Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged that Western partners have different expectations for Ukraine’s counteroffensive and stated that Ukrainian forces will perform operations as Ukraine sees fit independent of pressure from another country.
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in at least three sectors of the front and reportedly made gains on June 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Kreminna area in Luhansk Oblast, in western Zaporizhia Oblast, and on the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts.[1] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces in the Kreminna area achieved partial successes and consolidated themselves in new positions.[2] Ukrainian Tavrisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Valeriy Shershen reported that Ukrainian forces advanced up to one kilometer in western Zaporizhia Oblast and on the administrative border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts.[3] Shershen added that these Ukrainian advances were tactical measures aimed at improving Ukrainian positions along the front.[4] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces also conducted unsuccessful offensive operations along the Avdiivka–Donetsk City front.[5] Ukrainian Prime Minister Denys Shmyhal stated on June 21 that Ukrainian forces have liberated eight settlements and over 113 square kilometers of territory since starting counteroffensive operations on June 4.[6]
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“A better Russia can be produced only by a clear & stark Ukrainian victory, which is the most viable catalyst for a popular challenge to Putin. Such a…defeat is also required to enable Russians to shed their imperialist ambitions.” www.abc.net.au/…
One development, however, could spark more substantive change in Russia: a Ukrainian victory. Kyiv’s triumph in the war raises the possibility, even if only slightly, that Putin could be forced out of office, creating an opening for a new style of Russian government. A Russian defeat in the war could galvanize the kind of bottom-up pressure that is needed to upend Putin’s regime. Such a development carries risks—of violence, chaos, and even the chance of a more hard-line government emerging in the Kremlin—but it also opens the possibility of a more hopeful future for Russia and for its relations with its neighbors and the West. Although fraught, the most likely path to a better Russia now runs through Ukrainian success.
[...]
Managing relations with Moscow therefore requires a long-term and sustainable strategy to constrain Russia and its ability to wage aggression beyond its borders. Such a strategy should also aim to weaken the grip of authoritarianism in Russia over time.
Corruption has been a key enabler of the Putin regime; illicit networks entrench regime interests and prevent individuals outside the regime from gaining influence within the system. To weaken these barriers, Washington must properly enforce sanctions on the Kremlin’s cronies in the business world, combat money laundering, make financial and real estate markets in the United States and Europe more transparent, and support investigative journalists in their bid to uncover such corruption. The United States can also bolster Russian civil society, an important force in forging a more liberal and democratic country, beginning with supporting the work of the many actors in Russian civil society—including journalists and members of the opposition—who have fled the country since the start of the war in February 2022. Backing them now would help lay the groundwork for a better relationship between the United States and a post-Putin Russia.
Ultimately, however, Washington and its allies can do little to directly shape Russia’s political trajectory. A better Russia can be produced only by a clear and stark Ukrainian victory, which is the most viable catalyst for a popular challenge to Putin. Such a resounding defeat is also required to enable Russians to shed their imperialist ambitions and to teach the country’s future elites a valuable lesson about the limits of military power. Support for Ukraine—in the form of sustained military assistance and efforts to anchor the country in the West through membership in the European Union and NATO—will pave the way for improved relations with a new Russia. Getting there will be hard. But the more decisive Russia’s defeat in Ukraine, the more likely it is that Russia will experience profound political change, one hopes for the better.
www.foreignaffairs.com/...
- Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in at least three sectors of the front and reportedly made gains on June 22.
- Senior Kremlin officials continue to publicly address the Ukrainian counteroffensive in a cohesive manner and acknowledge Ukrainian forces will conduct further operations, while continuing to inflate Russian successes.
- Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu announced that the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) will form a “reserve army” by the end of June, form a new army corps, and reinforce key Western Military District (WMD) formations as part of intended force restructuring.
- The Russian MoD is unlikely to fully formalize Russian volunteer formations by its stated July 1 deadline.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky stated that Ukrainian intelligence indicates that Russian forces are preparing to conduct a possible sabotage attack at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP). A Russian-created radiological incident at the ZNPP remains unlikely but not impossible.
