Russia quietly admits hundreds of billions of dollars in "direct losses" due to sanctions and war in Ukraine, but they persist. In terms of natural resources, for Western Europe, Russia’s expanded land grab in Ukraine amounts to a tactical setback.
Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is being established as the face of the Russian “special military operation” in Ukraine. Prigozhin gave a recruitment speech on September 14 announcing that Russian prisoners have been participating in the war since July 1 when they were instrumental in seizing the Vuhlehirska Thermal Power Plant.[1] A Russian milblogger noted that Prigozhin is introducing a “Stalinist” method that allows the Kremlin to avoid ordering a general mobilization that could ignite social tensions in Russian society.[2] Milbloggers have been consistently praising Prigozhin’s success in Ukraine and some even said that he should replace the Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu, whom milbloggers and Kremlin pundits blame for the Russian defeat around Kharkiv Oblast.[3] Russian military correspondent and milblogger Maksim Fomin (alias Vladlen Tatarsky) claimed to have spoken to Prigozhin about the situation on the Ukrainian-Russian border after the withdrawal of Russian forces in the area.[4] The Prigozhin-Fomin meeting, if it occurred, could indicate that the Kremlin is attempting to address milbloggers’ months-long complaints that the Russian Defense Ministry did not hear their criticism highlighting the ineffectiveness of Russian higher command. Prigozhin is Putin’s close confidant, and his developing relationship with milbloggers may help retain milblogger support for the Kremlin’s war effort while scapegoating Shoigu and the Russian Defense Ministry for the defeat around Kharkiv Oblast. ISW previously assessed that the Kremlin has changed its information approach to address the demands of the Russian milbloggers and nationalists’, suggesting that Putin seeks to win back the critical milblogger community alienated by Russian failures.[5]
Russian forces likely targeted Ukrainian hydrotechnical infrastructure in western Dnipropetrovsk Oblast on September 14 to interfere with Ukrainian operations across the Inhulets River. Ukrainian sources reported that eight Russian cruise missiles struck unspecified targets in Kryvyi Rih, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, and caused extensive flooding in areas of Kryvyi Rih.[6] Russian sources identified the target location as the Karachun Dam, which sits along the Inhulets River on the western outskirts of Kryvyi Rih.[7] Footage of the aftermath of the strike shows a 2.5m increase in the water level of the Inhulets River, which runs south of Kryvyi Rih and is an important geographical feature for the ongoing Ukrainian counteroffensive along the Kherson-Mykolaiv border.[8] Russian forces likely targeted the Karachun Dam to damage Ukrainian pontoon bridges further downstream, especially in light of recent reports that Ukrainian troops are attempting to expand their bridgehead over the Inhulets River near Davydiv Brid as part of the ongoing Kherson counteroffensive.[9]
understandingwar.org/…
Click here to see the interactive map, updated daily: arcg.is/09O0OS
Key Takeaways
- Wagner Group financier Yevgeny Prigozhin is being established as the face of the Russian “special military operation” in Ukraine.
- Russian forces likely targeted Ukrainian hydrotechnical infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast in order to interfere with Ukraine’s ability to operate across the Inhulets River
- The Ukrainian counteroffensive in eastern Kharkiv Oblast continues to degrade Russian forces and threaten Russian artillery and air defenses.
- Russian and Ukrainian sources reported Ukrainian ground attacks in northern Kherson Oblast, western Kherson Oblast, and northwest of Kherson City but did not report any major gains.
- Russian forces continued ground attacks around Bakhmut and northwest and southwest of Donetsk City.
- Funding volunteer battalions is likely placing financial strain on Russian cities and oblasts.
- Russian occupation authorities shut off mobile internet in occupied Luhansk Oblast on September 14, likely to preserve Russian operational security and better control the information environment as Russian forces, occupation officials, and collaborators flee newly-liberated Kharkiv Oblast for Russian and Russian-controlled territories.
understandingwar.org/…
WASHINGTON — Days after Russia’s humiliating rout in northeastern Ukraine, the Biden administration said on Thursday that it would send an additional $600 million in military supplies to Ukraine, including more artillery ammunition.
