Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted counteroffensive operations in five sectors of the front on July 5 and made gains in some areas.
Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted counteroffensive operations in five sectors of the front on July 5 and made gains in some areas. Geolocated footage posted on July 5 shows that Ukrainian forces have advanced southwest of Berkhivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), west of Yahidne (2km north of Bakhmut), and southwest of Bakhmut.[1] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations south and north of Bakhmut, and Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces are advancing in an unspecified area on Bakhmut’s southern flank.[2] Ukrainian MP Yuriy Mysyagin stated that Ukrainian forces established a new position north of Opytne (6km northwest of the outskirts of Donetsk City) along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front.[3] Russian sources claimed that Ukrainian forces conducted assaults in the Lyman direction, the Bakhmut direction, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City front, on the border between Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[4] Ukrainian Deputy Chief of the Main Operational Department of the General Staff General Oleksii Hromov reported on July 5 that Ukrainian forces have advanced 7.5km into Russian-controlled territory in western Zaporizhia Oblast and along the administrative border between the Zaporizhia and Donetsk oblasts.[5] Hromov stated that Ukrainian forces have liberated nine settlements and 160 square kilometers of territory since the start of the Ukrainian counteroffensive on June 4.[6]
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The U.S. Intelligence Community has no doubt been constantly assessing the most important question for national security decision-makers in the aftermath of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s June 24 attempted mutiny against the Russian military — namely, how will the fallout from the revolt, however temporary, change Russia’s threat to the West? Is it greater or less?
The determining factors in approaching that question include the U.S. government’s ability to forecast Russia’s stability and predictability, which clearly is diminished coming out of this episode, owing to President Vladimir Putin’s weakened position. Most importantly, Putin’s image of being all-knowing and all-powerful, which facilitates his more than two decades of one-man rule, has been compromised. He is likely to have sustained a loss in confidence — and fear — among those within the institutions on which he depends: the military, the intelligence apparatus, and the security services. He can’t spin this to regain the status quo of the conditions with which he once ruled — absolute and unquestioned authority based on the expected repercussions of doing otherwise.
Putin now has choices to make, and for the moment, he appears to be seeking an illusory middle ground with half measures. He waited too long to address Prigozhin’s threat, in part probably because he believed the Wagner leader’s behavior and contributions served his own interests, and in part because he might have feared too heavy-handed an approach could backfire.
The result will be less-reliable Russian national security institutions, regardless of what Putin does now. And that atmosphere will make him — and Russia — less predictable, and complicate the task of anticipating near-term, over-the-horizon, and wild-card threats. Those threats might come from among the desperate, motivated by fear, or from the opportunists who see his vulnerability, and/or it may come from the dangers in how Putin responds to either. Insiders might have reevaluated their greater odds to succeed — or at least their survivability — by moving, or joining a move, against him.
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- Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted counteroffensive operations in five sectors of the front on July 5 and made gains in some areas.
- Ukrainian forces reportedly conducted a series of missile strikes targeting Russian rear positions along the entire front overnight and during the day on July 5.
- Ukrainian and Russian officials maintained their heightened rhetoric regarding the situation at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) on July 5 following significant claims of a possible attack against the plant overnight on July 4-5.[35] Russia likely continues setting informational conditions for a possible false flag attack against the ZNPP, but remains unlikely to cause a radiological incident at this time.
- Ukrainian officials reported that Russia continues to procure Iranian-made Shahed drones and is setting conditions to manufacture these drones in Russia with Iran’s assistance.
- The Kremlin continues to show concern over the risk of a potential armed rebellion in Russia after Wagner Group’s rebellion on June 24.
- The Financial Times (FT) reported that Chinese President Xi Jinping personally warned Russian President Vladimir Putin against threatening to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine during his visit to Moscow in late March.
- Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin dismissed Sergei Mikhailov from his position as General Director of TASS state newswire and replaced him with Andrey Kondrashov.
- Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line, and Russian and Ukrainian forces continued skirmishing around Kreminna.
