It’s less than 50 miles from Kyiv to the Belarus border—only that shortest route would be directly along the broad Dnieper River. Even so, getting from Belarus to Kyiv along major highways isn’t really much of a trip. The four-lane E95 highway runs straight from the border on the northeast. A network of several smaller highways on the northwest side of the city requires a series of turns and twists, but the total trip isn’t much longer. Either drive should take no more than a couple of hours.
Getting to Kyiv from Russia takes somewhat longer, but is really in the kind of range that most Americans wouldn’t hesitate to take on a day trip. Just 175 miles up the M02, or slightly longer routes down the M03 or H07. Even the longest of these routes is the sort of drive that can usually be accomplished in a morning—with time out for a bathroom break and a stop for coffee.
But when Russia crossed the borders of Ukraine, approaching from both north and east, on Feb. 24, they did not sit down to dinner in Kyiv, even if that’s what many of them had been expecting. In large part, that’s because many of these highways ran through cities. The E95 cuts through Chernihiv, the H07 starts in Sumy, and the M03 runs through Kharkiv. Considering that warnings provided by U.S. intelligence and the very visible 190,000-person force gathered along the border, these cities were already braced for impact. That’s why, on the first day of the Russia invasion, forces actually only penetrated quickly along the relatively uncontested M02.
Russian advance toward Kyiv on Feb 24
Over the day, Russian forces fanned out on secondary streets and smaller dirt or gravel tracks that allowed them to somewhat bypass those cities, but these routes were tedious and slow. Soon enough they would also be muddy and all but impassable. So while Russia was able to “occupy” more territory as it spread around these city-sized roadblocks, it wasn’t able to actually place significant forces along the major highways to the east.
Ukrainian forces stand ready in Kyiv on Feb. 25.
It was really only on the set of secondary roads to the northwest of Kyiv that Russian forces managed to find a relatively uncontested route to the Kyiv suburbs. Though there were a series of minor actions and quite a number of vehicles left at the roadside, Russian forces advanced fairly rapidly through villages and towns west of the Dnieper. Just over a day into the war, there were startling pictures of advanced units of the Russian forces driving along suburban streets.
Five days after the invasion began, the situation looked like this: Russia continued to advance slowly along the line of the M02 to the northeast, though it was meeting increased resistance. Some forces had been worked around Sumy from the south and were proceeding down the H07. And Russia was massing forces northwest of Kyiv. That purple box on this map represents a “significant” Russian build-up. Despite these advances, the bulk of Russian forces that might otherwise have advanced on Kyiv was still bottled up behind Chernihiv, Sumy, and most of all, Kharkiv.
The situation in northern Ukraine on Mar. 1
The bombardment of Kharkiv began early, and has never let up.
Kharkiv is Ukraine’s second-largest city, sits on the best highway approaching Kyiv from the east, and is only a handful of miles from a Russian military base right across the border. Russia came at Kharkiv with a massive frontal assault, with paratroopers dropped into the city, and absolutely relentless shelling, missiles, and bombs. If Russian forces were able to mass northwest of the Kyiv suburbs, in Kharkiv, they massed right on the edge of the city. And still, Ukrainian forces refused to fold.
Why is there an expanded view of Kyiv on Mar. 5? Because with the number of forces massed near the city and Russian moving forward, expectations were that the fighting would soon be street-to-street within the capital.
Conditions in northern Ukraine on Mar 5
Citizens of Kyiv shelter in a subway station on March 2
The map on Mar. 5 is all about Russia finally getting its act together and moving. Those slow creeping forces coming along the M02 are finally beginning to result in some equipment sitting on the outskirts of Kyiv, while all those giant “convoys” driving along roads to the west are on the move to the south. The intention is clearly to do to Kyiv what Russia has accomplished in other cities: Surround it, cut it off from resupply, and force defenders to confront a situation in which they get continually weaker, while Russia continues to both build its forces and shell the city from all sides.