The new shipment — which will also include counterartillery radar, counterdrone systems and mine-clearing equipment — continues the Pentagon’s recent trend of sending large amounts of ammunition that Ukraine needs to carry out heavy fighting in the country’s south, east and northeast.
The latest drawdown of military goods from Pentagon stockpiles — the 21st since the invasion began in February — was announced just hours after President Vladimir V. Putin of Russia and his Chinese counterpart, Xi Jinping, held their first face-to-face meeting since the war began, amid signs that Moscow lacked the full support of its most powerful international ally following Ukraine’s stunning comeback in the country’s northeast.
“We are delivering the arms and equipment that Ukraine’s forces are utilizing so effectively as they continue their successful counteroffensive against Russia’s invasion,” Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken said in a statement. “President Biden has been clear we will support the people of Ukraine for as long as it takes.”
Notably, this shipment did not include the MGM-140 Army Tactical Missile System, or ATACMS, long-range guided missiles that can strike targets up to 190 miles away.
www.nytimes.com/...
This topic will be a topic as @POTUS announces the next Presidential Drawdown Authority (PDA) for Ukraine military aid, which may occur in 2-3 days, with a new tranche figure somewhere between $500-750M.
The package will likely consist of mostly HIMAR pods & artillery 2/
Many will ask: "Why no longer range ATACMS?"
Most of those asking may not know the difference - besides the extended range - of ATACM missiles versus HIMAR rockets. So here's some details comparisons: 3/
A GMLRS rocket (pronounced GIM-LERS, Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System) is fired by the HIMARS.
These rockets:
-Are 6 rockets to a "pod"
-each has a 200 lb warhead
-with range of 15-92+ km (9-57+ miles)
-extremely precise (hit w/in 10 m of target)
-cost about $160k/rocket 4/
An ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System) Missile was developed in the '80's as part of a "deep strike" weapon to hit 2d echelon Soviet Targets.
The missile:
-is 1 missile per pod (6 "caps" on pod are for deception)
-with a 500lb warhead
-has a 300km/190mile range
-cost $850k
5/
So, key comparisons:
HIMARS can hit 6 different targets with GPS precision, with a 200 lb "bomb" for each target, at 50+ miles
ATACMS can precisely hit 1 target, at longer range, with a 500 lb explosion.
The two are below. 6/
Key decisions since the start of support to UKR ask "what do they need in this phase of the fight?"
In phase 1 (the attack on Kyiv) it was Javelin & Stinger. Shoulder fired, easy to use.
In phase 2 (Donbas) it was a lot of artillery, radars, trucks, HIMARS, precision ammo. 7/
During each stage, questions were:
-What do they need...right now?
-Can we get it there, can they logistically support it?
-How will they use it?
-What are the number of targets that need to be struck?
-How much can we draw from US stocks/ammo supplies?
& What's the cost?
8/
UKR would like a technologically advanced, modern army...right now!
But every nation has national security requirements...& not many have additional/usable "stocks."
One guy tweeted me "yeah, but we have 1000 M1 tanks in a desert boneyard" with this picture: 9/
Image
Yes. Those are M1 tanks (they fire a 105 mm rounds; the M1A1 we use today fires a 120mm) & I'd suggest they have pretty dry seals & unworkable engines/transmissions. Not good without mechanics, parts, supplies, ammo.
Ah, but I digress from ATACMs.... 10/
On ATACMS, @SecDef - a smart guy with battlefield savvy - likely weighed a lot of advantages/disadvantages of providing ATACMS to UKR.
I don't know what those were, but that's his job.
He then recommended to POTUS: "not right now. UKR is doing great without them." 11/
His reasons might be cost/effectiveness per round, capability of acquiring targets at over 100km (you have to see what you want to hit), # of targets, # of missiles in US stock required to meet US contingency plans, and more. All likely played a part in the discussion. 12/
But he and POTUS also wanted to prevent even further conflict escalation. US/NATO/UKR has done a great job of "managing" & fighting so far.
RU threats may seem lame, but there's still potential for more violence. RU general mobilization, WMD use, more intensive strikes. 13/
Putin still wants to blame the US/NATO, pull us into this. He may believe a way out is further widening the conflict.
That's dumb, but Putin hasn't been smart so far.
