This is a ciontinuum of my series on the Federalist Papers.
Part I (1-12) is HERE. I highly recommend reading at least Federalist No. 10 and No. 11.
As I’ve mentioned. I’m making it a personal project to read all the Federalist papers and share my thoughts on them. I’m not a legal expert; just a very big enthusiast of US history and civics. So now, I’ll cover the next few Federalist Papers. These next few ones require A LOT of historicAal context as they mainly criticize the Articles of Confederation.
The general theme of these essays is best summed up by a James Madsison line in Federalist No. 18:
have thought it not superfluous to give the outlines of this important portion of history; both because it teaches more than one lesson, and because, as a supplement to the outlines of the Achaean constitution, it emphatically illustrates the tendency of federal bodies rather to anarchy among the members, than to tyranny in the head
If you’re hear looking for validation for a strong federal government rather than the ineffective mess the Roberts Court seems to want, these papers are for you.
Federalist No. 13: Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government [Alexander Hamilton]
TL;DR: Alexander Hamilton argues that a single national government will be more efficient at a tassk than having multiple state governments doing the same thing. Hamilton even goes so far as to namne drop some of the Thirteen Colonies to outline, one by one, how being in a union will benefit them.
If the States are united under one government, there will be but one national civil list to support; if they are divided into several confederacies, there will be as many different national civil lists to be provided for--and each of them, as to the principal departments, coextensive with that which would be necessary for a government of the whole. The entire separation of the States into thirteen unconnected sovereignties is a project too extravagant and too replete with danger to have many advocates.
Federralist No. 14: Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory Answered [James Madison]
TL;DR: James Madison continues the theme from Federalist No. 10 by elucidating the difference between a democracy and a republic; and why it’s important to disstinguish between the two and not confuse them.
It is, that in a democracy, the people meet and exercise the government in person; in a republic, they assemble and administer it by their representatives and agents. A democracy, consequently, will be confined to a small spot. A republic may be extended over a large region.
Also, there is a line in this essay where Masdison makes an argument against making the exercise of representation inconvenient, just in case you need a Founding Father backing you up against voter supression.
As the natural limit of a democracy is that distance from the central point which will just permit the most remote citizens to assemble as often as their public functions demand, and will include no greater number than can join in those functions; so the natural limit of a republic is that distance from the centre which will barely allow the representatives to meet as often as may be necessary for the administration of public affairs.
Federalist No. 15: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union [Alexander Hamilton]
TL;DR: Any decent student of American history will know that our Constitution was drafted bedcause the Articles of Confederation really sucked at its job. In No.15, ?Hamilton gives some of the best arguments against that odious states riights fetishism that insists on neutering the Federal Government when ever it tries to do anything.
In this passage, Hamilton settles it definitively given the struggles of the Confederation.
The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing Confederation is in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of which they consist. Though this principle does not run through all the powers delegated to the Union, yet it pervades and governs those on which the efficacy of the rest depends. Except as to the rule of appointment, the United States has an indefinite discretion to make requisitions for men and money; but they have no authority to raise either, by regulations extending to the individual citizens of America. The consequence of this is, that though in theory their resolutions concerning those objects are laws, constitutionally binding on the members of the Union, yet in practice they are mere recommendations which the States observe or disregard at their option.
Hamilton also makes it a point to argue that any proper national governmment shouldf have the power to govern citizens DIRECTLY; without relying on any intermediate actions from the States.
But if we are unwilling to be placed in this perilous situation; if we still will adhere to the design of a national government, or, which is the same thing, of a superintending power, under the direction of a common council, we must resolve to incorporate into our plan those ingredients which may be considered as forming the characteristic difference between a league and a government; we must extend the authority of the Union to the persons of the citizens, --the only proper objects of government.
In addition, there is also mention for the necessity of government; and an argument for why government by bodies is superior to government by one man.
Why has government been instituted at all? Because the passions of men will not conform to the dictates of reason and justice, without constraint. Has it been found that bodies of men act with more rectitude or greater disinterestedness than individuals? The contrary of this has been inferred by all accurate observers of the conduct of mankind; and the inference is founded upon obvious reasons. Regard to reputation has a less active influence, when the infamy of a bad action is to be divided among a number than when it is to fall singly upon one. A spirit of faction, which is apt to mingle its poison in the deliberations of all bodies of men, will often hurry the persons of whom they are composed into improprieties and excesses, for which they would blush in a private capacity.
Federalist 16: The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union [Alexander Hamilton]
Having detailed why the Arrticles of Confederation suck in No. 15, Hamilton then uses No. 16 to pexpplaiin just how strong the Federal Government SHOULD BE (.i.e. it must have all the powers it needs to discharge its responsibilities weven if the States try to obstruct it.
The result of these observations to an intelligent mind must be clearly this, that if it be possible at any rate to construct a federal government capable of regulating the common concerns and preserving the general tranquillity, it must be founded, as to the objects committed to its care, upon the reverse of the principle contended for by the opponents of the proposed Constitution. It must carry its agency to the persons of the citizens. It must stand in need of no intermediate legislations; but must itself be empowered to employ the arm of the ordinary magistrate to execute its own resolutions. The majesty of the national authority must be manifested through the medium of the courts of justice. The government of the Union, like that of each State, must be able to address itself immediately to the hopes and fears of individuals; and to attract to its support those passions which have the strongest influence upon the human heart. It must, in short, possess all the means, and have aright to resort to all the methods, of executing the powers with which it is intrusted, that are possessed and exercised by the government of the particular States.
Read that long highlighted passage carefully because it rebuts every odious states rights argument aimed at neutering the federal government
Federalist No. 17: The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union [Alexander Hamilton]
TL;DR: Hamilton continues to advocate for a stroongnational argument and allays concerns about it infringing on State powers. He argues that States are likelier to usuurp Federal powers than the Federal government would be to usurp State powers.
