Russian and Ukrainian sources credited superior Ukrainian combat coordination, more precise artillery fire, and stronger electronic warfare (EW) systems for recent Ukrainian advances south of Bakhmut amid continued discussions of significant Russian losses in the area.
Ukrainian personnel that participated in the recent liberation of Klishchiivka (7km southeast of Bakhmut) stated on September 18 that high morale, sufficient training, sufficient resources for artillery fire and drone strikes, good coherence between Ukrainian units, and detailed reconnaissance enabled Ukrainian forces to advance.[8] One Ukrainian commander stated that elements of various Russian units defending in the area suffered from a lack of coherence.[9] Russian Airborne (VDV), Spetsnaz, and 3rd Army Corps elements defended near Klishchiivka; and persistent issues with horizontal integration among Russian forces in Ukraine likely prevented these disparate Russian elements from sharing information and coordinating combat operations.[10]
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- The Russian government quickly signaled on September 19 that Russian peacekeeping forces would not intervene in Azerbaijan’s military operation into Nagorno-Karabakh, despite Russia’s previous security ties to Armenia.
- Russian and Ukrainian sources credited superior Ukrainian combat coordination, more precise artillery fire, and stronger electronic warfare (EW) systems for recent Ukrainian advances south of Bakhmut amid continued discussions of significant Russian losses in the area.
- Russian losses have reportedly significantly increased in western Zaporizhia Oblast in recent days, and the Russian military likely struggles with a lack of available combat effective units that the Russian command is willing to laterally redeploy to this sector of the front.
- Russian forces conducted a series of Shahed-131/-136 drone and ballistic missile strikes on Ukrainian rear areas on September 19.
- Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu met with Iranian Armed Forces General Staff Chief Major General Mohammad Bagheri in Tehran, Iran on September 19.
- Russian forces conducted offensive operations along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line, near Bakhmut, along the Avdiivka-Donetsk City line, and in western Zaporizhia Oblast but did not advance on September 19.
- Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in at least two sectors of the front on September 19 and advanced along the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line and in western Zaporizhia Oblast.
- A Latvian company has reportedly been exporting chips and microcircuits to Russian defense industrial base (DIB) companies despite international sanctions designed to prevent Russia from importing such components.
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Evidence has emerged in russian government documents to confirm Ukrainian reports of russia's staggering losses in the war, which now stand at 273,460 killed russia's labour and social development ministry has ordered 259,493 death certificates since the all-out war's start, according to tender documents discovered by independent russia media Verstka The discrepancy with Ukraine's higher figure can be accounted for by the fact that until June, russia only provided death certificates to families of deceased regular army personnel About 20,000 Wagner mercenaries are thought to have been killed in the war - virtually all in fighting before June "The numbers may indirectly indicate the approximate scale of the russian group participating in the battles and losses," Verstka reports The same ministry also ordered over 936,000 combat veteran certificates - a figure that coincides with Ukrainian and other figures for the number of starting and newly recruited troops russia has deployed to Ukraine since Feb. 24, 2022 An amalgam of Ukrainian, Western and independent russian data suggests... About 2.4 russian troops are wounded for each soldier killed in the war (a rate much lower, for example, than the U.S. WWII wounded-to-killed rate of 4-to-1 - owing to poor russian combat medicine) 60% of russian wounded - or about This leaves just over 400,000 russian troops deployed in Ukraine - almost perfectly coinciding with Ukrainian figures
Russian losses have reportedly significantly increased in western Zaporizhia Oblast in recent days, and the Russian military likely struggles with a lack of available combat-effective units that the Russian command is willing to laterally redeploy to this sector of the front. Ukrainian Tavriisk Group of Forces Spokesperson Colonel Oleksandr Shtupun stated that Russian forces lost 313 personnel (likely a total of killed and wounded) in the Tavriisk direction on September 18, including western Zaporizhia Oblast. Shtupun stated that this is significantly higher than Russian losses during the previous two days when Russian forces lost roughly 200 personnel each day.[17] Shtupun stated that Russian Airborne (VDV) forces are conducting defensive operations in the Tavriisk direction (likely in western Zaporizhia Oblast) and that “Storm-Z” detachments with convict recruits have arrived to act as “cover” for VDV units, possibly referring to the need to cover the VDV units during a potential withdrawal.[18] ISW has previously observed elements of the 7th Guards Mountain VDV Division and 76th Guards VDV Division conducting counterattacks against Ukrainian forces in the Robotyne (10km south of Orikhiv) area, and ISW has previously assessed that these operations have likely degraded these VDV forces heavily.[19] “Storm-Z” detachments are often combat ineffective and will likely provide the Russian defense in western Zaporizhia Oblast with marginal combat power.
