Following the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the legacy of Nestor Makhno and the Makhnovshchina was again taken up by Ukrainian anti-authoritarians that joined the Territorial Defense Forces (TDF).[342][343] Symbols of the Makhnovshchina have appeared in the propaganda of the Resistance Committee, an anarchist detachment in the TDF,[344] on the patches of a Ukrainian armed unit of green anarchists,[326] and on flags flown on the back of modern-day tachankas.[345] The Ukrainian Armed Forces also adopted the name "Makhno's bow" (Ukrainian: Махновський лук) for their defense forces engaged in the battle of Huliaipole, which has occupied a key place in the line of contact between Ukrainian and Russian-occupied Zaporizhzhia.[326][346] A museum exhibition on Makhno was damaged during the Russian shelling of Huliaipole, while his statue in the town centre is covered with sandbags in order to protect it.[347]
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Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations near Svatove on July 31 and made unconfirmed gains. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian troops conducted unsuccessful offensive operations east of Berestove (20km northwest of Svatove) and near Novoselivske (14km northwest of Svatove).[30] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Russian forces attempted to advance south of Novoselivske and push Ukrainian troops across the Oskil River, which runs west of Svatove.[31] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Russian forces took up more advantageous positions near Kuzemivka (13km northwest of Svatove).[32]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Ukrainian forces continued counteroffensive operations near Bakhmut on July 31 and did not make any confirmed or claimed gains. ...Russian sources indicated that elements of the 11st Guards Air Assault (VDV) Brigade and 4th Luhansk People’s Republic (LNR) Brigade are fighting in the Bakhmut area.[41]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations along the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area and reportedly made marginal advances on July 31. The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) and other Russian sources reported that Russian forces, including the 247th Airborne (VDV) Division, repelled Ukrainian ground attacks near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[44]
Kremlin-appointed Children’s Rights Commissioner Maria Lvova-Belova confirmed on July 31 that Russia has transferred 4.8 million Ukrainians, including over 700,000 children, to the Russian Federation since the beginning of the war.[20] In a report on the activities “authorized by the President of the Russian Federation for children’s rights” in 2022, Lvova-Belova claimed that Russia has “received” 4.8 million Ukrainians since February 2022 and noted that the vast majority of the 700,000 children who arrived to Russia did not have parental or guardian supervision.[21] The report carefully frames these activities as humanitarian gestures of goodwill. International humanitarian law, however, defines the forced transfer of civilians to the territory of an occupying power as “deportation.” And the circumstances of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the situation in occupied territories are likely sufficiently coercive to mean that most “transfers” of Ukrainian civilians to Russia meet the threshold of forced deportation, which is prohibited under Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, regardless of Russia’s claimed motive.[22] ISW continues to assess that Russian authorities are conducting a large-scale campaign to deport Ukrainians to the Russian Federation.[23]
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Imagery posted on July 30 and 31 visually confirms damage to the Chonhar Bridge following a Ukrainian strike on July 29. Satellite imagery posted on July 30 reportedly shows damage to the Chonhar railway bridge.[16] Social media sources additionally circulated an image taken by someone standing on the bridge itself reportedly showing damage to the railway bridge.[17] One source speculated that the pictures taken from the bridge do not match the location of the damage as shown on available satellite imagery, which suggests that the full extent of the damage to the bridge is still unclear.[18] Russian milbloggers maintained their silence on damage to the Chonhar Bridge on July 31, possibly supporting ISW’s previous assessment that the Kremlin may have directed Russian commentators to refrain from covering the strike in an effort to exert greater control of the information space.[19]
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