I did not expect so many passagges championing Federal power over the States in the Federalist Paopers…. but here we are.
it may be safely affirmed, that the sense of the constituent body of the national representatives, or, in other words, the people of the several States, would control the indulgence of so extravagant an appetite. It will always be far more easy for the State governments to encroach upon the national authorities than for the national government to encroach upon the State authorities. The proof of this proposition turns upon the greater degree of influence which the State governments if they administer their affairs with uprightness and prudence, will generally possess over the people; a circumstance which at the same time teaches us that there is an inherent and intrinsic weakness in all federal constitutions; and that too much pains cannot be taken in their organization, to give them all the force which is compatible with the principles of liberty.
Hamilton brings up the example of “feudal anarchy” during the Middle Ages duer to aristocrats having too mucxch power to defy their sovereigns.
When the sovereign happened to be a man of vigorous and warlike temper and of superior abilities, he would acquire a personal weight and influence, which answered, for the time, the purpose of a more regular authority. But in general, the power of the barons triumphed over that of the prince; and in many instances his dominion was entirely thrown off, and the great fiefs were erected into independent principalities or States. In those instances in which the monarch finally prevailed over his vassals, his success was chiefly owing to the tyranny of those vassals over their dependents.
Federalist No. 18: The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union [Alexander Hamilton and James Madison]
TL;DR: Hamilton and Madison make a lot of historical references to Greece to make a point that a weak federation is more dangerous than a tyrannical federal government. They point to the example of the Amphictyonic and AchaeanLeague whose weak council made it prone to disunion and was thus played against each other firsat by Macedon then by Rome leading to them being conquered.
Even in the midst of defensive and dangerous wars with Persia and Macedon, the members never acted in concert, and were, more or fewer of them, eternally the dupes or the hirelings of the common enemy. The intervals of foreign war were filled up by domestic vicissitudes convulsions, and carnage.
And it concludes with this instructive line about discord being more dangerous thasn tyranny.
I have thought it not superfluous to give the outlines of this important portion of history; both because it teaches more than one lesson, and because, as a supplement to the outlines of the Achaean constitution, it emphatically illustrates the tendency of federal bodies rather to anarchy among the members, than to tyranny in the head
Federalist No. 19: The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union [Alexander Hamilton and James Madison]
TL;DR Hamilton and Madison continue their theme of weak confederations collapsing and falling prey to external enemies. This time, they point to the Holy Roman Empire, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, asnd the Swiss Confederation.
If the nation happens, on any emergency, to be more united by the necessity of self-defense, its situation is still deplorable. Military preparations must be preceded by so many tedious discussions, arising from the jealousies, pride, separate views, and clashing pretensions of sovereign bodies, that before the diet can settle the arrangements, the enemy are in the field; and before the federal troops are ready to take it, are retiring into winter quarters.
The small body of national troops, which has been judged necessary in time of peace, is defectively kept up, badly paid, infected with local prejudices, and supported by irregular and disproportionate contributions to the treasury.
They point out that even relatively successful confederation with weak unions have historical flaws.
e connection among the Swiss cantons scarcely amounts to a confederacy; though it is sometimes cited as an instance of the stability of such institutions.
They have no common treasury; no common troops even in war; no common coin; no common judicatory; nor any other common mark of sovereignty.
They are kept together by the peculiarity of their topographical position; by their individual weakness and insignificancy; by the fear of powerful neighbors, to one of which they were formerly subject; by the few sources of contention among a people of such simple and homogeneous manners; by their joint interest in their dependent possessions; by the mutual aid they stand in need of, for suppressing insurrections and rebellions, an aid expressly stipulated and often required and afforded; and by the necessity of some regular and permanent provision for accomodating disputes among the cantons. The provision is, that the parties at variance shall each choose four judges out of the neutral cantons, who, in case of disagreement, choose an umpire. This tribunal, under an oath of impartiality, pronounces definitive sentence, which all the cantons are bound to enforce.
Federalist No,20:
The Same Subject Continued: The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the Union [Alexander Hamilton and James Madison]
TL;DR: Hamilton and Madison make another long historical digression. This time, they discuss the Dutch Republic.
make no apology for having dwelt so long on the contemplation of these federal precedents. Experience is the oracle of truth; and where its responses are unequivocal, they ought to be conclusive and sacred. The important truth, which it unequivocally pronounces in the present case, is that a sovereignty over sovereigns, a government over governments, a legislation for communities, as contradistinguished from individuals, as it is a solecism in theory, so in practice it is subversive of the order and ends of civil polity, by substituting VIOLENCE in place of LAW, or the destructive COERCION of the SWORD in place of the mild and salutary COERCION of the MAGISTRACY.
Hamilton and Madison also impress upon the importance of having a strong federal government as a hedge against tyranny. The highlighted passage calls to mind the judiciary’s increasing usurppation of executive powers to make the Biden administration unable to govern.
A weak constitution must necessarily terminate in dissolution, for want of proper powers, or the usurpation of powers requisite for the public safety. Whether the usurpation, when once begun, will stop at the salutary point, or go forward to the dangerous extreme, must depend on the contingencies of the moment. Tyranny has perhaps oftener grown out of the assumptions of power, called for, on pressing exigencies, by a defective constitution, than out of the full exercise of the largest constitutional authorities.
I’ll come back next time to cover Nos 21 to 30 ;). My apolofgies, this is by necessity a slow and difficult project. I would appreciate your responses as I want to know if I hasve misread particular essays or made a misundewrstnding in the speed of which I wrote this down. Thnks.