer Ukraine again, NATO will face exactly the same risks then that some are now seeking to avoid by driving Kyiv to concessions. Those concessions will only have made the renewed invasion and return of escalation risks more likely while weakening Ukraine’s ability to deter and defeat another massive attack.
The most important conclusion to draw from all these reflections, however, is this: Ukraine’s power and Western support for Ukraine is at or near its peak and can remain there only as long as fighting continues and Ukraine continues to make gains. Both will likely begin to drop rapidly once fighting is halted or conditions of real stalemate descend. Russia’s diminishing power and influence, on the other hand, will likely begin to rise when active combat stops. Success for Ukraine and the West lies in ensuring that Ukraine has secured territorial gains, military capabilities, and economic and reconstruction support while it is at or near its peak that are all great enough to deter a recovering Russia from restarting the war even as Ukraine’s power and Western support drop.
Ukraine should not cash in the leverage it might have now to secure a temporary cessation of hostilities that will leave it in a far more vulnerable condition that will invite future Russian aggression, therefore. Kyiv and its Western supporters, rather, should reinforce Ukraine’s current advantages to consolidate Ukraine’s position during the fighting so that Ukraine—and peace—can survive the inevitable erosion of Kyiv’s current advantages after the conflict’s end.
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