Updated
Just to clarify right at the start, “expand” and “escalate” aren’t necessarily the same thing. They could be, but “escalate” suggests Russia brings in new weapons, like using nukes. “Expand” means more countries become involved. The most obvious candidate for expansion seems to be Transnistria, the breakaway region of Moldova, but there are a bunch more, and yes, this is something of a glorified list.
Again, to be clear at the start, these possible expansions aren’t equally plausible. Think of them as being on a spectrum. Since there are Russian generals talking about linking up to their occupied areas of Ukraine to Transnistria, let’s call Transnistria the likely end of the spectrum.
The opposite end would be so marginally plausible that we really need to squint to see how that might happen. Let’s call that the Finland end, as in Finland invades Russia. Hard to see? Well, yes, Finland hasn’t threatened Russia, and while it’s well-armed, it preparations are highly defensive, as in tunnels rather than tanks. Nonetheless, the thought has to cross the minds of Finns that it lost land to the Soviet Union in World War 2, which must seem unfair since the Soviet Union was the aggressor. The thin stretch of Russia north of Finland that borders on Norway was once Finland’s Arctic coast. The Karelian Isthmus was Finnish too. Would they attack Russia is Russia looked weak enough? Highly unlikely, but they could. So figure every other possible conflict goes on that Transnistria-Finland spectrum.
This post would get insanely long if I were to game out each scenario, nor will I try to rank them by likelihood or risk. Think of this as the beginning of a process to be forewarned and therefore forearmed, that brainstorming session where get together and flip the big tablet of drawing paper to a fresh sheet where we write down everything we can think of with analysis of each idea for later. Having said, I’ll admit as I worked on this that some groupings did suggest themselves, such as, things Russia might try as it seeks to rebuild the empire; things other countries might try with Russia busy with Ukraine; and conflicts with no connection to Ukraine or Russia, but with the world distracted, maybe now is the time.
So in no particular order:
- The aforementioned Transnistria: a breakaway state from Moldova with Russian garrisons of “peacekeepers” sitting on it. Russia might be thinking they can launch an amphibious invasion of Ukrainian Bessarabia (that bit of Ukraine west of Odessa and south of Moldova), link up to the garrisons in Transnistria and open a western front against Ukraine, or destabilize Moldova, or just invade it to force it back into the empire.
- Still in Transnistria, with Russia looking weaker than expected and busy in Ukraine, might Moldova decide to do the invading and take back the breakaway state? Again, we’re not asking if something can be done or should be tried, just if it might be tried. If Russia can’t reinforce them, the troops in Transnistria are few. If Moldova thinks it can overcome whatever forces the Transnistrian government has, maybe now is the opportunity.
- Finland, the aforementioned opposite end of the plausibility spectrum: if Russia is weak enough, the Finns must have a thought about undoing the territorial losses of World War 2, especially now that the Arctic Ocean is getting ice-free enough to be routinely navigable, not to mention moving the border further southeast in case Russia ever does someday invade.
- Russia tries to seize the Suwalki Corridor, or Suwalki Gap: this is a 65-mile wide area that makes up the border between Lithuania and Poland. It’s the one border between the Baltic states and the rest of NATO. If I were ranking in order how likely I thought these might actually happen, this would be a clear second. “Baltic states” refers to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, three small adjoining states that have often been part of the Russian empire. They temporarily gained independence with the collapse of the Russian empire during World War 1, and again with the collapse of the USSR. They hurried to join NATO for reasons that should now be obvious. Besides being a border, the gap or corridor, I guess take your choice, is also the space between Russia’s enclave Kaliningrad and its ally Belarus.
- Russian invasion of the Baltic states: or maybe Russia will try to take the whole of the Baltic states, given that Russian TV is actually talking about invading. Unlike Ukraine’s Russian minority, the Baltics’ substantial Russian minorities haven’t been fully integrated and might support an invasion, which combined with their small size, means Russia should be able to overrun them quickly, assuming Russia ignores that it would be starting a war with NATO. But Russia already thinks it’s at war with NATO and thinks it will win, so why not?
- Sweden: if you read and/or watched the video in the link above, you saw the seizure of the Baltics included seizing the island of Gotland. Russia might be delusional to think it can pull this off, but the Swedes are taking seriously the chance they’ll try.
