On this week’s episode of The Brief, host Markos Moulitsas welcomed two guests to talk about the situation on the ground in Ukraine, break down Russia’s military strategy (or lack thereof), and the importance of avoiding nuclear conflict.
This week’s guests are well-versed on military strategy and were able to offer some insights into how the conflict could play out in the coming days and weeks. Brandon Friedman is CEO of McPherson Square Group and cofounder of Rakkasan Tea Company, which sells loose leaf teas from post-conflict areas. Friedman has served two tours with the Army’s 101st Airborne Division in Iraq and Afghanistan, and is author of the memoir The War I Always Wanted. Jon Soltz served as a United States Army officer in the Iraq War and is a cofounder of VoteVets, an organization that, through public issue campaigns, “relentlessly lift[s] up the voices of veterans on matters of national security, veterans’ care, and everyday issues that affect the lives of those who served, and their families.”
Russia’s military assault on Ukraine appeared to begin overnight and even took many Ukrainians by surprise. Yet, as the conflict unfolded over the previous few days, little appears to have gone according to Vladimir Putin’s plans. “What surprised you most about the start of this war?” Moulitsas asked.
Friedman noted that everybody has been a bit shocked at the lack of competence on the part of the Russian military:
I think everybody … expected something different here. There was sort of a sense [in] the 1990s that the Russians weren’t that great, and over the last 20 years, that kind of changed. They supposedly modernized their military in terms of equipment, tactics, and all this stuff. And we’ve seen them operate a little in Syria, but I don’t think anyone expected this performance, which has just been terrible.
“It almost seems like Putin himself didn’t know that his military was this poor. I mean, the entire point of this war was for him to say, ‘No, the west can't focus on China. We are a global superpower, pay attention to us, and we’re going to take what’s ours.’ And almost the exact opposite has come out,” Moulitsas added. “Anybody that might be afraid of Russia suddenly is thinking, ‘Okay, they’ve got nukes; let’s not pretend that Russia is not incredibly dangerous. But maybe they’re not as fearsome as we thought.’”
Moulitsas expressed that keeping lines open to deliver food, fuel, and mechanics remains of utmost importance in this war.
Drawing on lessons from how the U.S. Army trained the Iraqi military force, Soltz explained that sustainment is key:
You’re better off giving them things they can sustain and manage on their own rather than providing the Western way of war, and that gives them a fighting chance. That’s why we say logistics wins wars ... You’ve really got to be proficient at sustainment. I’ve got to tell you, the Russians are lucky that the United States isn’t involved. I mean, this sh*t would have been over. Like, there’s no second chances for these kids. I will tell you, I do feel bad for these conscripts, because we are learning here that conscription may not be the 21st century way of war ... You’ve got to have people that want to fight—you’ve got to have people who want to be there, and I [have] some sympathy for these Russian soldiers who literally didn’t even know where they were going. Which isn’t surprising, considering the fact that [Russian military leadership] limit[s] the amount of information they pass down.
Friedman laid out how he envisions the war unfolding in the coming weeks and months:
It’s going to be a really, really big shock to these guys once they get inside Kyiv. [If I were Russian,] I would turn around and come back the way I came. Russia is eventually going to be able to overpower the Ukrainian army when it comes to breaking into the cities, just by sheer brute force, they will. But then, once they get in there, then they have to sustain themselves, and they have to pacify the population, and they have to be able to set up some form of governance, and all this stuff. They’re not going to be able to do that because everybody in Kyiv hates them. And it’s going to become a living nightmare for these guys once they get inside the city.
As Friedman sees it, if they were to take Kyiv, Russian troops would be trapped and unable to leave, creating “an absolute nightmare of an insurgency” against them. Recalling his time in Iraq, specifically in Baghdad, he noted that there was never a point at which more than 1% of the population was willing to pick up arms and fight with the American troops and the Iraqi government forces. In contrast, in Kyiv, Friedman pointed out, easily 10 to 20% of the population would be willing to take up arms against the Russians.
“It’s just going to be a nightmare for the Russians, and they’re going to be facing a population where a high percentage hates them, a high percentage is going to be willing to take up arms, and they’re angry. It’s going to be a hornet’s nest,” he concluded.
Soltz agreed that Russia does not actually want to take Kyiv right now, as it is far from being in their interest. “If your strategic objective is to keep Ukraine away from NATO and destroy the open-door policy and get a puppet government [in place], how is what you’re doing helping you achieve your objective?” he asked. “There is no way for Russia to win this war—I don’t care how many buildings they knock down, I don’t care how many casualties Ukraine takes. [Ukrainians] are going to win this war because the goals that Putin has pushed are not achievable.”
