On Nov. 20, 2023, Ukrainian intelligence officer Tatarigami_UA wrote a short analysis describing how increasingly ubiquitous Russian glide bomb attacks have become a major problem for Ukrainian forces.
Those glide bombs—regular dumb bombs retrofitted with wings—have limited precision. However, they are massive, and their large destructive effects have become increasingly problematic for front-line Ukrainian forces. His solution—fighter jets with 100km+ radar detection abilities and air-to-air weaponry to match, namely the F-16.
Training is ongoing. Ukraine reportedly intends to deploy the F-16s in squadron strength or greater (15-24 planes), expecting to reach a critical mass of qualified pilots and airframes by late Spring 2024.
So, why are the F-16s important?
Consider the struggles Ukraine has had in expanding its beachhead near Krynky.
Newly contested area in the dotted orange lines.
Russian forces in the area complain that their artillery is afraid to fire more than a handful of rounds before relocating due to the ferocity of Ukrainian counter battery fire. As a result, artillery doesn’t appear to be a major problem for Ukrainian forces pushing down from the riverbanks.
Additionally, Ukrainian drones continue to target Russian armor and quickly destroy new Russian anti-drone electronic warfare (EW) systems, including one confirmed destruction on Nov. 24th. Ukraine has the upper hand in the drone war.
While Russian artillery and drones appear to be nothing more than a nuisance, Russia’s massed glide bombing campaign is not.
Andrew Perpetua tracks geolocated footage of Russian air strikes on his daily updated map, tracking the frequency of Russian glide bombing strikes on Ukrainian positions along the Dnipro River:
- 11/24: 13 airstrikes.
- 11/23: one airstrike.
- 11/22: five airstrikes.
- 11/21: nine airstrikes.
- 11/20: two airstrikes.
- 11/19: three airstrikes.
- 11/18: 12 airstrikes.
That is 45 glide bomb strikers in a single week.
That may not sound like a huge number, but 500-1500 kilogram bombs pack far more explosive power than a 49.5 kilogram 152mm artillery shell—10 to 30 times more powerful. And even with rudimentary guidance systems, these glide bombs strike with greater accuracy than a typical artillery barrage. Look at the size of these bombs:
This is what they look like hitting targets. Look at the size of the explosions contrasted with the taller buildings still standing in Avdiivka.
And a ground-eye view:
Russian glide-bombs have a theoretical range of over 50km, but in combat situations, with pilots flying low to avoid Ukrainian air defenses, they seem to be restricted to a release range of around 35-40 kilometers.
Thirty-seven of the 40 air strikes targeted Ukrainian positions on the left (southern) bank of the Dnipro, or within 1 kilometer of the river on the right (northern) bank. The remaining strikes struck targets within 3 km of the river. That means that Russia can only hit targets within a few kilometers of the front lines, afraid to strike deeper into Ukrainian territory.
Given the range of the glide bombs, and the location of the strikes, we can guesstimate where Russia is releasing them—around 30-35 kilometers behind the front lines:
Likely location of glide-bomb release points by Russian aircraft
Both Ukraine and Russia deploy various short and mid-ranged missile defenses systems close to the front lines to protect against enemy airstrikes, such as the Buk System.
Most air defenses systems rely on radar, whether to identify the location of a target to fire a heat-seeking missile, or to guide the missile to its target. Either way, radar detection is the key to ground based air defenses.
To avoid radar detection, Russian (and Ukrainian) pilots fly at treetop heights as they approach their targets. Low-altitude flying in NATO parlance is defined as any fixed-wing aircraft flying below 600 meters. Ukraine and Russia are flying at altitudes of around 75-150 meters.
These low altitude approaches make radar detection difficult for two reasons.
First, interference, or “radar clutter.”
Radar clutter
A radar detects aircraft by bouncing electronic waves off of the surfaces of objects. A radar is designed to ignore “blips” (contact points) that may be false positives generated by objects on the ground.
A fighter flying low enough may appear to a radar to be a false hit and thus avoid detection.
The second reason flying low helps avoid radar is the “radar horizon.”
Radar waves are straight, whereas the earth’s surface is a curvature.
Aircraft can use the curve of the earth to hide from radar
By flying low enough, and far enough from the enemy radar tower, an aircraft can “fly below the horizon” from the perspective of the enemy radar crew and thus avoid detection.
