Recently a diary (several, in fact) was posted that made the argument that cluster bombs were necessary in Ukraine. Using the supposed success of these weapons in the first Gulf War, and arguing largely that these weapons allow Ukraine to sustain their forward momentum due to the way these weapons help make up for a lack of ammunition, the poster promoted these weapons as necessary for the effort against Russia.
So let’s examine the use of these weapons in Iraq during the Gulf War and the long-term cost over time. Then, let’s look back at other trench-clearing weapons, the way the arguments played out for them. Finally, we’ll look at similar lines of logic, and the cost of applying them to other wars in our history (namely Vietnam).
Since 1991 cluster bombs caused thousands of casualties in Iraq. You can find the specific statistics and others at this article, quoted below. Supporting documentation for this research is also linked at that site.
Demographics
In 2018, civilians (133) made up 99% of all cluster munition casualties for which the status was known. Two casualties were recorded as military and the status of 14 casualties was unknown. The high percentage of civilian casualties is identical to 2017 data and consistent with findings based on analysis of historical data.
Regardless of the time period since attacks, cluster munition remnants disproportionately harm civilians, including children. Children (52%) accounted for the majority of all cluster munition casualties in 2018, where the age group was reported (63 of 122) compared to 36% (91 children among 252 casualties of known age group) in 2017.[8]
The majority of casualties, 71%, were men and boys, where sex was recorded (60 of 85 casualties), representing an increase in the ratio of casualties compared to those among women and girls from 2017.
It has been over 30 years since the Gulf War, and people are still dying to these things, despite decades of occupation and trillions spent. The NY Times did an article on the cost of these weapons not just on civilians, but on our own soldiers during the Gulf War (the conflict cited by the previous diary on this site as justification for these weapon’s effectiveness against the enemy).
The devastating effects that dud bomblets from cluster munitions have inflicted on civilians is well documented. They have killed or injured an estimated 56,000 to 86,000 civilians since World War II. The United States alone has spent more than $3.4 billion on demining operations since 1993, including in countries where it released hundreds of millions of bomblets in past wars that continue to kill and maim civilians. But the incident at As Salman airfield and the broader pattern of fratricidal cluster-munition deaths among American troops have never been documented in full, until now. Five years of reporting and hundreds of interviews reveal that As Salman was just one incident in a dark history of bomblets repeatedly cutting short American and allied lives. Among these submunitions, the BLU-97 in particular exemplifies the perils of this class of weapon — and the extent to which the deaths of service members have been played down by military planners.
If the argument is that these munitions will save ammunition, we still have to grapple with the fact that Ukraine is operating with limited resources, and will have to spend resources on demining the battlefield they will have to subsequently cross, and the defensive lines they will seed with bomblets. This demining process is not fast, cheap, or easy. Take Kosovo as an example, where these weapons featured prominently. Because the bomblets distribute over such a wide area (hundreds of meters) and because they can penetrate as much as 50cm into the ground, clearing these bomblets is extremely expensive, dangerous, and painstaking work. The challenge comes alongside pressure to increase economic production in the wake of their use, putting workers at risk. The battles in Ukraine are happening over the vast fields and farmlands of that country (and cities!). Those lands will be turned into death traps overnight. Clearing them will cost billions, and because of the nature of these weapons, people will still be maimed and killed decades afterwards even with that level of investment. Clearing the weapons in a timely fashion is not possible, and the cost to clear them will take away from spending on better weapons and ammunition down the road. This does not even address the cost in Ukrainian military casualties who will inevitable blow themselves up crossing into the land they’ve carpeted in bomblets.
A lot of ink has been spent on logistics on DailyKos since the invasion of Ukraine. What are the logistics of clearing cluster bombs out of the way of advancing soldiers? Can it be done effectively while keeping the intended pace of advancement? Or will they simply be trading away soldiers for short term gain? It’s no where near as clear cut as it has been made out to be by various posters on this board. Let’s take a look at what it requires in Kosovo (pg. 14) —
Clearance of cluster bomblets: a unique challenge
It is widely agreed that the clearance of cluster bomblets, at least those used by NATO in Kosovo, is among the most difficult of explosive ordnance disposal tasks.
The following are some of the main reasons why:
• The fusing system in a cluster bomblet is very sensitive. Bomblets have been known to detonate as a result of a change in the outside temperature.
• Because cluster bomblets can be extremely unstable they cannot be defused but must always be blown up in situ.