So having ATACM missiles with "USA" on the side hitting targets inside RU probably isn't the best thing. 14/
Ukraine is marching toward victory & they will have a modern army in the near future. Some may *want* ATACMs right now, but they're doing great in the close fight. ATACMS aren't needed now.
See...toldja these thoughts wouldn't be popular. 15/15
• • •
The 3rd Army Corps on paper is a powerful force, with several brigades encompassing 10,000 troops in a dozen or more battalions equipped with hundreds of T-80 and T-90 tanks and other vehicles.
But it’s a hollow formation, staffed by old, unfit volunteers including drug and alcohol addicts. And when the 3rd AC’s vanguard rushed to northeastern Ukraine’s Kharkiv Oblast last week in a desperate bid to block a Ukrainian counteroffensive, the corps just ... melted away.
The 3rd AC, based in Mulino, 200 miles east of Moscow, represents the Kremlin’s best effort to make good its deepening losses after 200 days of fighting in Ukraine. That the 3rd AC failed to make any difference in Ukraine is very bad news for the Russian war effort. It’s not going to get easier for the Russian army to stand up additional formations.
www.msn.com/…
Ukrainian Counteroffensives (Ukrainian efforts to liberate Russian-occupied territories)
Eastern Ukraine: (Vovchansk-Kupyansk-Izyum-Lyman Line)
The Ukrainian counteroffensive in eastern Kharkiv Oblast continues to degrade Russian forces and threaten Russian artillery and air defenses. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 14 that the intensity of Russian artillery attacks on Kharkiv City has decreased significantly, suggesting that Ukraine's counteroffensive has degraded Russian forces’ ability to conduct routine artillery strikes on the center of Kharkiv City as Russian forces have been pushed eastward towards the Oskil River and north back into Russia.[10] Ukrainian advances in eastern Ukraine have likely forced Russian forces to pull air defenses further away from the frontlines in order to protect those systems from Ukrainian artillery fire, potentially exposing frontline Russian troops to air attacks. The Ukrainian General Staff reported on September 14 that Russian convoys carrying S-300 and Buk systems moved through Lutuhine, Luhansk Oblast in the direction of the Russian border on September 11 and 12.[11]
Russian sources continued to discuss limited Ukrainian ground attacks in eastern Kharkiv, northern Donetsk, and western Luhansk Oblasts. Several Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian and proxy forces are defending against Ukrainian attacks on Lyman in northern Donetsk Oblast.[12] Russian sources also reported that fighting is ongoing in Bilohorivka (along the Donetsk-Luhansk Oblast border) and in nearby settlements around Siversk.[13] The Ukrainian General Staff noted that Russian troops attempted to attack in Spirne (12km south of Bilohorivka), likely in an attempt to push northwards and threaten Ukrainian forces in Bilohorivka.[14]
Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)
Ukrainian military sources maintained their operational silence on September 14. Kherson Oblast Council Head Oleksandr Samoilenko announced that Ukrainian forces have liberated Kyselivka, approximately 23km northwest of Kherson City, but Ukrainian military officials have not confirmed the liberation of the settlement at this time.[15] ISW has not seen any visual evidence supporting Samoilenko‘s statement, and Russian sources denied Ukrainian local reports of advances in the area.[16] The Ukrainian Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian strikes are continuously undermining Russian efforts to repair the Kakhovka Bridge over the Dnipro River and have rendered the Darivka pontoon bridge over the Inhulets River impassable.[17] Ukrainian forces have reportedly continued to target Russian crossings near the Antonivka area and are firing at Russian convoys.[18] Ukrainian forces maintained their interdiction campaign, reportedly targeting Russian manpower and equipment concentration points in Hola Prystan (approximately 12km southwest of Kherson City), Dudchany, and Mylove (both on the T0403 highway).[19] The Southern Operational Command also stated that Ukrainian forces inflicted damage on four ammunition depots in Kherson Raion.[20] The Ukrainian General Staff also noted that Russian forces continued to house troops in residential areas, specifically in the Chaplynka Raion north of the Kherson Oblast-Crimea border.[21]