- Russia invasion of Kazakhstan: if Russia were being rational about the best way to rebuild the empire, they would have started with Kazakhstan. It’s big, sparsely populated, and ruled by a dictator that just needed Russian help to suppress protests yet somehow didn’t endorse Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Ethnic Kazakhs might not fight all that hard to protect the dictatorship they have now, and ethnic Russians, unlike the ethnic Russians in Ukraine, might actually welcome the invasion. The West would have trouble getting to Kazakhstan to support it, even if we were inclined to support a dictatorship like we’re supporting the democracy in Ukraine, which seems doubtful. Russia might figure this out, and might even regret not having started there (unlikely -— the decision to go after Ukraine first seems purely from the gut). Seems a good moment for a reminder that the question isn’t whether Russia could still pull that off at this point, but whether the odds it will try are greater than zero.
- Resumption of Armenia-Azerbaijan war: if we were ranking possible expansions of the war by complexity, this would be first. Being as brief as I can be, these countries have fought twice over Nagorno-Karabakh since independence, most recently in 2020. Russia has peacekeepers there, but if they withdrew them for the war on Ukraine, Azerbaijan could take advantage to restart the war. Azerbaijan is bigger, and a dictatorship closely aligned with Turkey. Armenia is smaller and democratic, and aligned with Russia. Here’s a good explainer in much more detail:
- Russian invasion of Poland: Poland might be as big a mouthful to chew as Ukraine, but that hasn’t stopped Russians talking about invading it. Much of Poland was part of the Russian empire, and at least some Russians seem to think it still is.
- Polish invasion of Belarus: put this at the Finnish end of the plausibility chart, but like Finland, Poland is a nation that got attacked in World War 2 and still lost territory -— because the Soviets took it. Some land became western Ukraine, and some became part of Belarus. Ukraine is an ally now, but Poland must have thought the chance to redraw the map of Belarus might present itself since Belarus is weak and Russia might be too busy to do anything about it.
- Rebellion in Belarus: as shown by massive demonstrations after the dictator chose to pretend he won the election rather than step down after 30 years in power, the government is unpopular and unstable. If security forces stop backing him, he’s done. If security forces divide, civil war. Russia might intervene, and Belarussians might fight. Poland could intervene, even without NATO.
- Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and/or Uzbekistan decide to use force to rearrange their entangled borders: the USSR drew weird borders for these three central Asian Soviet republics in a way that must have made sense to someone in Moscow. Are they OK with those borders now? Don’t know. This is Russia’s “near abroad”, their sphere of influence, so they likely would try nothing without Russian approval in normal times.
- Along those lines, Georgia might retake its breakaway areas: Abkhazia and South Ossetia declared independence from Georgia, and Russia invaded Georgia to support them. Georgia has never recognized their independence, and presumably the presence of Russian troops is the only reason Georgia hasn’t tried to take them back.
- Also along those lines, Chechnya could try to break away again: Putin’s appointed dictator, Ramzan Kadyrov is with Chechen troops in Ukraine. While he’s gone, or if he gets killed, maybe if Russia seems sufficiently distracted, Chechens could rebel again. Some are fighting for the Ukrainians, so maybe they’ll get help this time.
- Revanchist Serbia: Serbia is run by one of the “illiberal democracy” dictators. Bosnian Serbs are agitating for breaking up Bosnia again, including building their own army. Some of the neighbors Serbia wanted to keep during the wars in the former Yugoslavia have joined NATO, but not all, specifically Bosnia and Kosovo. Serbia still claims Kosovo. NATO would no doubt object to trying to rebuild greater Serbia, but NATO’s a bit busy right now.
- Now let’s leaves Europe and the former Russian empire altogether, and think about what is likely the first potential conflict we all thought of, China invades Taiwan. Obviously that’s a separate war rather than an expansion, but I include it as one of the wars that could break out with the outside world absorbed by Ukraine. Presumably China watched carefully to see how the West would react to the invasion of Ukraine, and hopefully finds the way we pulled together to be a deterrent. No doubt they also notice Russia’s struggles and realize invasions can be harder than they look, especially if you believe your own propaganda. Nonetheless, they could decide the West, especially the US, is distracted enough that now is the time. This is a good time for a reminder that we’re not judging whether an invasion is something the invader should or do. We’re only figuring what they might try to do. Gaming them out comes later. Hopefully not much later, as in I hope our foreign policy brains are figuring this out right now, and figuring out how to both help Ukraine and deter China.
- Sticking to China, they could start a war in the South China Sea: clearly Taiwan is their oft-stated top priority. However, they’ve been acting aggressively in the South China Sea in recent years. They’ve been building artificial islands and claiming territorial waters that overlap other countries’ territorial waters, essentially claiming to own the world’s busiest ocean trade route. Those other countries are worried China is coming after them, and must be concerned the West is not looking right now.
