Ukrainian forces may have conducted a drone strike near the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) building in Moscow on July 24. Other actors could have launched such an attack.
Likely Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike near the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) building in Moscow on July 24. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) claimed that Russian electronic warfare (EW) suppressed two Ukrainian UAVs that detonated, damaging two non-residential buildings.[1] One drone detonated on Komsomolsky Prospekt within 500 meters of the MoD building and within 200 meters of a reported secret Russian General Staff Main Directorate (GRU) building.[2] Russian sources reported that the second drone hit a business center on Likhachev Prospekt.[3] CNN reported that an unspecified Ukrainian intelligence official confirmed that Ukrainian forces conducted the attack.[4] Ukrainian Digital Transformation Minister Mykhailo Fedorov stated that unspecified UAVs attacked the capital and warned that more UAV attacks against Russia will occur.[5] Russian opposition source The Insider reported that Russian authorities banned Russian television channels from covering the drone strikes, citing sources in Russian state media channels.[6] Russian milbloggers had a muted reaction to these strikes; some criticized the Russian air defenses for allowing the drones to penetrate that far into Moscow, while others argued that the informational victory of such attacks is minimal and short-lived.[7]
understandingwar.org/...
Since February 24, 2022, a projected 11,675 foreign mercenaries from 84 countries have joined the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). This was stated by the Russian Ministry of Defense on July 10.
The largest numbers of mercenaries apparently came from Poland (over 2,600), the US and Canada (over 900 from each), Georgia (over 800), Great Britain and Romania (over 700 each), Croatia (over 300), as well as from France and the part of Syria controlled by Türkiye (over 200 each).
According to Moscow, the peak influx of foreign mercenaries was from March to April of last year, but after the first casualties, the growth rate suddenly decreased.
The number of foreign mercenaries in Ukraine appears to be rapidly declining. Russia’s Ministry of Defense believes that only around 2,000 remain today. It has also claimed that about 5,000 foreign volunteers fled Ukraine after seeing how the authorities treated them.
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- Likely Ukrainian forces conducted a drone strike near the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) building in Moscow on July 24.
- Likely Ukrainian forces targeted Russian military assets in occupied Crimea, temporarily disrupting Russian logistics through Crimea on July 24.
- Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an article published on July 24 likely intended to mitigate damage to Russia’s position in Africa and his own reputation resulting from Russia’s withdrawal from the Ukraine-Russia grain deal, Russian attacks on Ukrainian grain and port facilities, and Putin’s inability to attend the upcoming BRICS summit due to the International Criminal Court (ICC) arrest warrant issued for him.
- Russia conducted another drone strike on Ukrainian port infrastructure in Odesa Oblast overnight on July 23-24.
- Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations along at least three sectors of the front on July 24 and have reportedly advanced in certain areas.
- The Kremlin continues to codify domestic repression into Russian law, generating minimal opposition from select Russian lawmakers.
- Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, in the Bakhmut area, and along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line and made marginal gains south of Kreminna.
- Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, and in the Bakhmut area and reportedly advanced in the Bakhmut area.
- Russian forces conducted offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast and did not make any confirmed or claimed gains.
- Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and reportedly advanced in the Orikhiv area.
- Russian officials continue to highlight the claimed successes of the Russian defense industrial base (DIB).
- Ukrainian officials continue to reveal the involvement of Belarusian entities in the forced deportation of Ukrainian children.
understandingwar.org/...
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian and Ukrainian forces reportedly continued limited fighting northeast of Kupyansk, where Russian forces reportedly advanced on July 24. … Russian sources claimed that Russian forces advanced during offensive operations in the Svatove area on July 24…. ] ISW has not yet observed any visual confirmation of Russian advances in this area, and these Russian claims may be part of a broader effort to exaggerate claimed gains in the area.[36] ...Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted limited counterattacks in the Svatove area and did not advance. on July 24. A Russian source claimed that the Russian 21st Guards Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) repelled Ukrainian counterattacks west of Karmazynivka.[38]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks around Bakhmut and did not advance on July 24. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks northwest of Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut), near Bohdanivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), south of Ivanivske (6km west of Bakhmut), and west of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[44] ...Footage published on July 24 purportedly shows elements of the “Sever-Z” Brigade (the 200th Motorized Rifle Brigade, 14th Army Corps, Northern Fleet) assaulting Ukrainian positions near Bakhmut.[46] Ukrainian forces conducted counteroffensive operations north and south of Bakhmut and reportedly advanced as of July 24. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian forces have liberated four square kilometers in the Bakhmut direction in the past week and that Ukrainian forces continue to advance slowly but confidently.[47]
Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 24 and reportedly advanced in the Orikhiv area….Geolocated footage posted on July 23 shows elements of the Russian 810th Naval Infantry Brigade (Black Sea Fleet) and 291st Motorized Rifle Regiment (42nd Motorized Rifle Division, 58th Combined Arms Army, Southern Military District) repelling Ukrainian attacks northeast of Robotyne.[59] Malyar also reported that Ukrainian forces conducted successful offensive operations southeast of Orikhiv along the Novodanylivka—Verbove and Mala Tokmachka — Verbove lines and south of Orikhiv along the Novodanylivka—Robotyne line.[60] Russian sources claimed that the situation remains unchanged near Pyatykhatky (about 25km southwest of Orikhiv).[61]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in western Donetsk Oblast on July 24 but did not make any confirmed gains. Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar reported that Ukrainian troops have had success in unspecified sectors along the Novodarivka—Pryyutne and Novosilka—Staromayorske lines south of Velyka Novosilka.[53] ...Russian forces conducted limited ground attacks to regain lost positions in western Donetsk Oblast on July 24 but did not make any claimed or confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian troops repelled Russian attacks near Rivnopil (10km southwest of Velyka Novosilka) and Pryyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[55] Russian sources amplified various reports that elements of the 36th Combined Arms Army (Eastern Military District) and 14th Separate Guards Special Purpose Brigade (Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces [GRU]) are among the Russian formations fighting in this area.[56]
2/ Gerasimov, who we assume retains overall command of the Russian 'special military operation' in #Ukraine, is implementing a defensive strategy. But concurrently he is conducting offensive activities at the tactical and operation levels.
