We begin today with Michele Barbaro writing for Foreign Policy magazine that French President Emmanuel Macron may get his controversial overhaul of the French pension system but has lost France in the process.
Gone are the days when Macron sought to appease the yellow vests by backtracking on the fuel price hike that sparked their revolt and launching a “grand national debate” with civil society. “He is a far cry from his talk, typical of his first term, about a more horizontal, consensual decision-making,” Rouban said. “What we are seeing now is unilateral action.” (French presidents are limited to a maximum of two five-year terms, so Macron’s legacy is in the balance.) [...]
Beyond Macron’s political woes, there are fears that recent events will further alienate France from the democratic process—and it was already distrustful. In 2021, only around 30 percent of the French said they had confidence in the government, more than 10 points lower than the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development average. Now, 7 out of 10 people say the way the pension reform was approved was undemocratic, and the same percentage feel “anger” about it.
This kind of situation “can produce a rejection of the political class as a whole, which translates into abstentionism as well as an attraction to the extremes, particularly the extreme right,” said Michel Wieviorka, director of research at the School for Advanced Studies in the Social Sciences in Paris. According to polls, Le Pen is the public figure that best embodies the opposition to Macron’s pension reform, closely followed by radical left-wing firebrand Jean-Luc Mélenchon. More than 60 percent of respondents believe Le Pen is emerging from this crisis stronger than before.
Simon Kuper of the Financial Times wrote a an interesting essay, saying that Macron’s handling to the pension reform issue could hasten the end of France’s Fifth Republic.
Kuper traces the history of France’s Fifth Republic from its foundations in the Algerian crisis to the 1962 referendum that allowed for the direct election of the French president, to the apparent disliking that many French people have for the technocratic class ( “a sort of French-Confucian rule by the cleverest boys in the class“) to the anemic popularity of the last three presidents (Nicolas Sarkozy, François Hollande, and Macron) to Jean-Luc Mélenchon’s 2022 campaign promise of a “Sixth Republic” and, finally, to a tantalizing e-mail sent out by Macron’s own Renaissance Party that asked “… on which subject(s) do you think it would be useful to organise a citizen’s convention?”
It’s an interesting and provocative read, although the decentralization of French politics from Paris to allow for more local control has its drawbacks, as well.
Johannes Moehrle of The Article is also worried about what happens after Macron finishes his presidential term.
In his second term, Macron does not need to worry about reelection prospects, yet the country needs to worry about what comes after him. Although Macron’s term still runs until 2027, this pension reform may be his last significant domestic policy, as both his position in the assembly and his popularity on the streets will not give him much room for further legislation. For most of the French, Macron has now fully become the out-of-touch Jupiterian ruler they had always suspected him to be. It is likely that even if he attempts to unite the French people, as he initially set out to do, all efforts will be in vain.
In 2017, Macron eclipsed the traditional parties that had dominated the French political system, when he founded his En Marche movement and won the election. With the Socialists and Républicains left in tatters, Le Pen’s far-right National Rally and Mélanchon’s Corbynist France Unbowed have experienced a steady rise in popularity. Both in 2017 and 2022, Macron has been the only one able to defeat Le Pen and prevent the National Rally from ruling the country. With Macron as President, the Socialist centre-Left and Républicain centre-Right have not come up with anyone able to rival the far-Right or far-Left. Macron’s party is most likely to wither away as he departs from the Élysée. So: what, or who, is going to prevent the 2027 election turning into a battle of the extremes?
Speaking of France’s Socialist Party, Jon Allsop writes an essay for The New York Review of Books (paywall) wondering if Olivier Faure, the leader of France’s Socialist Party, can revive the center-Left Socialist party.
Faure is no Mitterrand (his critics in the party find the comparison risible). But perhaps he is relying in these moments on an analogy less of character than of trajectory. This year’s congress in Marseille might seem to have little in common with the 1971 Épinay congress that birthed the modern Socialist Party, but both followed on the heels of a disastrous presidential election: in 1969 Gaston Defferre—representing the Section française de l’Internationale ouvrière, the forerunner of the Socialist Party—tallied 5 percent. The journalists Albert du Roy and Robert Schneider wrote in Le Roman de la Rose (1982) that few observers imagined the Socialists would be in power within ten years of Épinay; many thought that the party was “killing itself” by allying with the Communists. The Communists initially dominated that alliance, “but then the leadership changed,” Martigny told me. Faure seems to “believe, in a way, that the situation is not that different today.”
The political climate is of course very different today. After last year’s presidential runoff between Macron and Le Pen, much ink was spilled on the idea that the traditional left–right economic axis structuring French politics had been displaced by something new. Then again, Mélenchon—a left-wing candidate who talks frankly about economics—could easily have made the runoff if a version of the NUPES [New Ecological and Social People's Union] had been in place in time for the election. The claim that the French left needs to unite to stand a chance in a majoritarian system was valid in 1971 and has now come back around. In between, the Socialists were hegemonic on the left. They certainly aren’t anymore. But their importance to the new French left still seems to be up for grabs.
