Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made some advances on September 1.
Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made some advances on September 1. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations south of Bakhmut, and geolocated footage shows that Ukrainian forces marginally advanced northwest of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[20] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces achieved unspecified success in the Novodanylivka-Novopokropivka direction (5km to 13km south of Orikhiv) in western Zaporizhia Oblast.[21] Russian sources claimed that Russian forces repelled Ukrainian attacks near Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) and Verbove (18km southeast of Orikhiv), however.[22] US National Security Council Spokesperson John Kirby stated on July 1 that the US has observed notable Ukrainian progress in the “Zaporizhia area” (likely meaning the western Zaporizhia Oblast direction) in the past 72 hours and that Ukrainian forces have achieved some success against the “second line of Russian defenses” in southern Ukraine.[23] Kirby also stated that anonymous US officials’ criticisms of the progress of the Ukrainian counteroffensive are unhelpful.[24]
Russian “Vostok” Battalion commander Alexander Khodakovsky continues to highlight the impact of the lack of Russian counter-battery capabilities on Russian morale in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area. Khodakovsky claimed on September 1 that Russian forces continue to suffer from a lack of counter-battery capabilities in the Novomayorske-Novodonetske-Kermenchyk area (12km to 18km southeast of Velyka Novosilka), where Khodakovsky and the “Vostok” Battalion are reportedly defending.[15] Khodakovsky insinuated that Russian forces are experiencing extreme physical and psychological stress in this area due to constant Ukrainian artillery fire and the Russian inability to return fire.[16] Khodakovsky expressed concerns about whether distressed and exhausted Russian forces will be able to defend against a future Ukrainian offensive in this sector of the front.[17]
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- Ukrainian Main Military Intelligence (GUR) Head Kyrylo Budanov reported that the Russian military deployed elements of a newly created “reserve army” (the 25th CAA) to enable units currently on the frontline in Luhansk Oblast to laterally redeploy to defend against the Ukrainian counteroffensive in southern Ukraine.
- The 25th Combined Arms Army is unlikely to be combat effective at scale given its rushed deployment, ahead of a previously reported intended deployment date of December 2023.
- Additional Russian lateral redeployments and the immediate commitment of intended operational reserves suggest that short term reinforcement needs are impeding intended long-term reconstitution efforts.
- Russian “Vostok” Battalion commander Alexander Khodakovsky continues to highlight the impact of the lack of Russian counter-battery capabilities on Russian morale in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area.
- Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut and in western Zaporizhia Oblast and made some advances on September 1.
- Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not make any confirmed gains.
- Russian occupation officials announced on September 1 that voting began for the Russian regional elections held in occupied Ukraine and will continue in various forms through September 10.
- Russian officials continue efforts to forcibly indoctrinate Ukrainian youth into Russian culture and identity by integrating schools in occupied Ukraine into the Russian educational system.
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Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued limited offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on September 1 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Russian forces conducted unsuccessful offensive actions near Novoselivske (15km northwest of Svatove) and Novoyehorivka (16km southwest of Svatove).[38] Russian Western Grouping of Forces Press Officer Yaroslav Yakimkin claimed on September 1 that Russian forces continued offensive operations in the Kupyansk direction and captured an unspecified Ukrainian stronghold.[39] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that elements of the Russian Western Grouping of Forces captured several unspecified Ukrainian strongholds and key heights in the Kupyansk direction between August 25 and September 1.[40] Russian sources claimed on September 1 that Russian forces continued to make unspecified gains near Synkivka (9km northeast of Kupyansk), Petropavlivka (7km east of Kupyansk), and Vilshana (14km northeast of Kupyansk), although ISW has not observed visual confirmation of these claims.[41]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations near Bakhmut on September 1 and made marginal advances south of Bakhmut. Geolocated footage published on September 1 indicates that Ukrainian forces made marginal advances northwest of Klishchiivka (7km southwest of Bakhmut).[48] The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations south of Bakhmut.[49] The Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD) claimed that Ukrainian forces repeatedly unsuccessfully attacked near Klishchiivka and Malynivka (24km northwest of Bakhmut) over the last week.[50]
Ukrainian forces reportedly continued offensive operations in the Donetsk-Zaporizhia Oblast border area but did not advance on September 1. Russian Eastern Grouping of Forces Spokesperson Oleg Chekov claimed that Russian forces repelled a Ukrainian attack in the direction of Pryyutne (15km southwest of Velyka Novosilka).[60] Other Russian sources claimed that small Ukrainian groups attacked in the direction of Staromlynivka (14km south of Velyka Novosilka) and that Ukrainian forces are conducting offensive operations near Staromayorske (9km south of Velyka Novosilka).[61] Russian “Vostok” Battalion Commander Alexander Khodakovsky expressed frustration with the inadequacy of Russian counterbattery fire near Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka) and along the Novomayorske-Novodonetske-Kermenchyk line (12-18km southeast of Velyka Novosilka), claiming that Russian artillery in the area takes several days to strike Ukrainian positions whereas Ukrainian forces do not suffer such constraints.[62] Khodakovsky claimed that Russian forces defending in the area are under extreme physical and psychological stress and warned that this stress will impact Russian forces’ defensive ability in the area.[63]
An FBI agent says Giuliani was compromised by Russians. According to this new whistleblower and various US intelligence findings, Giuliani apparently was a dupe—a useful idiot—for suspected Russian operatives and propagandists.
Giuliani’s efforts in Ukraine placed him in contact with several Ukrainians since sanctioned for allegedly assisting Russian disinformation efforts. The most prominent was Andriy Derkach, the son of a former KGB officer and then a Ukrainian legislator, who supplied Giuliani with unsubstantiated information about the Bidens’ supposed activities in Ukraine.
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