I’ve been an optimist for Ukraine winning the war since day 2. The two clues for me personally were seeing Russian tanks cross the border high speed (for a tank) sans infantry in a display of expected capitulation and a quickly defeated paradrop at Hostomel NW of Kyiv. Both showed signs the Russians were unprepared for serious Ukrainian resistance and the second showed the Ukrainians were prepared to react quickly and decisively. In the past two weeks the Russian offensive has slowed to crawl in most areas and it’s become obvious most Russian early gains were places the Ukrainians chose not to defend strongly for whatever reason. Kherson would be the biggest Russian capture to date and that was after Ukrainian forces slipped out undetected at a time of their choosing, not beaten out or surrounded by Russian forces.
Casualty rates for the Russians are reported as 11,000 dead, but I’m going to assume a conservative 1000 casualties per day (333 dead, 667 wounded). We’re starting day 15, so let’s call it 15,000 out of action Russians leaving 175,000 soldiers of the original 190,000. I’m assuming no significant forces are forthcoming from other parts of Russia for two reasons. One, this was billed as a special operation and inside Russia is portrayed as going well. Two, the protests inside Russia and the need to guard a very long border with China after showing military weakness will prevent a large redistribution of forces.
I do not see Belarus entering the conflict with its own troops. One, puppets are usually cowards and would only enter the war once it appears fait accompli (see Mussolini, Benito). Belarus shares a border with Poland and while I don’t think NATO will invade, the paranoids in charge there will not divert significant forces away from NATO borders. Putin has shown weakness, not strength. So defying Moscow becomes easier. Furthermore, should Ukraine go on the offensive, them driving to Moscow is not a possibility. Ukraine taking out a full belligerent Belarus would be (if unlikely).
To date Ukraine has performed a masterful defense. I have seen no Ukrainian casualty estimates but with some 60,000+ expats returning to fight and foreign volunteers I see Ukrainian military numbers increasing, not decreasing. I see different estimates for their force numbers, but 200,000 active troops (including territorial defense forces) and up to another 900,000 former soldiers means that with enough organizational time they can get their military formations up to 525,000 which would be enough to have the conventional 3-1 numerical advantage for a successful attacker.
However, they will certainly reach 3-1 locally long before that. And here lies a big Russian weakness. Ukraine has what’s called short lines of communication. Look at the map above. Ukraine controls the center of the country while Russian controls bits and pieces around half of the outside. Now imagine both sides simultaneously decide winning the southern battle is first priority and both redirect troops away from Kyiv to the south. The Ukrainians would need to travel a relatively straight 500 km. The Russians would need to travel north to Belarus, east past Kursk, south to Rostov, and finally west to Kherson. Roughly 4 times as long. For a military which has shown such poor logistics and vehicular movement, that is bad news. As Ukraine starts minor counter-offensives they will have an advantage in moving troops to needed places.
Sometime in the next month (I’m guessing before April) we will see a major Ukrainian push in the NW from Kukhari to the water cutting off Russian troops near Kyiv. These troops will surrender fairly quickly once cut off. They are the furtherest out on the supply chain and are most likely receiving the worst resupply. Ukraine can muster the local numerical advantage to make this happen. I imagine a significant number of troops are around Kyiv to begin with plus all the people and material coming in from the western border makes this the most likely first step.
From there cutting off the troops on the line from Chernihiv to Sumy would be next provided the ground is solid enough to go cross country. But really, after Kyiv next moves will be dictated by ground conditions and local Russian weaknesses. Western intelligence will allow the Ukrainians to know far more of Russian disposition than localized Russian commanders will know of the Ukrainian disposition. Between shorter lines of communication and superior information, the Ukrainians will be able to concentrate forces quickly from place to place defeating the Russians in detail. Without a major Russian escalation, this will snowball and quickly turn into a rout.
A Ukrainian conventional victory is now only a matter of dry ground, and enough time to organize the new soldiers and materials into an offensive. Putin could always pull something out of his hat, but he’s on the clock.