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #1 – Luhansk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the remainder of Luhansk Oblast and push westward into eastern Kharkiv Oblast and northern Donetsk Oblast)
Russian forces continued offensive operations on the Kupyansk-Svatove-Kreminna line on September 19 but did not make any confirmed gains. Russian milbloggers claimed that Russian forces continued ground attacks west of Kreminna, in the direction of Torske (17km west of Kreminna), in the Serebryanske forest area (11km south of Kreminna), near Bilohorivka (13km south of Kreminna), and near Spirne (25km south of Kreminna).[30] ...The Ukrainian Ministry of Internal Affairs reported that a Russian airstrike destroyed the bridge across the Oskil River in Kupyansk, likely in an effort to hinder Ukrainian supply efforts across the river.[32] Ukrainian forces maintain control of a number of other bridges across the Oskil, however. Geolocated footage posted on September 17 and 19 shows an element of the Russian 15th Motorized Rifle Brigade (2nd Combined Arms Army, Central Military District) operating near Raihorodka (12km southwest of Svatove) and Nadiya (15km west of Svatove).[33]
Russian Subordinate Main Effort #2 – Donetsk Oblast (Russian objective: Capture the entirety of Donetsk Oblast, the claimed territory of Russia’s proxies in Donbas)
Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations in the Bakhmut area on September 19 but did not make any confirmed advances. The Ukrainian General Staff reported that Ukrainian forces continue assaults south of Bakhmut and are inflicting significant manpower and equipment losses on Russian forces.[36]
Russian Supporting Effort – Southern Axis (Russian objective: Maintain frontline positions and secure rear areas against Ukrainian strikes)
Ukrainian forces conducted offensive operations in the western Donetsk-eastern Zaporizhia Oblast border area but did not advance on September 19. Russian sources, including the Russian Ministry of Defense (MoD), claimed that Ukrainian forces unsuccessfully attacked near Staromayorske (9km south of Veylka Novosilka), Urozhaine (9km south of Velyka Novosilka), Novodonetske (12km southeast of Velyka Novosilka), and Novomayorske (18km southeast of Velyka Novosilka).[46]
“The Russian Air Force has substantially revised its tactics in Ukraine and is holding down its losses by carrying out less effective bombing runs, Gen. James B. Hecker, the commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe-Air Forces Africa said Sept. 13.”
Starting this month, all high school students in Russia have a new history textbook. On its pages, they’ll find a strikingly simplistic account of the past 80 years — from the end of World War II to the present — that all but comes with the Kremlin’s signature.
Revisionism doesn’t begin to cover it. Stalin, in contrast to the standard depiction in Russian textbooks over the past 30 years, is presented as a wise and effective leader thanks to whom the Soviet Union won the war and ordinary people began to live much better. Repressions are mentioned, but in an accusatory way. The reader is left with the feeling that Stalin’s victims were guilty and suffered a well-deserved punishment.
The telling of the end of the Soviet Union is similarly distorted. Previous textbooks analyzed the collapse of the Soviet system and the inefficiency of the planned economy, writing about the arms race and the irrationality of the elderly Soviet leaders. The new tome blames everything on Mikhail Gorbachev, castigating him as an incompetent bureaucrat who succumbed to pressure from the United States. Then there’s the 28 pages on the war in Ukraine. They contain, of course, no history and only outright propaganda — a set of clichés recycled from Russian television.
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