- Ukrainian forces may be intensifying efforts to strike Russian ground lines of communication (GLOCs) in southern Ukraine.
- Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky acknowledged that Western partners have different expectations for Ukraine’s counteroffensive and stated that Ukrainian forces will perform operations as Ukraine sees fit independent of pressure from another country.
- Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks near the Kupyansk-Svatove line.
- Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Kreminna.
- Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Bakhmut.
- Russian and Ukrainian forces conducted limited ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
- Ukrainian and Russian forces continued offensive operations on the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts.
- Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
- Ukrainian officials reported that Russian forces are transferring GRU Spetsnaz units to Kursk and Bryansk oblasts to fight Russian partisans.
- Russian sources claimed that the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) arrested a group of saboteurs in occupied Melitopol that allegedly planned the assassination of unnamed Zaporizhia Oblast occupation officials and sabotage against railroads.
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Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks on the Kupyansk-Svatove line on June 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Synkivka (8km northeast of Kupyansk).[34] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled two Ukranian sabotage and reconnaissance groups operating near Synkivka and Novoselivske (16km northwest of Svatove).[35]
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Kreminna on June 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the Bilohorivka-Dibrova direction (within 10km south of Kreminna), achieved partial success, and consolidated new lines.[37] Ukrainian military officials reported heavy fighting northwest of Dibrova (7km southwest of Kreminna), near the Serebrianske forest area (11km south of Kreminna), and north of Hryhorivka (10km south of Kreminna).[38] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russia‘s “Center” Group of Forces repelled five Ukrainian attacks near Kuzmyne (3km southwest of Kreminna) and in the Serebrianske forest area.[39] The Russian MoD also claimed that Russian forces stopped three Ukrainian sabotage and reconnaissance groups near Yampolivka (17km west of Kreminna), Dibrova, and in the Serebrianske forest.[40]
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Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks near Bakhmut on June 22. Geolocated footage published on June 21 shows that Ukrainian forces recently made limited advances near Ozaryanivka (14km southwest of Bakhmut).[55] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive operations near Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut), Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut), and Bila Hora (12km southwest of Bakhmut).[56] Ukrainian Eastern Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Serhiy Cherevaty reported that the intensity of fighting has decreased in the Bakhmut area due to recent Russian force rotations.[57] Cherevaty stated that Russian airborne forces (VDV) and motorized rifle elements operate cautiously after seeing the degradation of the Wagner Group during the Battle of Bakhmut. Footage published on June 21 and 22 purportedly shows elements of the 137th Guards VDV Regiment (106th Guards VDV Division, Western Military District) and the “Prizrak” Battalion (a Luhansk People’s Republic formation) operating near Bakhmut.[58]
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Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian forces conducted a limited ground attack in western Donetsk Oblast on June 22. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled a Russian ground attack near Vuhledar (30km southwest of Donetsk City).[66]
Ukrainian and Russian forces continued offensive operations on the administrative border between Donetsk and Zaporizhia oblasts on June 22. Ukrainian Tavrisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Captain Valeriy Shershen indicated that Ukrainian forces advanced up to one kilometer in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia border area and in western Donetsk Oblast.[67] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces had partial successes on the Rivnopil-Staromayorske line (up to 8km south of Velyka Novosilka).[68] The Ukrainian General Staff also reported that Russian forces attempted to recapture lost territory near Makarivka (5km south of Velyka Novosilka).[69] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces repelled two Ukrainian ground attacks near Novodonetske (11km southeast of Velyka Novosilka) and Makarivka.[70] [71]
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Ukraine had partial success in the directions of Robotyne in Zaporizhzhya region and Staromayors'ke in Donetsk region.
"When I was out here about two years ago saying I worried about the Colorado River drying up, everybody looked at me like I was crazy,” Biden said during a recent speech in California.
"They looked at me like when I said I worry about Putin using tactical nuclear weapons,” the president continued. “It's real.”
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