• Mechanical mine-clearance techniques cannot be used to clear cluster bomblets as the bomblets could destroy the machine.
• Upon impact with the ground, cluster bomblets may penetrate the soil to a depth of 50 cm. Explosive ordnance disposal experts must then locate each bomblet, excavate the earth by the side of it without touching, and then lay a detonating charge.
• Dogs cannot be used to detect hidden or buried cluster bomblets because their noses might touch a bomblet — and the slightest touch can be enough to cause an explosion.
• It is potentially dangerous to use standard electromagnetic mine detectors to detect buried bomblets as their electromagnetic pulse may inadvertently set off the munition.
• Cluster-bomblet clearance cannot take place in certain weather conditions, since a gust of wind may be enough to cause a bomblet to explode.
If the argument is one of logistics, of filling a gap in ammunition, then that argument falls apart in the face of the costs associated with clearing up these indiscriminate weapons from the battlefield. While they may succeed in uprooting some infantry lines out of their defensive trenches, demining operations will cost money, lives, and explosive ordinance to accomplish. Ukraine will not be able to only drop this ordinance into the trenches themselves — these bombs cover huge swaths of ground with bomblets.
So far, we’ve seen that the impact of these weapons in Iraq during the Gulf War (and in the invasion of Iraq in the early 2000s) was almost entirely borne by civilians, not the military, and while these weapons may have made for an easier path for us to throw Saddam out of Kuwait, they were not the determining factor of our victory there. The subsequent cost of these weapons on Iraqi civilians over the intervening decades has been horrifying. In every case where these weapons have been used, the overwhelming violence they bring to bear is borne by civilians. In every case where these weapons have been used, the cost to remediate the damage they can do down the road is staggering. And even in the cases where these weapons have brought about short-term military success, the soldiers that then have to fight along the ground seeded by these weapons endure horrifying injuries and deaths as a result.
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Looking back at history, we can find many examples of similar lines of military thinking/logic/planning/etc. The closest analog is likely gas weaponry (chlorine, mustard, etc), used to clear trenches (just as these weapons will in theory be used in Ukraine) in WWI.
Sir John French made the following argument in a private letter to the British Secretary of State of War during WWI in response to the use of gas by the Germans — “We are taking every precaution we can think of but the most effective would be to turn their own weapon against them & stick at nothing.” That sounds more or less identical to the argumentation used by many supporting cluster bombs in Ukraine. The enemy uses it, and so we too must use it. They did exactly that (to limited effect — the wind being their primary obstacle). Chlorine gas and other gas weapons eventually gave way to Mustard Gas which burned flesh and got around the pesky use of gas masks.
Fortunately, the horror of those weapons brought about a convention against them. There is also convention against the use of cluster bombs, for similar reasons. The United States, tragically, joins the high and noble company of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea in failing to sign on to this convention. The company we keep, indeed.
U.S. justification for napalm and Agent Orange also serves as a clear warning against the use of cluster bombs — these weapons were used as anti personnel and to shape the battlefield, and had horrifying consequences for civilians and lingering consequences for the environment and the economy in Vietnam.
We sprayed nearly 20 million gallons of Agent Orange over Vietnam during the war. Doing so did not turn the tide of that war, nor bring the United States the victory or battlefield conditions we sought. It did, however, leave lingering horrors for the people of Vietnam, who have been enduring the consequences ever since. Hundreds of millions of dollars have been spent to try to remediate the damage we did there decades ago, and still those problems persist. We used that weapon because we thought it necessary to turn the tide. That did not turn out the way we wanted it to.
We have spent billions to try and clean up the remaining unexploded bomblets we’ve laid all across the globe. Despite that massive expenditure of money, our cluster bomblets continue to slaughter and maim civilians all over the world, even decades after they were dropped. This includes Iraq, which defenders of this weapon hold up as evidence of the necessity and useful application of these weapons in Ukraine.
I don’t think anyone would reasonably argue that cluster bombs are why we won the Gulf War. I don’t think anyone would reasonably argue that the US would have been defeated by Saddam Hussein in the first Gulf War had we not used those weapons. And as noted above, those weapons not only primarily killed civilians, but had a cost in American military life and limb, and a cost in billions of dollars to clean up.
All of the available evidence shows that cluster bombs are shitty weapons that have limited battlefield impact and massive humanitarian costs. Even in the conflicts where they have had an arguably positive strategic impact, the long term costs are simply not worth it. Using them, stockpiling them, transferring them to anyone for any reason is barbaric and self-defeating.