Social media footage and statements by Russian-appointed occupation officials are corroborating the ongoing Ukrainian interdiction campaign. Geolocated footage showed the aftermath of the Ukrainian strike on the School of Higher Sportsmanship, which reportedly served as an area of Russian troop concentration.[22] Geolocated footage also showed a Ukrainian volunteer air reconnaissance unit striking a Russian storage building in Velyka Oleksandrivka, on the T2207 highway.[23] Local residents also reported hearing the sound of explosions and six missile strikes near Kherson City.[24] The head of the Kherson Oblast occupation administration, Vladimir Saldo, stated that Ukrainian forces struck the Antonivsky Bridge, but noted that occupation authorities are continuing to use ferry crossings in the area.[25] The deputy head of the Kherson Oblast occupation regime, Kirill Stremousov, claimed that Ukrainian forces fired at a ferry transporting civilians across the Dnipro River near the Antonivsky Bridge.[26] Numerous geolocated videos show that Russian forces are using ferries to transport military equipment across the Dnipro River, and Stremousov did not provide evidence supporting his claims.[27]
Ukrainian and Russian sources identified three main areas of kinetic activity on September 14: northwest of Kherson City, around the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River, and south of the Kherson-Dnipropetrovsk Oblast Border near Vysokopillya. Russian milbloggers claimed that Ukrainian forces have adopted defensive measures near Posad-Pokrovske (about 30km northwest of Kherson City) and are conducting probing operations by firing at Russian defenses in Blahodatne and Barvinok (just south of Posad-Pokrovske).[28] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults on Novohryhorivka (29km northwest of Kherson City) and Bezimenne near the Inhulets River.[29] The Ukrainian General Staff stated that Russian forces shelled Mala Seideminukha and Novohredevne—both settlements near the Inhulets just south of Blahodativka—which indicates that Ukrainian troops have advanced further west from within the Sukhyi Stavok pocket.[30] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) also claimed that Russian forces destroyed Ukrainian military equipment in Bruskynske, along the T2207 highway that runs into Davydiv Brid.[31] A milblogger also claimed that Ukrainian forces are attacking Arkhanhelske (southwest of Vysokopillya) and Kostyrka (southeast of Vysokopillya).[32] A milblogger claimed that Russian forces also struck Ukrainian forces in Potomkyne (southeast of Vysokopillya).[33]
The Russian MoD did not comment on the situation in Kherson Oblast on September 14, only claiming that Russian troops struck Ukrainian positions along the Kherson-Mykolaiv frontline.[34]
understandingwar.org/...
The lion’s share of those coal deposits, which for decades have powered Ukraine’s critical steel industry, are concentrated in the east, where Moscow has made the most inroads. That’s put them in Russian hands, along with significant amounts of other valuable energy and mineral deposits used for everything from aircraft parts to smartphones, according to an analysis for The Washington Post by the Canadian geopolitical risk firm SecDev.
Russia possesses vast amounts of natural resources. But denying Ukraine its own has strategically undermined the country’s economy, forcing Kyiv to import coal to keep the lights on in cities and towns. Should the Kremlin succeed in annexing the Ukrainian territory it has seized — as U.S. officials believe it will try to do in coming months — Kyiv would permanently lose access to almost two-thirds of its deposits.
Ukraine would also lose myriad other reserves, including stores of natural gas, oil and rare earth minerals — essential for certain high-tech components — that could hamper Western Europe’s search for alternatives to imports from Russia and China.
[...]
“The worst scenario is that Ukraine loses land, no longer has a strong commodity economy and becomes more like one of the Baltic states, a nation unable to sustain its industrial economy,” said Stanislav Zinchenko, chief executive of GMK, a Kyiv-based economic think tank. “This is what Russia wants. To weaken us.”
Late last month, 1,200 feet underground in the Donbas region mine, soot-caked workers clawed at the black coal seams with a sense of urgency. The coal hewed from the walls fuels a nearby power plant, part of an energy grid strained and weakened by the war.
“Those that left to fight at the front are fighting for us down here,” said Yuri, a 29-year-old excavator operator. “We need to get as much coal as we can. The country needs it.”
$12.4 trillion in lost wealth
Ukraine is widely known as an agricultural powerhouse. But as a raw-material mother lode, it’s home to 117 of the 120 most widely used minerals and metals, and a major source of fossil fuels. Official websites no longer show geolocations of these deposits; the government, citing national security, took them down in early spring.