Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu made clear on Monday that Israel would not agree to a ceasefire, drawing parallels to the United States’ position after Pearl Harbor in 1941 and the September 11 attacks in 2001.
“I want to make clear Israel's position regarding the ceasefire. Just as the United States would not agree to a ceasefire after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, or after the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Israel will not agree to a cessation of hostilities with Hamas after the horrific attacks of October 7,” he said.
“Calls for a ceasefire or calls for Israel to surrender to Hamas, to surrender to terrorists, surrender to barbarism, that will not happen,” he added.
Netanyahu said while the Bible says there is a time for peace, he said “This is a time for war.”
When asked if he has considered stepping down, Netanyahu said the only thing he would resign is Hamas.
“We're going to resign them to the dustbin of history. That's my goal. That's my responsibility,” he said.
https://t.co/lHXzgp7eq3
Key Takeaways:
- The al Qassem Brigade—the militant wing of Hamas—likely conducted a complex attack targeting the IDF at the Erez checkpoint.
- The al Qassem Brigades and Saraya al Quds—the militant wing of PIJ— claimed a joint complex attack on the IDF in al Amiriya.
- Saraya al Quds claimed a complex attack on the IDF advancing along the Gaza coast.
- Palestinian militants clashed with Israeli forces and held large, anti-Israel demonstrations at their usual rate across the West Bank.
- Iranian-backed militants, including Lebanese Hezbollah, conducted seven attacks into Israel.
- Iranian-backed militants claimed two attacks targeting US forces in Syria.
- Asaib Ahl al Haq Secretary General Qais Khazali met with a Hamas delegation in Baghdad.
- Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi gave an interview with Arabic-language outlet al Jazeera, during which he tried to rally the support of the Arab world for Iran and the Axis of Resistance in opposing Israel. This messaging is likely meant to support the Iranian effort to disrupt Israeli normalization with Arab states by concentrating attention on Israel-Palestinian relations.
Challenge 1: Aligning political purpose and military objectives. The most important element of any military operation is purpose. The ‘why’ of military endeavours is orders of magnitude more crucial than the ‘how’, ‘who’, ‘when’ or ‘where’. This is because people respond to and are inspired by purpose. It is purpose that binds units together and sees soldiers willing to risk their lives, or to give their last full measure of devotion, in the service of their nation and their fellow citizens. As Lawrence Freedman has recently written: “The most important question is what is to be achieved. Assuming that Israel can fight its way to Gaza City, which would be the most likely objective of a major incursion, what then?”
This purpose must ultimately be derived from political, not military, objectives. It is the most fundamental rule of warfare. As Clausewitz wrote two centuries ago: “The political view is the object, war is the means.”
Thus, the impending military operation that will be executed by the Israelis in and around Gaza must have clear political objectives. The discussion about Israel’s political objectives for a Gaza operation have been covered by multiple commentators in the past two weeks. Some useful articles are here, here, here, and here. With these as context, the political objectives for Israel might incorporate the following:
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Destruction of Hamas as a military threat to Israel and as a political threat to regional stability.
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Restoration of deterrence against attacks by all actors, including Hezbollah and Iran, and to revive Israeli confidence in their security forces.
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A more stable Gaza that, as Raphael Cohen describes, is “something better than it was”.
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The reinvigoration of the process to normalise ties with Saudi Arabia and build on the Abraham Accords.
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Maintain the support of the United States as a strategic security partner.
But it is not enough to Whether this includes the destruction of Hamas commanders, soldiers, facilities and supply dumps, or the deterrence of other regional actors, alignment between political and military actions will be vital in the weeks ahead. However, as has occurred throughout history, once wars begin military actions can take on a life of their own. Activity at the tactical level can begin to inform and influence strategy and policy.
And while Israel will require clear military objectives, they will also need to ensure there are sufficient forces – in quantity and quality – to meet those objectives. This was a significant failure for Putin in February 2022; his political aspirations, and the military means allocated to achieve them, were not in synch. The Israeli’s must ensure they don’t make the same mistake.
Measuring progress in the achievement of political objectives will be also imperative. How will we know when they are met? This question is crucial because it will inform the Israeli government about war termination and ceasefires. Can Israel achieve its political and military objectives before a ceasefire is eventually forced upon it?
Ultimately, the outcome of Israel achieving its political objectives must be a reset in the Israel – Palestinian relationship. The strategy employed by Israel in recent years – Mowing the Grass – has failed and a new approach is needed. As RAND expert Raphael Cohen has written:
“Mowing the grass” embodies more than just strategic fatalism; it also reflects a large measure of hubris. At its core lies the assumption that Israel can control the rheostat in Gaza, hitting Hamas just hard enough to deter it from attacking Israel but not so hard that Gaza implodes into chaos or explodes into a regional war. Israel's mowing-the-grass strategy finally failed spectacularly on October 7.
It is hard to see what that new, post-war strategy towards Gaza might look like, however.
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