The societal crowdsourcing approach employed by Ukrainians has also seriously impeded Russian capacity to advance, occupy and gather intelligence. A new crowdsourcing intelligence tool allows Ukrainians to report Russian collaborators and saboteurs instantly and anonymously. Over 300,000 Ukrainians have used it. Various other IT solutions developed by civilians allow territorial defence units to protect information about checkpoints and sniper locations. It is a beehive of innovation.
The picture for Russia is quite the opposite: a rigid, hierarchical system, full of fear. Many in the west underestimated how little motivation there would be among Russians to fight and die for Putin’s imperial ambitions with no just cause. Russia is struggling to replenish its forces, turning to mercenary firms who have gone as far as recruiting prisoners (the Russian private military sector acts on orders from the Kremlin). War relies on accurate information about the enemy, and Putin is not getting it, because his subordinates are afraid to tell the truth.
Despite Russia pumping billions of roubles into modernisation, its armed forces remain unreformed at the command level, with corruption eating resources. To conceal massive embezzlement, official figures are often inflated. Tanks, artillery and armoured vehicles are only as good as the people operating them. And people are the last thing autocrats care about.
Finally, many were fooled by Russia’s menacing projection of the image of a great military power that can dominate any region with layers of missile power. Misconceptions about Russian military power are rampant. Ukraine’s successes in hitting Russian warships in the Black Sea and bases in Crimea demonstrate that Russia is vulnerable in ways few would have predicted.
Incredibly, many of these factors were obvious after the first few disastrous weeks of the Russian invasion. But it can take time to overturn long-held beliefs. We must not continue to make the same mistakes. Distinguishing myths and misconceptions about Russian and Ukrainian capacity from the real drivers of battlefield dynamics will be key to making sound policy and providing effective support for Ukraine. Indeed, it will be crucial for the outcome of the war.
www.theguardian.com/...
KYIV, Ukraine (AP) — A Russian missile blasted a crater close to a nuclear power plant in southern Ukraine on Monday, damaging nearby industrial equipment but not hitting its three reactors. Ukrainian authorities denounced the move as an act of “nuclear terrorism.”
The missile struck within 300 meters (328 yards) of the reactors at the South Ukraine Nuclear Power Plant near the city of Yuzhnoukrainsk in Mykolaiv province, leaving a hole 2 meters (6 1/2 feet) deep and 4 meters (13 feet) wide, according to Ukrainian nuclear operator Energoatom.
The reactors were operating normally and no employees were injured, it said. But the proximity of the strike renewed fears that Russia’s nearly 7-month-long war in Ukraine might produce a radiation disaster.
apnews.com/...
Southern Ukraine: (Kherson Oblast)
Ukrainian military officials maintained their operational silence regarding the progress of Ukrainian operations in southern Ukraine on September 19, noting Russian forces continued efforts to improve their defensive positions.[14]
Ukrainian sources reported on continued Ukrainian strikes on Russian rear areas and lines of communication.[15] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported Ukrainian forces destroyed Russian ammunition depots in Mykolayiv Oblast (likely near frontline positions), two unspecified command posts, and a Russian electronic warfare system in Kherson City.[16] Geolocated social media footage confirmed a Ukrainian missile strike against a Russian barracks in Kherson City on September 18.[17] Odesa Military Administration Spokesman Serhiy Bratchuk reported that Ukrainian forces destroyed two Russian ammunition depots in Blahodatne (northwest of Kherson City) and in Kherson City itself on September 18.[18] Satellite imagery and local reporting confirmed continued Russian efforts to repair damage to ground lines of communication (GLOCs) inflicted by Ukrainian strikes. Satellite imagery released on September 19 depicted Russian operations to repair damage to the Nova Kakhovka dam from September 16-18, after Ukrainian strikes partially collapsed the bridge over the dam on September 2.[19]
Ukrainian and Russian sources identified three areas of kinetic activity on September 19: northwest of Kherson City, near the Ukrainian bridgehead over the Inhulets River, and in northern Kherson Oblast near Olhine. Russian milbloggers reported that the frontline did not change northwest of Kherson City on September 19, and Ukrainian official sources reported that Ukrainian forces consolidated their tactical positions along the front.[20] Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Shchaslyve and Bezimenne (in the Davydiv Brid bridgehead), but ISW cannot verify these reports.[21] A Russian milblogger also claimed that high water levels in the Inhulets River due to Russian strikes on dams upriver are impeding Ukrainian forces' ability to support forward positions.[22] Ukraine’s Southern Operational Command reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian reconnaissance groups in the Arkhanhelske (northern Kherson Oblast) region.[23] Geolocated social media footage separately confirmed the presence of Wagner private military company fighters in Arkhanhelske on September 19.[24]
www.understandingwar.org/...
Video 1:
1.1 - A white/grey car is seen at the start of the footage in the middle of the street.
01/11 Unroll available on Thread Reader
1.2 - Shots are heard before the Russian armored vehicles arrive on the scene.
1.3 - They arrive at a 'safe' distance from the location of the white vehicle.
1.4 - The soldiers in the vehicles spread out and take positions.
02/11
1.5 - Arrived soldiers return fire.
1.6 - Left armored vehicle changes position by moving forward.
- Camera position changes -
1.7 - Russians firing.
1.8 - Returning incoming fire from 2 (!) different positions on the same height.
