UPDATE: Saturday, Mar 4, 2023 · 9:23:40 PM +00:00 · Mark Sumner
The latest note from the Ukrainian general staff just appeared. They call the Russian attempt to encircle Bakhmut on Saturday “unsuccessful,” and say that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks at Vasyukivka, Zaliznyanske, Dubovo-Vasylivka, and Orikhovo-Vasylivka north of the city. They also report Russian artillery fire in Bakhmut itself, and at Klishchiivka, Ivanivske, and Chasiv Yar on the south.
Klishchiivka is a particularly interesting name on this list. Russia had earlier occupied this area fully and pushed Ukrainian forces back toward Ivanivske. However, Ukraine had reported more success on the south in the last few days. If Russian is back to bombing Klishchiivka, Ukraine may have moved the line to the south more than anyone had realized.
UPDATE: Saturday, Mar 4, 2023 · 9:12:21 PM +00:00 · Mark Sumner
Videos still rolling out of Bakhmut today showing Ukrainian forces in control of the central part of the city. Mapping these, along with the earlier video showing a Ukrainian strike on Russian forces near Berkhivka, gives some sense of where fighting is currently happening.
The area that these videos are coming from is still clearly free from Russian forces.
UPDATE: Saturday, Mar 4, 2023 · 7:22:13 PM +00:00 · Mark Sumner
Most of the time, when we say that a city has been “flattened” by artillery, it’s an exaggeration. Yes, buildings may be damaged and broken, streets may be filled with rubble, but many of the structure still stand, even if damaged. Marinka … has been pretty much flattened.
On Thursday, Oryx added a new page to their dedicated coverage of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. That page provides, not a list of what has been destroyed in Ukraine, but a list of everything that has not. However, don’t go into this page expected to see a tank countdown. You won’t see “Russia has 1,200 T-72s remaining, oh wait, they tried for Vuhledar again, now it’s 1,100.” There aren’t any numbers on this page.
This is just types of equipment that have not so far been reported. Think of it as Ukrainian BINGO. Any day now they’ll get to cross off a BMD-4 infantry fighting vehicle or a Kornet-D anti-tank missile. Though much of the equipment remaining are experimental prototypes and tiny variants that might not be recognized if they showed up to get smashed.
If you go to this page, and scroll down the brief list of tanks that have not yet participated in the turret tossing championships, right down at the bottom you’ll find this entry: Armata T-14. That’s a vehicle that has appeared in these updates several times, even if it’s never moved an inch into Ukraine. That’s because the T-14 is a prime example of how under Vladimir Putin, corruption and incompetence have made it almost impossible for Russia to actually take a new weapons system past the concept stage.
Only now, with Western tanks soon to make an appearance in Ukraine, Russia is claiming that their own “super tank” is on the way. That’s an interesting claim, because the number of production models of the T-14 is essentially zero.
Development of the T-14 goes back to a project called Object 187 that was initially designed in the late 1980s. It was meant to directly address some of the traditional shortcomings of Russia’s fast-and-cheap tanks, without driving the cost per vehicle through the roof.
The size and weight of the tank was raised from the 43 tonne size of a T-80, up to around 55 tonnes, putting it closer to the size of the original Abrams M1. That allows it to carry a good deal more armor, as well as a bigger engine and better gun. Also, the autoloader was redesigned in a way that is meant to avoid repeats of the astoundingly common ammo cookoff and turret toss that has been seen again and again in Russian tanks deployed in Ukraine.
Also there’s even been thought into something radically new in Russian tanks: Protecting the tank crew. That includes moving all of that crew down and forward, leaving the smaller turret in which no one rides. There are even some analysts who think the tank is equipped with a “hard kill” system that shoots down incoming anti-tank missiles. A system that would not just be effective against the older TOW generation missiles, but even Javelins and their equivalent.
It’s a very different tank than anything Russia now fields. There’s not a lot of evidence that it would be “super” in the sense of better than the Western tanks about to take the field, but on paper it certainly seems more competitive than anything Russia now has rolling around.
The problem for Russia has been building them.
The first T-14 rolled out in a parade in 2015. Russia signed a contract for a “test batch” of 100 tanks in 2016. None of them had been delivered as of 2020. Actual production of the test batch didn’t get underway until 2021.
Right now, depending on who you believe, there are somewhere between 15 and 40 T-14 tanks in existence. However, all of those tanks are part of that test batch. Some of them aren’t even full blown tanks, they are “test articles” created to debug issues with some specific issue of the frame, engine, or other systems. All of the T-14 tanks that exist to this point are early models created to test not just the systems in the tank, but the processes on the assembly line. Russian operators who have climbed into the existing handful of T-14s that will actually move around and shoot have had very little good to say about them. From the way they have reacted both in both parades and field demonstrations, these early prototypes appear to be more than a little unreliable and fragile.