- Ukrainian forces conducted successful offensive operations in the Bakhmut area, and Russian milbloggers reported that Ukrainian forces liberated an important height near Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).
- Russian and Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line.
- Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks in the western Donetsk Oblast-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
- A Ukrainian official confirmed that Ukrainian forces maintain positions in east (left) bank Kherson Oblast.
- Ukrainian officials reported that Russia’s hybrid cryptomobilization and contract service recruitment campaigns have failed to produce large numbers of recruits, contrary to Russian claims.
- Russian officials are setting information conditions to postpone regional elections in occupied Ukraine likely out of concerns for successful Ukrainian counteroffensives.
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Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove line on July 5. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian assaults south of Novoselivske (15km northwest of Svatove), west of Novovodyane (17km southwest of Svatove), and on Novoyehorivka (16km southwest of Svatove).[36] A Kremlin-affiliated source claimed that Russian forces cleared a depot and an industrial zone in the southwestern part of Novoselivske and established positions on two unspecified streets in the settlement.[37] The source claimed that Russian forces are continuing to fight for control over Novoselivske. Geolocated footage published on July 5 shows Ukrainian forces striking Russian forces just north of Novoselivske along the N26 highway.[38] Another Kremlin-affiliated source claimed that Russian forces attacked the Novoselivske and Novovodyane areas.[39]
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Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian Objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Ukrainian forces conducted successful offensive operations in the Bakhmut area on July 5. Geolocated footage posted on July 5 shows that Ukrainian forces have advanced southwest of Berkhivka (6km northwest of Bakhmut), west of Yahidne (2km north of Bakhmut), and southwest of Bakhmut.[45] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces repelled Russian attacks near Bohdanivka (5km northwest of Bakhmut), Orikhovo-Vasylivka (11km northwest of Bakhmut), and south of Berkhivka.[46] The General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continue to conduct offensive operations to the north and south of Bakhmut City and have entrenched themselves in new positions.[47] Ukrainian Ground Forces Commander Colonel General Oleksandr Syrskyi stated that Ukrainian forces are storming Russian positions on the northern approaches of Bakhmut and have recaptured unspecified areas.[48] Ukrainian Deputy Defense Minister Hanna Malyar stated that Ukrainian forces are advancing in an unspecified area on Bakhmut‘s southern flank and that it is difficult for Russian forces to maneuver within Bakhmut.[49]
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Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Russian and Ukrainian forces did not conduct any confirmed ground attacks in western Donetsk Oblast on July 5. Footage posted on July 4 shows elements of the Russian 155th Naval Infantry Brigade (Pacific Fleet) and 39th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (68th Army Corps, Eastern Military District) storming Ukrainian positions near Mykilske (3km southeast of Vuhledar).[66] ISW has recently observed artillery elements of the 39th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade operating on the western outskirts of Donetsk City near Marinka.[67]
Ukrainian forces continued ground attacks in the western Donetsk Oblast-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area on July 5. The Russian MoD claimed that Russian forces repelled small Ukrainian ground attacks near Staromaiorske and Urozhaine (both about 8km south of Velyka Novosilka).[68] … Ukrainian officials acknowledged continued Ukrainian counteroffensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia oblasts border area.[70] Geolocated footage dated July 3 shows burning Russian armor north of Pryyutne; it is unclear whether Ukrainian forces hold the village, however.[71]
Ukrainian forces continued to conduct ground attacks in western Zaporizhia Oblast on July 5. The Russian MoD claimed on July 5 that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian ground attack near Zherebyanky (26km southwest of Orikhiv).[72] Russian sources continued to claim that small Ukrainian assault groups attacked Robotyne, Nesteryanka, and Kopani (all within 7-12km south of Orikhiv).[73] Former Russian officer and ardent nationalist Igor Girkin claimed that Ukrainian forces continued attacks but did not advance in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[74] Geolocated footage shows that Russian forces have advanced to positions immediately south of Pyatykhatky (25km southwest of Orikhiv) as of July 4.[75]
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