With Russian forces making gains in the western suburbs, and the second line of forces approaching along the H07 after bypassing Sumy, all of this seems possible. It’s not quite the “kick them out by this afternoon” speed Russia anticipated, but the story is still one of Russia on the advance, and Kyiv’s eventual capture seems almost inevitable.
Now, let’s zip forward to Mar. 10 to see how that worked out …
The situation in northern Ukraine on Mar. 10.
The biggest change between this map and the last one is immediately obvious. @War_Mapper (who made all these terrific maps) has decided to switch to a darker shade of red. Other than that, the biggest change is that the expanded view of Kyiv has been dropped, because that street-to-street fighting no longer seems like something that’s going to happen any minute now. Russia’s move to encircle the city from the west still seems more aspirational than actual, the build-up of forces in the northeast continues to be slow. Chernihiv, Sumy, and Kharkiv continue to act as giant plugs around which Russia is only able to flow fractions of their armored columns. This is the period of that “40-kilometer convoy” that was being tracked seemingly inch by inch as it slowly advanced toward Kyiv. It was also the peak period of CNN’s breathless reporting of how close Russian forces were to the city, seemingly measured with calipers so that each report could be direr than the last.
Ukrainian forces help evacuees escape Irpin and Bucha, March 8
What did Russia actually accomplish in this period? Nothing. Around Kharkiv, Russia has actually already begun losing significant positions. Its massed forces are no longer along the city’s eastern border and it no longer threatens to encircle Kharkiv in the south. Fighting in Kyiv’s western suburbs continues to see Irpin, Bucha, and Hostomel as areas of active conflict, rather than safe Russian control. Those arrows are just arrows.
Jump ahead to Mar. 15, and the stalemate of Russian forces is obvious.
The situation in northern Ukraine on Mar. 15
What’s changed? Those blobs of Russian buildup east and west of Kyiv have changed shape. But if those arrows are supposed to indicate intent, it’s starting to seem if they really mark failure. Russia still hasn’t managed to get around Kharkiv. A slight advance around Chernihiv from the west isn’t opening up a flow of hardware and troops to the Kyiv suburbs, and things look remarkably as they did two weeks earlier. What was inevitable is starting to seem a lot more … evitable.
Zelenskyy’s continued presence in Kyiv was powerful
That’s not to say that everything was calm during this period. There was continued hard fighting west of Kyiv as Ukraine attempted to retake those western suburbs and evacuate citizens over bridges and through the rubble. Russia also began to direct more missiles into Kyiv itself, including several that on Mar. 15 struck residential buildings and started extensive fires.
Still, the city remained largely intact, with electricity, water, and other services running in the city core. And through it all, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy remained a visible presence in the city, refusing to leave when offered a chance to escape.
The situation in northern Ukraine on Mar. 20
By Mar. 20, Russia had still failed to make a significant advance on encircling Kyiv. The western suburbs were still under contention, and the routes to the east looked to be, if anything, less secure than they had a few days earlier. @War_Mapper updated his maps to show villages known to be under Russian control, but the big splash of orange east of Kyiv reclassified this area as a “forward operating area.” Russia might be able to move forces through these areas, but not without a risk of ambush or a more serious attack by Ukrainian forces.
Russian missiles struck this shopping center in Kyiv
This showed that supply lines to that Russian force on the east side of Kyiv were not—and probably never had been—secure. Russia continued to be dependent on what it could get down the M02 highway to the northeast—a route that had significant opposition west of Nizhyn—and what could be slipped around Sumy or Chernihiv. None of those major cities had fallen. None of them seemed about to fall.
Many of the arrows have disappeared from this map because it’s obvious that Russia is no longer moving forward. This map may represent the greatest advance of Russian forces in the north. It also illustrates just how tenuous that position really was.
During this period, Russia’s missile attacks on Kyiv expanded and became even more indiscriminate. Along with increased attempts to encircle Chernihiv, it seemed clear that Russia was bringing the same tactics of simply pounding a city to death that it had employed at Mariupol, to the north.