In the last week, as the date for Western tanks to appear on the front lines draws closer, Russian sources have been repeatedly insisting that the T-14 Armata is coming. Maybe it is. However, it if does, there won’t be many, every one of them will be its own one-off beta test in building this tank, and absolutely no one in the Russian military will have any idea of how to maintain it or use if effectively.
In some ways, it would be kind of nice to see one hit the mud in Ukraine … long enough to see what a Challenger 2 can do with it.
Bakhmut and the big picture
In comments on Friday there was an extended discussion about the rate of loss for Ukraine vs. Russia. Daily Kos frequently posts the numbers of estimated Russian losses as issued by the Ukrainian general staff. We rarely cover Ukrainian losses, and when that happens it’s generally when covering a statement from U.S. or U.K. military intelligence in which they give a vague figure for estimated losses to date.
There are places we can go for a clue about what’s happening. For example, Oryx publishes only verified numbers concerning equipment losses, and from those it’s possible to determine something about the nature of losses in Ukraine.
Equipment losses in Ukraine invasion by category
Category |
Russia |
Ukraine |
Ratio |
Tanks |
1790 |
470 |
3.8 |
Armored Fighting Vehicles |
707 |
268 |
2.6 |
Infantry Fighting Vehicles |
2151 |
493 |
4.4 |
Armored Personnel Carriers |
299 |
229 |
1.3 |
I’m using these categories since they seem more indicative of “front line losses” involving vehicles carrying servicemembers than others such as towed artillery, SPGs, etc. (Why the huge difference between IFVs and APCs? Because Russia has a lot of BMP-3s and treats them like all purpose transports … it also loses a lot of BMP-3s.)
The overall ratio that this gives is about 3.4:1. If this accurately reflects the relative rate of troop losses throughout the invasion, then it suggests that, if Russia has lost 152,000 soldiers—the latest estimate from the Ukrainian military—then Ukraine has lost about 57,000. If Russia has actually seen only around 50,000 losses (a number recently cited by U.K. military intelligence), then Ukraine might be expected to have suffered around 17,000 lost.
There are reasons to doubt this estimate. For example, if Ukraine were losing vehicles in areas being rapidly overrun by Russian forces, those vehicles may be less likely to make an appearance on social media and get tallied by Oryx. However, Russians also have smartphones and Russian Telegram is replete with images showing the destruction of Ukrainian equipment and captured or abandoned vehicles. Oryx gets all that. I don’t have any compelling reason to believe that, just because a Ukrainian vehicle was lost in territory now occupied by Russia, it is less likely to be cataloged.
Overall, throughout the war, a three to one ratio of men and material lost seems about right.
However, there are certainly exceptions. No one could watch the multiple fruitless attempts to take the town of Vuhledar, leaving at least 130 tanks and other armored vehicles scattered across fields, without seeing a ratio that’s almost incalculably high. Vuhledar, to date, has been a shooting gallery for Ukrainian artillery, anti-tank weapons, and snipers. Put a number on it as high as you like, and it’s probably still not high enough.
But far more importantly, there are estimates from the troops and unit commanders who have been fighting for months at Bakhmut. For many of those months, Russia prosecuted action in the area by sending out “zerg” attacks in which infantry units played the role of sensors; advancing until they were taken down, then replaced by another that advanced until it was eliminated, rinse, repeat, many times daily. Some have declared that the ratio there is close to 10:1, but there’s another number that has come up repeatedly.
According to a commander of Ukrainian forces long stationed at Bakhmut, and reported in Ukrinform, the ratio of Russian losses to Ukrainian losses at Bakhmut is around 7 to 1.
That number shouldn’t be surprising. The long held general rule for a successful military advance is for the offensive side to hold a 3:1 advantage at the point of conflict. Go far above that, and it can help turn the operation into a rout. Fall much below it, and the advance is likely to fail.
Superior equipment and training can certainly alter this number significantly, as can the tactical advantages of terrain. Huge forces of untrained local citizens trying to retake their land have been reliably defeated by relatively tiny numbers of well-trained and better equipped forces holding a reinforced position (see just about any slaughter from the centuries of British colonialism that clog most lists of “greatest military victories”).
Until the fall of Soledar, Bakhmut was a situation where very badly trained, poorly equipped prison troops “recruited” by Wagner Group were being thrown at Ukrainian defenders who had established positions in hardened buildings. To win a battle like that, Russia needed to be able to field a huge numerical advantage, but it’s logistical and command structure didn’t support delivering such numbers. So they failed. A lot.