3/ Before we explore Gerasimov’s defensive strategy, let’s review the range of options that were open to him once #Ukraine began its 2023 offensives.
4/ Option 1: Hang Tough. Gerasimov’s first option was to hang tough for the time being and observe the development of the initial phase of the Ukrainian offensive. As such, Gerasimov probably wanted to wait for as long as possible as see where the Ukrainian main effort would be.
5/ Option 2: Hang Tough (plus). Gerasimov’s next option was a variation on Option 1, but with limited offensive jabs at Ukrainian weak spots to hasten any Ukrainian culmination.
6/ Option 3: Reorient the Defence. Perhaps the most politically difficult – but militarily effective – would have been a reorientation of the Russian defence around Crimea and the Donbas. This would mean Russia giving up most of the territory illegally seized since February 2022.
7/ It has become apparent that Gerasimov has decided on Option 2. His main effort is clearly holding onto ground in southern Ukraine, from Donetsk all the way west into Kherson. Gerasimov has several supporting efforts however.
8/ One is the ongoing series of drone and missile strikes against Ukrainian civilian targets. Recently, this has included strikes against civil targets in #Odesa. Another supporting effort is the defensive efforts in eastern Ukraine around Bakhmut.
9/ While in an overall defensive posture, Gerasimov has also launched attacks in north-eastern Ukraine and in Donetsk. Russia has attacked along the Svatove-Kreminna axis, but as the two maps below from 4 June and 23 July show, Russian progress on this axis has been limited.
10/ While we are yet to see a large part of Ukraine’s combat power committed, Gerasimov has now had over seven weeks to observe and learn from the Ukrainian armed forces and the conduct of their attacks in the south and the east of Ukraine.
11/ As such, what observations might Gerasimov have taken from the first weeks of Ukrainian offensive operations?
12/ 1st, Gerasimov will be reassured that the efforts to develop the defensive positions in southern Ukraine are paying off. Gerasimov probably feels this has given him breathing space to preserve his combat power, while absorbing Ukrainian attacks & degrading Ukrainian forces.
13/ The Ukrainians are making slow progress in the south. There have been some challenges however. Observations by @HoansSolo and @KofmanMichael, in the wake of their recent visit to Ukraine, are worth reading and reflecting upon.
14/ 2nd, Gerasimov will be watching the correlation of forces in the south carefully. While the Russian forces in the south are relatively fresh, the Ukrainians are extracting a significant toll on them.
15/ One area of focus for the Ukrainians is degrading the Russian recon-strike complex, particularly and artillery. Earlier in the war the Russians had a significant advantage in numbers of artillery systems, and them ammunition for them.
16/ But this advantage has been reduced through provision of western towed, self-propelled and rocket artillery systems, as well as supply of Western precision munitions and DPICMs. Gerasimov will be watching this battle of artillery systems in the coming weeks.
17/ 3rd, Gerasimov will be seeking ways to exacerbate the challenges that Ukrainian forces experience in fighting their way through the Russian southern defensive scheme. He probably believes he can win an attritional fight.
18/ 4th, Gerasimov will probably be thinking about options for Russian operations once the Ukrainian offensives have reached their culmination point. His assumption (and hope) will be that Ukraine won’t make a major breakthrough in the south and the east.
19/ Gerasimov still has many challenges. He must deal with high level military #strategy, coordination of Russian military operations, and provide the politico-military interface between the Russian military & Putin. He is also dealing with the aftermath of the Prigozhin mutiny.
20/ A great survivor despite Russian defeats in Ukraine, Gerasimov is likely to continue & evolve his current defensive strategy. The Russian commander will be hoping his plan will result in #Ukraine culminating before they can break through the Russian defences in the south.
21/ Given the length of the front line, the size of respective forces in the field, and the determination of both sides to achieve their objectives, both the Ukrainians and the Russians will have prepared themselves for a long campaign over the northern summer and autumn.
22/ Both sides, after their initial experiences in this Ukrainian 2023 counter offensive, appear to have taken stock, learned, adapted and put their heads down for the long haul of military operations ahead. End.
23/ You can read a more detailed assessment on this topic at my latest post at Futura Doctrina.
24/ Thank you to the following, whose images and links were used in this thread: @DefenceU @DefenceHQ @ZelenskyyUa @michaelh992 @Ercin_Erturk @TheStudyofWar @criticalthreats @combined2forces @bradyafr @WarOnTheRocks @HoansSolo @KofmanMichael @RALee85
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