But after weeks of near stalemate, things are about to change.
The situation in northern Ukraine on Mar. 25
There are significant differences between Mar. 20 and Mar. 25, and almost all of them represent a shift in Ukraine’s favor. On the west, Russia has lost firm control of suburbs south of Bucha as Ukrainian forces engage in an active counterattack of the area. On the east, Russian forces have been completely dislodged from their position immediately adjacent to the city and forced to relocate to the area of Nova Basan, about 25 miles to the east. The large suburb of Brovary, under full or partial Russian control since the first week of the war, is back in Ukrainian hands.
In Kyiv, businesses began to reopen as the threat diminished
Russian forces have less control of the area around Chernihiv. Less control of the route along the H0 west of Sumy. And even less control along the M02 around Nizhyn. East and west of Kyiv, Russian forces are being pressed into falling back and regrouping as Ukrainian troops engage in an active counteroffensive.
Inside Kyiv, stores and offices began to reopen and some citizens that had been sheltering in subways and other shelters began to move back into their homes. For some, this meant picking through the rubble of disaster, and the threat of daily missile strikes remained. But for most, the immediate fear of Russian tanks rolling down the street, or Russian artillery letting go from some location close enough to reach the heart of the city, had passed. At least for the moment.
That map position on Mar. 25 is not much changed four days later. On Monday, Ukrainian forces reportedly recaptured the suburb of Irpin on the west, and took several small villages beyond Brovary on the east. However, it’s not clear how much of the Ukrainian gains are the result of serious counterattacks in this area versus Russia simply pulling back.
On Mar. 24, Russian officials first indicated that it intended to withdraw from the war in the north and refocus the invasion on the Donbas region and southern Ukraine. On Tuesday, both Ukrainian and U.S. intelligence indicated that significant movements were underway, with Russian forces pulling back from both Chernihiv and Kyiv.
The utter destruction of Mariupol is a humanitarian disaster to the rest of the world, but for Russia, it’s their one success. As Russian forces continue to advance in street-to-street fighting in the ruined city, they’re getting closer and closer to gaining their much-desired land bridge between the Donbas and Crimea.
With Russia and Ukraine now moving toward another round of not-very-hopeful talks, it’s expected that Russia will attempt to break Ukraine north and south. In occupied towns like Kherson and Melitopol, they’re already not just installing puppet governments, but creating tiny new puppet “republics.” Russia will want to use these micro-states as pawns in the negotiations, with the goal of bringing together the whole of southeast Ukraine as a new extension of Russia.
That’s a deal that Ukraine is very, very unlikely to accept. This means that all those forces on both sides, still fighting around Kyiv and Chernihiv and Sumy, are going to get a chance to do it again—this time, in the south.
A reference for all the highways cited above.
Tuesday, Mar 29, 2022 · 4:05:14 PM +00:00 · Mark Sumner
What are all those pundits who predicted a swift victory for Russia doing now that it appears Putin’s invasion tide is rolling back from Kyiv? They’re explaining how expending thousands of troops and hundreds of armored vehicles in a losing effort to capture the capital was all genius.
And what’s the story behind how losing Kyiv is genius? Why Russia was a vastly outnumbered underdog who had to fend off the numerically superior forces of Ukraine.
No, I am not kidding.
Tuesday, Mar 29, 2022 · 4:37:03 PM +00:00 · Mark Sumner
Can’t help but note that Ritter — the Russia never wanted Kyiv guy today — was singing a very different song at the beginning of the war.
And while weeping in admiration for Russia’s incredible competence, Ritter was also confident about their goal.
But hey, all that was just a “feint.” A feint so good that it apparently fooled Ritter right up until the day he got new marching orders.
Tuesday, Mar 29, 2022 · 6:26:14 PM +00:00 · Mark Sumner
Trostyanets is a city located near the Russian border about halfway between Sumy and Kharkiv. It’s on the major north-south highway between those two cities, rather than on a direct route to the west. It was in Russian hands since the first week of the invasion.