What was the secret sauce that allowed Russia to finally crack Soledar and then other areas around Bakhmut? More. It just brought more. More regular army troops in addition to the Wagnerites. More of the “mobiks,” many of whom have now had something that actually looks like training. More equipment. More artillery. More drones. More air strikes.
The Russian force fighting against Ukraine at Bakhmut is essentially two armies, which don’t cooperate well and each of which has its own issues with bringing significant power to bear. In no sense is the Russian army at Bakhmut working as well as it could be. However, it’s working as well as it needs to be to force Ukraine to surrender ground around the city.
If there’s any one factor which has plagued militaries throughout history it’s simply that: More. What do you do when your opponent marshals more than that 3:1 advantage? What do you do when they have enough numbers in place to overcome any deficit they may face in training, equipment, or position?
There’s another factor in this, as well. That 3:1 number is the standard for offensives that expect to succeed without taking undue casualties. What do you do when an enemy believes the short term advantage of winning a confrontation is great enough that almost any level of casualties is acceptable? That 3:1 requirement is not a thing if you’re willing to leave two-thirds of your force on the ground to win the battle at hand. Russia seems to be willing.
Put it all together and you get two seemingly contradictory things: At Bakhmut, Ukraine has killed 7 Russian soldiers for every 1 Ukrainian soldier lost, but they’re also on the edge of losing Bakhmut.
Russia has won a Pyrrhic victory. The question is whether, unlike Pyrrhus of Epirus, Vladimir Putin has enough in reserve that he can continue. Because there’s no evidence that the next town is going to be sold any cheaper.
Bakhmut today
There were contradictory indications in Bakhmut on Friday. Not only did Ukraine manage to bring General Oleksandr Syrskyi into the city to consult with local unit commanders, there was news late in the day that the “road of life” was not the only lifeline out of the city after all. Reports indicated that, despite a planned explosion that reportedly took out a bridge southwest of Ivaniske, the T0504 highway to Kostyantynivka was open and that Ukrainian vehicles were moving both ways — though some of those vehicles reportedly had to hotfoot it after Russian artillery started hitting segments of the road.
A similar situation appears to have been underway on the road of life through Khromove to Chasiv Yar. Russia brought up infantry north of the M03 around Paraskoiivka and managed to take a section of the Khromove road under fire. Combined with the deliberate downing of a bridge there on Friday morning that slowed traffic getting onto and off the road, and the route became difficult.
Earlier in the week, there had been reports that new units were being brought into Bakhmut. Now multiple sources are indicating that those units were not brought in to fight in the city, but are positioned along new trenches dug west of Bakhmut for the purpose of holding open the roads.
However, Ukraine is definitely not done fighting in Bakhmut as of Saturday morning.
According to The Kyiv Post, Ukraine appears to be conducting a “fighting withdrawal” from the city. They’re still extracting a cost from the Russian forces as they advance, but they’re also not making unproductive “last stands” to hold the rubble choked streets.
This thread, from retired Australian general Mick Ryan, does a good job of walking through why such withdrawals are necessary, and how they can best be conducted.
This quote from Australian Army doctrine is also useful: “Withdrawal is a task employed regularly during mobile defence or the delay to accomplish the overall aim of resuming offensive action…it should be treated as a routine tactic rather than a harbinger of disaster.”
Ukraine is leaving Bakhmut not so it can fall back and wait for Russia to hit it again in some other place, but so that it can retake the offensive in the spring. And spring … is coming soon.
Even now, the movements around Bakhmut are costing Russia dearly. This actually looks to be near the small reservoir directly south of Berkhivka — one of the few in the area that has not been deliberately breeched.
Putin’s other army
The best thing I can say about this statement from MTG is that she gave it to a half-empty room at a CPAC conference so poorly attended that it’s clear something is badly broken in the power structure of the Republican Party. Whether this means that the Trump-Gaetz-Greene powered CPAC is now seen as out of step, or if the GOP is simply fragmenting into groups around the various 2024 candidates, it’s hard to tell.
In any case, Marge is doing a lot of heavy lifting for her friend Vladimir at this event.
Where is that bold leader of the Russian Federation anyway? Not anywhere in public. After cancelling a trip to southern Russia because of two reported skirmishes in border villages hundreds of kilometers from his destination, Putin pulled off this amazing show in Moscow — table length: infinite.
Biden went to Kyiv. Zelenskyy went to Bakhmut. Putin is afraid to go to Moscow.
Good stuff is coming
Meanwhile, Russian forces are also getting … something.
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