03/11
1.9 - Both return fire positions are at a higher 45° angle. (Based on the turrets and the tracers)
1.10 - Little flashes are also seen from the impacts of the bullets on the left Russian vehicle.
Video 2: 2.1 - Russians returning fire.
04/11
2.2 - Another tracer is fired at the Russian vehicles.
Why "another tracer"? Because with the incoming tracer in 1.8 there was a soldier standing BEHIND the vehicle.
With this incoming tracer a soldier is standing to the LEFT of the vehicle. Also the angle is different.
05/11
2.3 - A Tigr arrives at the scene.
Video 3:
3.1 - Under cover fire, and what seems to be a flare, soldiers are advancing to the place the shots came from.
06/11
Image 1:
You see the impacts on the building and you can estimate from which direction they came. The height and angle matches with the footage from video 1 and 2.
07/11
GeoLocation by @kr007t
Vid 1 & 2: Position of the armored vehicles: 46.651465, 32.607663
POV of the journalist: 46.648748, 32.609287
GeoLocation: Picture: "Kherson cooperative economic and legal college" - 46.652128, 32.607870
10/11
Conclusion:
Based on GeoLocated footage it is highly likely the Russians encountered a hostile team (background and/or motivation unknown) , with at least 2 firing positions inside a building.
It's unlikely this was propaganda.
11/11
• • •
Ukrainian forces likely continued offensive operations along the Lyman-Yampil-Bilohorivka line on September 19. Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) Head Denis Pushilin claimed that fighting is ongoing in Yarova, 20km northwest of Lyman, confirming that Ukrainian troops likely advanced eastward from previously captured positions in Sviatohirsk.[11] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces are still in control of Yampil and Lyman, but that Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups are operating along the entire Lyman-Yampil-Bilohorivka line.[12] Geolocated combat footage confirms that Ukrainian troops have retaken Bilohorivka, which lies along the Donetsk-Luhansk Oblast border and within 20km of the Lysychansk-Severodonetsk area.[13]
www.understandingwar.org/...
Russia has lost at least four combat jets in Ukraine in the past ten days, and the number has dropped by about 55 since the invasion began. Russia has no superiority in the air.
This was reported by the British Ministry of Defence on Twitter.
It is noted that this surge in losses is partly due to the fact that the Russian Air Force takes more risks in trying to provide close air support to Russian ground forces under pressure from Ukrainian offensives.
According to British intelligence, the situational awareness of Russian pilots is often poor. In addition, there is a real possibility that some aircraft deviated from enemy territory and fell into denser air defense zones as the front line moved rapidly.
"Russia’s continued lack of air superiority remains one of the most important factors underpinning the fragility of its operational design in Ukraine," the British Defence Ministry said.
As Ukrainian News Agency earlier reported, the Air Force of the Armed Forces of Ukraine destroyed an enemy Su-25 attack aircraft in Kherson region in the morning.
ukranews.com/...
Nationwide, the figures are staggering. Some 140,000 residential buildings have been destroyed; 44 million square meters of housing have been damaged; and millions of Ukrainians are living in homes “ill-suited to provide sufficient protection from harsh winter conditions,” according to the United Nations.
www.nytimes.com/...
Currently, we are encountering more than 4 billion USD in direct losses, such as destroyed, burned, and stolen goods; and more than 22 billion USD of lost potential income from undistributed food stocks. 2/14
The recovery of grain exports is critical for the budget of Ukraine. The reduction in exports is obviously highly detrimental. From a macrofinancial point of view, exports support foreign currency reserves and the exchange rate of the hryvnia. 3/14
From a macroeconomic point of view, Ukraine's inability to sell goods means a decline in GDP, wages, and demand among suppliers for fertilizers, seeds, and other agriculture-related products. 4/14
There is a budgetary impact: if exports are working, then agricultural activities continue, the budget receives income taxes, VAT, social welfare taxes, military taxes, and rent for shares. 5/14
Before the war, agriculture accounted for 40% of all exports. The stability of agricultural export processes is critical for our economy. 6/14
There are several programs to support agricultural production in Ukraine. 7/14
A small-scale payment program of 3,100 UAH per hectare has been launched for farmers with up to 120 hectares in ownership, as well as assistance for cattle, reaching 5,300 UAH per head for farms with up to 100 head of cattle. 8/14
A soft loan program has been launched to support medium-sized manufacturers. Farmers can receive up to 90 million UAH loans to support their businesses in all agricultural areas. Interest on loans is covered by the state. 9/14
There are also grant programs for horticulture and greenhouse farming. It is possible to receive a grant to plant new plots of up to 25 hectares, and for building a greenhouse of up to 2 hectares. Several dozen grants have already been issued. 10/14
Since 2010, the Ukrainian agricultural sector has been composed of 10-15% of small producers, 25% large agricultural holdings, and 60% medium agricultural businesses. The share held by large agricultural holdings is decreasing. 11/14
The efficiency of medium-sized manufacturers is higher than of large enterprises, with many delegated functions and land owners can be offered better lease terms. 12/14
Another trend is an increase in diversification to avoid focus on too few crops. The agricultural sector is dependent on fuel and gas, but some agrobusinesses are moving towards alternative energy sources like methane and biogas. 13/14
In general, more than 30 billion USD will be needed to restore losses in the agricultural sector. There are several stages in the recovery plan, with the first one covering the first two years after the war ends, and the second covering the next five years. 14/14
• • •