Expanding on this, Soltz also argued that Putin is failing to reach his objectives and is now simply trying not to look weak:
So his concept was ‘Let me intimidate people and keep Ukraine away from NATO’ … the point still is, if you take Kyiv at this point, you’re grabbing the tiger by its tail. And you’re looking at some type of operation that is going to be brutal. And I think that’s why we’re seeing a shift in strategy or tactics today, to be like, let’s go back to blowing cities up, because that might be Putin’s best chance to get some type of negotiated end state [in which] he doesn’t look completely like an idiot.
[Russians don’t really want Kyiv] because of what Brandon is saying. Because now you’re dealing in an asymmetric, 365º battlefield where huge percentages of the population are armed [and] want to fight you. And the casualties are going to be substantial for Russia. It might look ugly for a week, but I’m telling you, in the long run, Russia cannot win this war [with] the goals they’ve established right now.
Once again drawing on his time in Iraq, Friedman recalled that many Iraqis were happy to help U.S. soldiers to protect them and help them gather intelligence—and drew a contrast to the situation facing Russian soldiers in Ukraine:
There was a huge portion of that population that was happy to have us there and overthrow Saddam. What that looks like in real life is, not only do you have people who can interpret for you, and translate, and help you with stuff; but they can warn you, they can tell you when there are some guys down the road planting IEDs, or where there are some guys down the road setting up an ambush. Russians aren’t going to have that—no one wants to help them. It’s going to be such a difficult environment in which to operate, and you’re already dealing with conscripts who don’t want to be there, who didn’t think this was what they were going to be doing. It’s going to be brutal for them.
Moulitsas pointed out the holes in Putin’s argument, that if Ukrainians are “actually Russian,” “then why are you killing them?”
Friedman agreed: “They’re sort of painting themselves into a corner on that.”
Moulitsas also wondered what would be most important to deliver to the Ukrainian armed forces right now. Friedman recommended focusing on anti-armor, communications equipment, fuel, batteries, Javelin missiles, and UAVs (drones). Soltz feels more worried about the civilians but is hopeful that NATO appears to be very united on this issue right now:
It’s phenomenal to watch the will of the Ukrainian people. If I’m NATO, I’m worried about, what do we do to protect civilians? Because if the civilians don’t have food, or if they don’t have basic ways to live and keep the fight going from a sustainment standpoint, they’ll quit. I think another vulnerability is that the Russians are not maneuvering at night … so I start to think about, ‘Where are the vulnerabilities with the Russians?’ and the ability for us to provide them accurate IO operations and intelligence, and sort of getting their ability [up] to do certain things at night that the Russians can’t do. I mean, you can tip the scales.
I also think that this is a 21st century war. Everybody in the United States is actually participating in this war, right? Everybody in the United States who knows that Russia is losing this war, it’s important for them to say that, because Ukrainians are watching. This is a 21st century battlefield where if you’re NATO, you’re like, ‘How do I win the strategic IO war here? How do I continue to create NATO support for what the Ukrainian population is doing? How do I prevent a humanitarian crisis? And what are the tactical advantages we can provide the Ukrainians that give them some operational ability to defend themselves?’ And I think those are three different lines of effort that I feel NATO is working on, to be honest. There is a unity among NATO right now that’s unprecedented.
However, both Soltz and Friedman have cautioned against any NATO military involvement. Soltz, in particular, urged that Americans should shy away from any actions that would turn this into a U.S.-Russia intervention:
Right now, the Ukrainians are winning on their own. They’re actually winning this war … I get the operational standpoint of a no-fly zone, but right now, the Russians are getting run without it. They are legitimately getting run without it. I’m not sure you want to see that type of escalation at this moment, because now, does that cost you your NATO coalition? To the Biden administration’s credit, when we were pushing to send more NATO troops to Eastern Europe a month ago, they were very concerned about this looking like a U.S.-Russia conflict. I give them credit for that. [For] all the heat that they [have taken], that is an extraordinarily important dynamic. Because the strategic power for NATO is unity, is strategic unity. So I think you want to preserve that, and I’m not sure if you do a no-fly zone, you get that. Now, it’s different if they take a NATO country, or they touch a NATO country. Totally different problem set at this point.
Putin’s “saber-rattling” threats of using nuclear arms seems to have shifted the entire conversation as well, Moulitsas noted. Friedman warned against stoking nuclear conflict, which he currently views as the most volatile part of this conflict given the difficulty of predicting Putin’s next move:
It’s like, ‘Is this guy serious or not?’ … You’ve got a lot of Russia watchers who are experts in this area who are warning us to take him seriously, so I will. It certainly should give everyone pause when we talk about a no-fly zone and engaging Russian forces directly. People think they have this idea of how things are going to go, but once the shooting starts in any type of conflict, your ability to control [the potential for nuclear conflict] degrades by the hour, or by the minute. It could spiral out of control very quickly.
Moulitsas thinks that the Biden administration has been very rational and methodical in its approach to potentially engaging Russia, and rightfully so.
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