- The Myanmar junta might escalate: there were insurgencies in Myanmar even before the coup, and they’ve grown since then, joined by many pro-democracy protesters who feel they have no choice at this point but to take up arms. I don’t know how much more the junta can escalate the war, but if they can increase the brutality, and they’ve been holding back because of international reaction, well, nobody is looking now.
- Japan grabs the Kuril Islands: these have been disputed between Japan and Russia since the USSR seized them at the end of World War 2. The two have still not signed a peace treaty because of these islands. They were recognized by Russia as Japan’s in the treaty that ended the war in 1904-05, and were inhabited by Japanese, until the Soviets kicked the inhabitants out when it seized the islands. Japan might not have a big armed forces, but Russia’s keeps shrinking.
- Resumption of the Syrian civil war: the regime won the war thanks to Russian intervention (Iran helped too, but mostly Russia). Syria has Russia’s one base outside Russia. With Russia busy, especially if it moves its troops to Ukraine, the regime might be vulnerable and tempting for someone to have another try at removing it. That likely wouldn’t be the US since that would mean a shooting war with Russia, but if we were at war with Russia, we might decide to go after those isolated troops in Syria, with taking out Assad being a nice two-fer.
- Another one that likely has to wait for already being at war with Russia, Libya, which has two governments: the internationally recognized government controls the west, and Russia supports the government in the east. This time, Russia is using the notorious Wagner mercenaries. Going after them, though not officially the Russian army, would mean starting a war with Russia, thus why I say this seems implausible unless war with Russia already started.
- And another for after war already started, Mali: France recently pulled out after years of helping the elected government fight an Islamic insurgency. France lost patience with the junta that replaced the elected government, and then brought in some of Russia’s Wagner mercenaries of its own. Junta and Wagner troops were recently accused of committing a massacre of hundreds of villagers. France claims it has video evidence of junta soldiers and Wagner mercenaries attempting to frame France for another massacre by moving bodies into a mass grave which the junta would then say was a grave they just discovered, full of victims of a French massacre. France just left and I doubt anyone else in the West wants to take up a war in Mali, but if war with Russia happens anyway, there’s another instance of isolated Russian troops with a chance for a dictator-removal two-fer.
Looking at the list, there are groupings that suggest themselves: ways Russia might expand the war; ways Russia’s neighbors might expand the war; wars that might start while Russia is distracted or weakened; wars that might start while the West is distracted; expansions if war with Russia has already started.
Just to clarify, “West” doesn’t just mean NATO. It means the democracies that are part of the western block, so that would include non-NATO countries like Japan and Australia.
Obviously I could have forgotten something, especially once the definition of expansion is expanded to include potential conflicts that don’t involve Russia or Ukraine at all, but something someone might try while the West or Russia is distracted. Go ahead and suggest something in the comments. I might even add that something to the list. Probably some expansion will become likely enough that we do indeed need to game it out.
Friday, May 6, 2022 · 9:47:00 PM +00:00 · ericf
Commenter libera nos had good suggestions:
(1) Moves by powers in the West (some combination of Germany, Poland, Lithuania, maybe even Sweden, which has an attenuated historical claim) to make the Kaliningrad oblast demilitarized, or otherwise change its status. Kaliningrad used to be East Prussia and the city of Königsberg, and before that is was all of Prussia, before it grew. So it was German core territory, not some far off enclave. The USSR kicked out the Germans after World War 2 and annexed it, so part is now an enclave of Russia. It’s isolated, but heavily defended. I can’t see any neighbors marching in unless they’re already at war with Russia, and in Germany’s case, maybe not even then, since Germany is still very reluctant to be viewed as remilitarized and aggressive.
(2) Chinese demands for return of lands around Vladivostok, or even Chinese takeover. That strip of the Pacific coast where Vladivostok sits was once part of China before Russia grabbed it as the Ching dynasty was declining. This would put China at war with Russia, but with Russia distracted, China could make a try for it.
(3) Chinese demands for control over Mongolia as a protectorate, including the Tuvan region. The now independent nation of Mongolia was formerly Outer Mongolia, part of the last Chinese empire, the aforementioned Ching. Inner Mongolia is still Chinese. It broke off after World War 1 and immediately allied with the Bolsheviks, and has been a client state or the USSR/Russia ever since. It’s geographically huge, but has just a few million people, so China should be able to take it easily if Russia gets out of the way.