The distance at which an aircraft becomes undetectable to radar due to the curvature of the earth is called the “radar horizon.” Due to the refraction of the radar waves, actual detection distances extend beyond the simple visual horizon, but you get the point. Ultimately, given the constant nature of the earth’s curvature, a radar’s detection distance is based mostly on two factors:
- The height of the radar.
- The altitude of the aircraft.
The higher the elevation from which the radar is emitted, the “further” the radar can peer over the horizon. The higher the enemy aircraft is flying, the further it can be detected. The theoretical maximum detection range of an aircraft can be reduced to a single mathematical formulae based on those two variables.
In practical terms, the higher the radar, the further you see. The higher the aircraft, the further from which it can be seen.
For example, using a radar tower 20 meters tall, an aircraft flying at 30 meters could be detected at a distance of 41 kilometers.
When paired with interference challenges, practical detection range falls a little below the theoretical maximum—thus Buk Systems generally detect low flying enemy aircraft at around 35 kilometers away.
So assuming Ukrainian air defenses set up around 5 kilometers behind the front lines, the “30 kilometer zone” into which Russian aircraft dare not fly into suddenly makes a lot of sense. The release point distance is not random. It is just at the edge of Ukrainian air defense range.
So how can Ukraine extend that range? The earth’s curvature is fixed, and Russia won’t fly its aircraft at higher altitudes. So the only other variable that can be manipulated is … the height of the radar. And that’s where F-16s come in.
Flying at tree-top heights (150 meters or less), F-16s can remain safe from enemy air defense while detecting Russian aircraft much further than any SAM battery. The difference is massive—tracking an enemy bomber flying at 30 meters, an air defense radar antennae would see the aircraft at a distance of around 40 kilometers, while the F-16 would detect it at 72 kilometers.
Furthermore, when Russian bombers release their glide bombs, they rapidly ascend as they prepare to release the bombs, as the bombs need altitude to glide the necessary distance. This would give F-16s in the vicinity an even better chance at interception.
Therefore, an F-16 flying combat air patrols 30 kilometers from the front lines (to avoid Russian air defenses) with a powerful enough radar would be capable of intercepting a Russian bomber 40 kilometers or more behind the front lines.
Ukraine is getting 61 F-16 AM/BMs from Denmark and the Netherlands which come equipped with the AN/APG-66(V2A) Radar—offering detection ranges of fighter-sized objects at distances of up to 110 kilometers. Detecting enemy aircraft at 70-75 kilometers, even through radar clutter, should be well within the capabilities of this radar.
The question would be whether Ukraine has air-to-air missiles capable of engaging targets at 70+ kilometers. The US has already placed a large order of AMRAAM C-8 long-range missiles for Ukraine with a range of 160+ kilometers, but the first deliveries are not expected until 2026.
Securing the most advanced AMRAAM D3 or C8 missiles with 160+km ranges may be a challenge, but Ukraine may have an easier time finding allies willing to part with their stocks of AMRAAM C5 and C7 missiles, which boast an engagement range of up to 105 kilometers. AMRAAM C-5 and C-7 variants are 20-25-year-old missiles, first introduced between 1996 and 2003, thus thousands are stocked in US military stockpiles and those of Ukraine’s allies. Operators include Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the United Kingdom, Germany, Poland, France, Sweden, and others.
If Ukraine can assemble enough pilots, F-16s with good enough radars, and armed with AMRAAM C5~C7 missiles, suddenly Ukrainian air defense against low-flying bombers could extend up to 10~20km further than it currently does.
F-16s and AMRAAM missiles would push Russian aircraft out of their glide bomb drop zone area
This would make a huge difference in the war.
Presently, Russian bombers can fly in and strike targets up to 5 kilometers behind the front lines with relative impunity, staying out of radar detection ranges of Ukrainian air defenses.
Low-flying F-16s well behind the front lines could extend the reach of Ukrainian air defense an extra 15-20 kilometers with minimal risk—neutralizing any Russian bombers in the glide bomb drop zone.
Sixty F-16s will not be enough to provide regular around-the-clock defenses for 1,000 kilometers of front lines. But focused on a narrow stretch of hotly contested front lines, like the Dnipro riverbank near Kherson or the area north of Tokmak, the F-16s would make regular Russian glide bomb attacks too costly to conduct.
Russia is making up for its disadvantages in drone and artillery warfare through relentless glide bombing. F-16s are what Ukraine needs to counter this new Russian threat.