I’m seeing a lot of “Putin is Crazy” comments on this site and elsewhere in the media. This is a dangerous underestimation of Putin, and Russia in general. Here are some key points to keep in mind when forming an opinion on the Russia/Ukraine situation.
On a European scale, Russia is playing from a position of weakness.
On a balance of forces scale, Russia is weaker than the European members of NATO. For example, Russia has 750 combat fixed-wing aircraft, more or less en.wikipedia.org/… Compare that with the top 6 European NATO air forces, (UK, Germany, France, Italy, Poland, Spain) and they weigh in at around 900 comparable aircraft. Running down lists of other metrics, from size of various combat commands, etc, again the European component of NATO has anywhere from parity to something of an advantage in available forces.
From an arms race perspective European NATO members have twice the tank factories, aircraft factories, three times the population and fifteen times the GDP. From a nuclear standpoint, France and the UK have 400 deployed nuclear warheads, 1/3 of Russia’s total and more than enough to have a credible nuclear deterrent en.wikipedia.org/…
And all of that is true before accounting for the USA.
Unlike the 1950’s and 1960’s, Russia is simply not in a position to win any great European war, even for the sacrifice of millions of Russian lives. In fact, the only places where Russia has a potential to flex its military to the west are Ukraine and the Baltic states, and the latter are NATO members. Russia’s main advantage lies not in its total military might, but in its willingness to use that might.
The long-term trend lines for Russia are grim.
The Russian economy is about the same size as Spain’s. On a more local level, Russia’s economy is slightly less than three times the size of Poland’s. As Europe moves to divest from fossil fuels, Europe is also divesting from a major sector of the Russian economy. A single decade of 10% growth in the Polish economy, and Poland alone might find itself a peer competitor to Russia.
Plagued by rampant corruption, a huge land area and large population, Russia is facing a real prospect of falling from superpower, to great power, to regional power, to regional player in a single lifetime. A moderate run of bad luck could even turn Russia from seeking a leadership role in the world to maintaining its own territorial integrity and autonomy; trying to avoid becoming a client state to Germany or China.
In Ukraine, the trend line isn’t favorable either. A western leaning Ukraine is making progress on its corruption and rule of law issues (even if slow, cultures take time to shift). Under threat of Russian occupation and invasion, we may be seeing the birth or renaissance of a Ukrainian national identity in real time. In 8 years, Ukraine has grown a military more or less from the ground up, transforming from a nonentity to a credible asymmetric threat to any Russian invasion. Over time, if this trendline continues, Ukraine will eventually develop to the point where it can run a coherent national defense strategy even in the face of a Russian invasion, making such much more costly.
Putin is aggrieved.
The politics of white grievance are a driving force in American politics, so why wouldn’t the politics of grievance be a force in Russia as well? Russia and Putin are quick to point fingers at the west for breaking promises about the expansion of NATO or disrespecting spheres of influence.
Putin doesn’t really recognize Ukraine’s sovereignty nor autonomy as an inherent thing. From his perspective, he’ll point to Catalonia or Puerto Rico as examples of western powers rejecting calls for independence. He’ll point to things like the 2003 invasion of Iraq as examples of western ‘hypocrisy’ when it comes to intervention as justified for national security.
The unfortunate reality in international politics is that it comes down to power, pragmatism, and convenience. Powerful countries tend to push their neighbors around. Always have and probably always will. As the suzerain of the USSR, Russia pushed around its satellites, and it is uncomfortable to be on the receiving end of such treatment. Putin’s government may have a bunch of different reasons woven into their narrative why they have every right to go in and do whatever it is they’re about to do. Like usual, it is simply justification as part of a means to an end.
Putin Perceives a NATO-aligned Ukraine as an existential threat.
From a certain point of view, his perspective is correct. Russia has a long history refining the use of hard power. Military force and, destabilization, and the threat of, or actual military intervention are evergreens in the songbook or Russian foreign policy. Look at the number of interventions during the last years of the Soviet Union, or even the intervention in Kazakhstan recently. The Ukranian city of Shostka is 500km from Moscow. That falls within the range of either the Russian Iskander missile, en.wikipedia.org/… or a US ATACMS en.wikipedia.org/… Looking from a historical Russian perspective, that is a clear and present threat of military force inside Russia proper. The clear implication is that Europe will start making demands on Russia with a threat of invasion and takeover.
And basically, this is true. Europeans of the current generation aren’t into big wars, and so a lightning drive on Moscow isn’t going to happen. However, Europeans don’t consider bullying of neighbors using hard power to be acceptable, and want Russia to stop. It is be fair to say that Europe would reply in kind to Russia’s military threats given the opportunity. Think of it like the 6 year old that just won’t stop swinging the shovel around while playing in the yard. Her parents might not care how she’s playing on her own, but she needs to stop swinging wildly so near her little brother!
Putin may be getting desperate.
Take those three items together and remember that Putin and other Russian leaders grew up during an era when Russia was one of two world superpowers. Russia’s military, political ‘unity’ and population are what got them there. Watching a country fallen to regional power status and falling farther would be a bitter pill indeed.
What’s Next?
Keep in mind that actions taken by nations are anything but X or Y propositions. All exist on a spectrum and in a specific context. It is essentially unthinkable that Putin would make the same mistake as Tojo in November of 1941, launching a large surprise attack on NATO forces that assures a major war.
Instead recognize that Russia will take calibrated actions that are using the military to get a means to an end. Pressure, division and use of force are all tools in Russia’s toolbox.