Moving back stateside, Susan B. Glasser of The New Yorker complains about the press being trolled by Number 45 again.
The political class’s collective capacity for analyzing and digesting events that have not yet occurred, which still might not occur, and whose details are presumably crucial to understanding how they will play out, was on full display. First of all, as Trump anticipated, his breathless warning forced Republicans once again to publicly defend their embattled leader—a useful exercise at a moment when dissatisfaction with his losing electoral record was starting to shape the 2024 Republican primary race. One by one, they took Trump’s bait, including some of the would-be rivals whose campaigns are premised on the idea of providing the G.O.P. with an alternative to him. Many of the defenders slammed Bragg and attacked the case against Trump as politically motivated—without even bothering to wait for there to actually be a case against him. Even Mike Pence, who had seemed earlier this month as if he was finally ready to get up the courage to properly denounce Trump, joined in, bemoaning “another politically charged prosecution” aimed at the former President. On Capitol Hill, House Speaker Kevin McCarthy called the charges sight unseen “an outrageous abuse of power by a radical DA who lets violent criminals walk as he pursues political vengeance against President Trump,” while several House committee chairmen quickly demanded testimony from the prosecutor and vowed to get to the bottom of his outrageous attacks on their leader. Trump must have been so gratified to know that when he whistles for them they still come running.
By midweek, though, the wait for Indictment Day had started to seem as elusive as the Infrastructure Week that Trump promised and never delivered on for all four years of his Presidency. I was thoroughly exhausted by all the legal analyses about the weakness of the charges and evidence in a case that had not yet been filed. When I saw the dramatic photos of Trump being arrested by burly New York cops which were circulating everywhere on the Internet, the fact that they were obviously fakes left me ruminating not only on the terrors of artificial intelligence but also on the existential question of just what constitutes news right now: If we all expect Trump to be arrested and have already spent days discussing every aspect of the case against him, does it matter that there is not actually a case yet? It was right around the time that I was contemplating the fake photos when I saw the latest leaks from Mar-a-Lago, where Trump, ever intent on feeding the news cycle, had let it be known that he might want to be handcuffed and paraded in front of the media mob for his arraignment—if it ever actually happens.
I agree with Glasser but it does seem like breathlessly criticizing the vapid reporting of Beltway press speculation about Number 45’s impending indictments is becoming a reporting genre in its own right.
Jennifer Rubin of The Washington Post reminds us of the upcoming state Supreme Court race in Wisconsin, the exorbitant amount of money being spent on the race, and the significance of the race for the 2024 elections.
The election to fill the swing seat on the Wisconsin state Supreme Court has already shattered spending records for a judicial race. Candidates and outside groups have spent more than $20 million in the run-up to the April 4 contest. Outside spending for right-wing candidate Daniel Kelly, a staunch abortion opponent who consulted with the state party on the phony 2020 elector scheme, is outpacing spending for progressive, pro-choice Judge Janet Protasiewicz by $4.2 million.
There is no better example of the way in which the U.S. Supreme Court’s Dobbs decision overturning Roe v. Wade continues to reverberate through our politics — and will continue right through the 2024 election.
Finally today, Ronald Brownstein of The Atlantic says that Republicans now control the majority of House seats where median income is below the national median income and what that may mean for fights over economic issues like the debt ceiling and the budget.
Democrats, who led the legislative efforts to create Social Security under Franklin D. Roosevelt and Medicare under Lyndon B. Johnson, have long thought of themselves as the party of seniors. But today, Republicans represent 141 of the 215 House districts where adults aged 65 and older exceed their 16 percent share of the national population, while Democrats hold a clear majority of seats in districts with fewer seniors than average, according to the Equity Research Institute analysis.
Republicans now also control most of the House seats in which the median income trails the national level of nearly $65,000 annually. Republicans hold 152 of the 237 seats in that category. Democrats, in turn, hold 128 of the 198 seats where the median income exceeds the national level.
Perhaps most surprisingly, Republicans hold a clear majority of the districts where the share of residents who lack health insurance exceeds the national level of 9 percent. The GOP now holds 110 of those 185 highly uninsured seats. Democrats control 138 of the 250 seats with fewer uninsured than the nation overall.
Equally revealing is to examine what share of each party’s total strength in the House these seats represent. From that angle, the parties offer almost mirror-image profiles. About two-thirds of House Republicans represent districts with more seniors than the national level, while about two-thirds of Democrats represent districts with fewer of them. Roughly two-thirds of House Republicans represent districts where the median income lags the national level, while three-fifths of Democrats hold seats where incomes surpass it. Almost exactly half of Republicans, compared with only about one-third of Democrats, represent districts with an unusually high concentration of people lacking health insurance.
Have the best possible day, everyone!